Despite growing criticism, airstrikes against terrorist networks in Africa have come to define U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the continent.
Though airstrikes alone cannot obliterate terrorist groups and effectively combating violent extremism requires a comprehensive strategy, airstrikes, when used selectively and judiciously, can contribute to the fight against terrorism and enable achievements on the ground.
First, airstrikes deter terrorists; second, even if temporarily, they disrupt the command-and-control capacities of the groups; third, in many countries, they serve as crucial close air support for local armies, saving the lives of hundreds of soldiers.
Civilian deaths in airstrikes can directly feed into propaganda narratives by terrorist groups, potentially mobilizing new fighters and resources.

Kinetic action continues to play a defining role in countries’ counterterrorism strategies in Africa, even in the face of mounting criticism due to civilian deaths. From the Sahel to the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia, an increasing number of airstrikes are conducted to counter the terrorist threat on the African continent, the global epicenter of terrorism-related deaths. The Trump administration conducted more strikes in Somalia than the Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations combined, with 126 strikes in 2025 alone. The U.S. is not the only country that continues to wage counterterrorism campaigns from the air: with the deployment of three F-16 jets in Mogadishu, Türkiye also increased its kinetic operations against al-Shabaab, while Sahelian armies and their Russian supporters depend upon drones and aircraft to neutralize terrorists and insurgents. The proliferation of drone technologies has also influenced terrorist groups, which successfully use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to target their enemies.

The two most important criticisms leveled at the use of airstrikes are that they are not effective in dismantling terrorist organizations, and that the collateral damage they cause can actually contribute to the strengthening of violent extremist groups. Civilian deaths in airstrikes can radicalize individuals with no prior affiliation with the targeted terrorist group— though this can be said about other counterterrorism measures as well. Considering recent airstrikes against terrorists in Africa, experts have argued that the killing of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki in Nigeria does not affect the general structure and survival of the organization. The same argument was made in 2019 about U.S. airstrikes in Somalia against Al-Shabaab, which, according to Kenyan scholar and human rights advocate Shadrack Gutto, could not address the goals of the belligerents and bring peace to the country.

The limited effect of airstrikes in counterterrorism campaigns is true in many aspects. Combating violent extremism in Africa requires a more comprehensive strategy; airstrikes eliminating training camps and high-value targets — including senior commanders — alone cannot obliterate terrorist groups. Yet, in some cases, airstrikes can act as a deterrent for terrorist groups, beyond just the threat to high-level leadership. The intensification of aerial operations undermines the notion that even low-ranking members are safe far from the battlefield. In Somalia, the decision of the first and second Trump administrations to ease the rules of engagement extended airstrikes from key and senior commanders to mid- and low-ranking fighters. While previously lower-ranking members of terrorist organizations were relatively safe from drone strikes, the increase in U.S. operations — and the growing presence of Turkish, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and UAE drones and combat aircraft — meant a missile could reach anyone, anywhere.

This paradigm shift forced al-Shabaab to switch to new operational techniques, avoiding large gatherings of senior leaders and implementing tighter regulations for group communications. In Nigeria, a surprise U.S. airstrike on December 26, 2025, which hit alleged Islamic State–Sahel/Lakurawa camps in the northwest, also changed the landscape. According to local sources contacted by the author of this IntelBrief, terrorist fighters who had previously felt safe from airstrikes were shocked into fleeing toward the north to avoid new attacks. Of course, neither example demonstrates a full defeat of terrorist groups, but these cases demonstrate how airstrikes can weaken groups’ coherence and operational capacities — at least for a time.

In recent years, foreign aircraft and drones have started to operate as the air forces of states with limited capacities. In Somalia, Niger, or Mali, American, French, Russian, Turkish, and other planes and UAVs filled the capability gap and provided essential close air support (CAS) for troops under attack, bombing locations where terrorist groups tried to gather their troops before more major attacks. In the last decade, violent extremist groups shifted to conventional tactics, attacking and, in many cases, overrunning dozens of military bases across Africa by mobilizing hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of troops. Because many countries lack the infrastructure and resources to rush ground reinforcements to protect remote areas, the most reliable option for many counterterrorism forces is access to close air support, which can destroy attacking forces from above. In these cases, airplanes, drones, and helicopters can provide the necessary firepower to stop mass infantry attacks and eliminate their key component, Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs).

However, in analyzing recent engagements, it appears that airpower is much more effective in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin than in the Western Sahel. The reason for this is not exclusively the availability of military equipment but also the size of the area of operation: during Operation Hilaac and the fights around Mogadishu and Benadir in early 2025, drones and jets were deployed relatively close to the battlefield, where the epicenter of operations covered only a few hundred square kilometers. On the other hand, in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border area, the Liptako Gourma region covers more than 500,000 square kilometers. Terrorist groups move relatively fast and freely on this vast terrain, launching attacks sometimes from a distance of hundreds of kilometers. Under these circumstances, airpower has a very narrow time gap to be deployed. This is one of the main reasons why air strikes happen not during, but after a terrorist attack to at least mitigate the consequences and destroy surviving military assets before they are utilized by extremists. But if the operational area is more limited — as was the case when Russian military and helicopters accompanied fuel convoys to Bamako — airpower can serve as a useful tool in the Sahel.

Airstrikes have serious disadvantages as well. First, maintaining constant and effective striking capabilities places a heavy financial burden on the deployed troops. Second, in the long run, it is almost impossible to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. In recent years, both the United States and Türkiye have been blamed for killing civilians in airstrikes in Somalia. Such losses of innocent lives can be easily utilized for propaganda by terrorist groups, mobilizing new fighters and resources. Overreliance on air power as a can also discourage investment in proper fortification of military bases, mobile quick-reaction forces, and infrastructure, such as road-clearing capacity.

Because multiple African countries must counter terrorist groups with thousands of fighters, it is difficult to imagine counterterrorism operations without the incorporation of occasional, selective air strikes. Airpower alone killed hundreds of terrorists in Africa while protecting both soldiers and civilians who otherwise would have been killed, such as by Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) in a crowded city center. While serving as an instrument in governments’ toolboxes, airpower can help shape effective counterterrorism strategies, but alone cannot destroy extremist organizations.