Ending War in Yemen Requires Talk, Not Labels

Ending War in Yemen Requires Talk, Not Labels

U.N. Security Council horse-trading has begun in earnest in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first reported case of deal-making in New York centered around the often-overlooked conflict in Yemen. On Monday, Russia’s mission to the United Nations voted in favor of a new resolution that, among other things, named the Houthi movement that controls northwestern Yemen a “terrorist group.”

This marked a sudden about-turn for Moscow. Russian officials had raised strong objections over the use of the terrorist label just a week earlier, part of a longstanding pattern of Russian opposition to overtly onerous censure of the Houthis by the Security Council. One cause for the Russians’ change of tune? On Friday, the United Arab Emirates, which had proposed adding the Houthi terrorist label to the Yemen resolution, abstained in a vote on another resolution, one censuring Moscow for its Ukraine invasion.

American, British, and other Western officials were furious at the UAE abstention on a vote on what has quickly become the top U.S. foreign policy objective of isolating Russia. Emirati opprobrium towards the Houthis and Russian deal-making does not explain the UAE abstention in the Ukraine vote its entirety. (Emirati officials say that the abstention demonstrates Abu Dhabi’s independence from U.S. foreign policy dictates, and some observers see it as a rebuke to a perception of dwindling U.S. support for its partners in the Gulf as American interests shift.)

But four Western diplomats we spoke to in New York after the vote said they felt it was clear that the UAE was willing to expend political capital in order to secure the Russians’ vote for the resolution. Labelling the Houthis terrorists, in other words, is a big deal for the UAE. And they aren’t finished yet. Abu Dhabi is likely to direct its energy toward securing a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation for the Houthis in Washington. However, this would be counterproductive, deepening Yemen’s humanitarian plight while doing little if anything to push the Houthis toward compromise and making diplomacy harder.

The reason for the Emiratis’ ire towards the Houthis is clear. Last month the rebels, who control Yemen’s populous northern highlands including the capital, Sanaa, launched four rounds of missile and drone attacks on the UAE, killing three civilians and injuring several others. One of the targets was the Al Dhafra Air Base, which hosts U.S. forces. In claiming responsibility, the Houthis intimated that they planned to target civilian infrastructure next, including the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the world’s tallest building, and Dubai Expo 2020.

Emirati officials contend the Houthis’ cross-border attacks were unprovoked because, they say, their forces withdrew from the war in Yemen in 2019. (The UAE role in Yemen is complicated: Abu Dhabi is not directly involved in frontline combat but wields considerable influence over armed groups on the ground, including fighters who put a stop to Houthi territorial gains earlier this year.) They also say that threatened attacks on civilian targets are unjustifiable, cross a red line, and clearly satisfy the criteria of what constitutes terrorism.

The UAE responded to the cross-border attacks by mobilizing international support. Along with Saudi Arabia and Israel, it launched a campaign for the U.S. government and world powers to label and designate the Houthis as terrorists. In particular, it has sought the reinstatement of the FTO designation the Trump administration rushed through in its final days in office, and which the Biden administration rescinded shortly afterward in early 2021.

At the same time, Emirati diplomats began to push for the Security Council resolution, on the renewal of an eight-year-old sanctions regime for Yemen, to include reference to the Houthis as a “terrorist organization”—an extremely rare move for the Security Council—in addition to a group-wide arms embargo, travel ban, and assets freeze for the Houthis, along with a stepped-up maritime interdiction regime in and around Yemeni waters.

UAE officials say that the push to label and designate the Houthis terrorists is not a purely symbolic or punitive measure, although they say the United States should support this effort if only for the sake of the countries’ strong bilateral relationship. They claim it makes strategic sense, arguing that a terrorism designation would fit into a broader campaign against the rebels designed to bring them to the negotiating table through military, political, and economic pressure. The main intended effect of an FTO designation would be to make the sanctioned group so toxic to deal with politically and economically that it either collapses or capitulates to its enemies’ demands.

There are valid arguments for pressuring the Houthis to bring them back to the negotiating table. By the end of 2021, with military victory in the oil-rich governorate of Marib in sight, the Houthis had become maximalist in their political demands and became hostile toward U.N. efforts at diplomacy, likely perceiving that there was no point in negotiating until they had fully seized Marib. By late 2021, many Western officials were debating how to deal with the Houthis once they had scored such a major, possibly decisive, victory in the war.