A combined military offensive over the weekend, featuring forces from al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a secessionist group in northern Mali, threatened to topple the ruling military junta in the capital of Bamako.
The entire episode comes as an embarrassment for Russia and its Africa Corps fighters, who replaced mercenaries from the Wagner Group, which has failed at force protection, but also in beating back a growing JNIM-led insurgency throughout the country.
Having such a large country under the control of a terrorist group will set off alarm bells from Washington to Paris, yet both the United States and France are not postured to respond to the growing instability throughout the Sahel.
JNIM’s tactical evolution over the years has seen it develop from a terrorist group concentrated in rural areas to an insurgent-like force capable of waging complex urban operations while also implementing a strategy of economic warfare.

A combined military offensive over the weekend, featuring forces from al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a secessionist group comprised of Tuareg and Arab tribes in northern Mali, threatened to topple the ruling military junta in the capital of Bamako. The attack unfolded throughout the country and was highly coordinated, as insurgents and their counterparts launched ambushes and combined conventional and unconventional military tactics, including the use of kamikaze drones, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), RPGs, small arms and light weapons, and artillery. Bamako, Kidal in northern Mali, Mopti in the central part of the country, and military bases in Gao, Sevaré, and Kati, where the Malian military’s command center is located, all came under intense assault. In Gao, Malian troops and Russian forces were confined to former UN bases. A number of Sahel experts called the combined and coordinated attack “unprecedented” and suggested that JNIM might be capable of deposing the ruling regime. JNIM fighters operated with impunity and did not seem concerned with retribution from the Malian military or Russian mercenaries.

The entire episode comes as an embarrassment for Russia and its Africa Corps fighters, who replaced mercenaries from the Wagner Group. Sadio Camara, Mali’s Defense Minister, was killed in an attack, even as he was supposed to be under the protection of the Africa Corps, which has failed at force protection, but also in beating back a growing JNIM-led insurgency throughout the country. Malian junta General Assimi Goita’s whereabouts are also unknown, and there have been some reports that Modibo Koné, another junta leader, has been killed. Goita swept to power back in 2021, although the country writ large has been dealing with a low-level insurgency for well over a decade. Before Russian mercenaries entered the country, French forces had attempted to conduct a long-running counterinsurgency campaign, but departed without achieving their objectives. In an agreement with JNIM and the FLA, Africa Corps fighters seem to have withdrawn heavy weapons from Kidal and have reportedly retreated toward Tessalit. For its part, before the agreed upon withdrawal, Africa Corps released footage showing aerial strikes against JNIM/FLA targets, with claims that the mercenaries destroyed more than 100 of the insurgents’ vehicles. JNIM published a communique that strongly suggested the Russians refrain from engaging in this conflict, thus leaving the door open to a potential relationship in the future, despite the fact that Russian mercenaries have been associated with notable atrocities and human rights abuses in Mali during their tenure there.

If JNIM is able to capture control of the country, as it seemed poised to do after a similar offensive in November, it will be yet another nation ruled by jihadists, following the exemplar of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, though there are notable differences with those two cases. Still, it seems that JNIM has certainly observed and learned lessons from other theaters. Analysts like Jason Warner and Wassim Nasr have analyzed and assessed how HTS’s success in Syria may have impacted JNIM’s modus operandi and current approach. And Mina al-Lami, chief jihadist media specialist at BBC, has talked about JNIM distancing itself from al-Qaeda over the past year, eschewing al-Qaeda’s focus on transnational issues and instead reflecting more on local concerns and grievances in Mali and the broader Sahel. But a focus on local issues does not mean that JNIM does not harbor broader, regional, and transnational ambitions. Time will tell, but a failed state in Mali will offer further operational space to JNIM and other jihadist groups, including some of JNIM’s rivals, some of which might decide to dedicate more resources to external operations attack planning.

Having such a large country under the control of a terrorist group will set off alarm bells from Washington to Paris. Yet, both the United States and France are not postured to respond to the growing instability throughout the Sahel, which for several consecutive years has served as the epicenter of jihadist terrorism. In addition to JNIM, the Islamic State has several affiliates that operate in the region, including the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Burkina Faso and Niger, the other members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), will inevitably be concerned about the success of JNIM in Mali, and the jihadists’ success could embolden likeminded militants in Nigeria.

JNIM’s tactical evolution over the years has seen it evolve from a terrorist group concentrated in rural areas to an insurgent-like force capable of waging complex urban operations while also implementing a strategy of economic warfare, where choking off fuel supplies has remained an effective maneuver. The FLA and JNIM have cooperated to share assets and resources, and the effectiveness of the operation reveals deeper coordination. It remains unclear what will happen next, or if the JNIM/FLA coalition will seek to continue pressing its advantage. Some assume that the coalition wants to overthrow the government and rule in its place, but it may be more interested in some kind of power-sharing agreement or negotiated settlement that helps assuage the grievances of the insurgents. With growing political support and continued aversion to the Russian-backed junta in Bamako, Mali may be on the verge of a tectonic shift in its politics, with massive implications for the broader region.