As things stand, it might be tempting to declare Daesh all but defeated in Libya. Daesh is most visible, and therefore most effective, when it controls territory. It uses territory for building both military and financial might, and for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Daesh has not controlled significant territory in Libya since it was ejected from Sirte in 2016. Since then, its bases have been small and transient, and largely only possible in the southern desert area of Fezzan, while the number of militants steadily dwindled, especially when the US was able to locate some of these bases and hit them with airstrikes.

But, despite four years of being hounded, Daesh remains a steadfast, if currently reduced, actor in the Libyan theater. We have a very detailed picture of its activities throughout 2018 and 2019 and, for those two years alone, we have records of close to 100 noteworthy attacks on other players in the field, including at least three high-profile ones in Tripoli in 2018: On the High National Election Commission (HNEC), the National Oil Corporation, and the Foreign Ministry.

The HNEC attack is particularly relevant. Most attacks are limited in scope and serve to improve the tactical position of the group in the areas where they are active. But the HNEC attack came a short while after the leadership of Daesh in the Levant called for its followers everywhere to attack electoral infrastructure. Being able to mount such a significant attack — it killed more than a dozen in the heart of Tripoli, in a relatively well-defended part of the country — on such short notice would indicate that the group does possess greater capabilities than it is currently deploying visibly, and that it is instead choosing to keep at least some capacity in reserve.

This is not to overestimate the current level of threat that the group potentially poses if it chose to carry out attacks at full tilt. Rather, it signifies a new and potentially highly relevant shift in strategic thinking in how it approaches its position in Libya. It retains the capacity to organize high-profile attacks such as these — attacks of the kind we have come to expect from this group in particular. But it appears to only carry out such attacks when it feels its relevance is questioned and it needs to reassert itself as a potent force in the news cycle. Instead of its usual recipe of pursuing maximum “shock and awe” attacks as a means to set itself up as the most extreme group driving recruitment, it has shifted its focus to capacity-building, recruiting quietly, amassing arms, and building networks.

To be clear, Daesh was never the most competent at subtle approaches to insurgency and its Libyan branch is no exception. It lacks the wherewithal to build local alliances, as Al-Qaeda traditionally has done. It remains the case that, since the fall of Sirte, Daesh in Libya is overwhelmingly composed of non-Libyan fighters, further diminishing its capacity to embed itself in the local political landscape.

The bulk of Daesh activity seems to have moved to Fezzan, where the group has increasingly embedded itself in local human and illicit goods trafficking, particularly along the refugee migration routes. This area has always been a no man’s land and it gives Daesh the opportunity to work with non-Libyans or with Tuareg Libyans, who have long been marginalized and thus lack any true affinity to a “Libyan” identity.

In short, at the beginning of 2016, Daesh was in control of Sirte and was running rampant across the urban centers along the central coast of Libya; it looked threatening and was much more likely to inflict damage, but it was cash-strapped and overextended. When the coordinated counterattack by the other Libyan factions came, with air support from the West, the result was a foregone conclusion. Today, Daesh is smaller in terms of manpower, but it is financially stable. It has become more stably rooted in the Fezzan region despite the threats posed by US airpower. Daesh has tapped into a large pool of potential recruits from sub-Saharan Africa. It is less visible, and less of an immediate threat to everyone around it, but it is on a stable footing and its potential for rapid growth is significant.

This is a smart strategy for Daesh in the Libya of today. There remain questions about how successful it is in pursuing this strategy, how well it is currently able to recruit from the refugee flows of sub-Saharan Africans, and how well it is managing to cooperate with other interests in the Fezzan smuggling “economy.” What we do know from its propaganda is that this shift in strategy and focus is deliberate and conscious. This capacity to shift strategy so effectively is new for Daesh, and it is why it remains a force we need to keep a close eye on in Libya.