Key Takeaways:
A September 2026 leaked dossier (~150 files) is cited as evidence the Sudanese Armed Forces built crude chlorine-gas bombs (~15 kg), tested them in the desert, and used some in 2024 near Khartoum and the Al Jaili refinery, with gas allegedly taken from water plants. Intercepts are said to put Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in the know and behind a cover-up after U.S. detection. Washington sanctioned Sudan and Burhan (more in June 2026); Khartoum denies any toxic agents were used.
The author (Rohan Gunaratna) says this is a CWC war crime but not a repeat of Iraq or Syria: chlorine is industrial, not state-grade sarin, the war is SAF vs RSF with atrocities on both sides, and no one wants troops in East Africa. The live response is sanctions, blocked OPCW roles, and inspectors—not strikes.
The larger claim is political: a strained army leaning on Bashir-era Islamist militias (e.g. al-Baraa bin Malik, NIF networks) plus alleged IRGC supply lines. Even if the SAF wins, it may be hostage to those networks—a harder, armed replay of the Turabi–Bashir deep state—with risks for the Red Sea and the Horn after the war. Investigate militias and unconventional know-how that could outlast the fighting.Introduction
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) developed and used chlorine-based chemical weapons during the country’s civil war. A leaked secret dossier from September 2026 revealed extensive evidence. (1) A trove of nearly 150 documents, blueprints, text messages, and videos obtained from senior military phones outlines a program to combine explosives with 15kg (33lb) of chlorine gas. (2) Chlorine gas munitions were tested in the desert and deployed in small numbers during 2024, including attacks near Khartoum and at the Al Jaili oil refinery. Some chlorine supplies were diverted from civilian water-treatment facilities. (3) Intercepted communications implicate military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in direct knowledge of the program and ordering a cover-up after U.S. detection. (4) The United States sanctioned Sudan and Gen. al-Burhan following determinations that chemical weapons were used in violation of international law and the CWC. Additional sanctions were enacted in June 2026. (5) As expected, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and military officials have strongly denied the allegations, calling them baseless and maintaining that no toxic agents were deployed.
Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons, and the world intervened in Iraq and Syria. Now that chemical weapons have been used by military chief Gen. al-Burhan, will the world intervene in Sudan? Dropping chemical munitions is a grave violation of the CWC. It reduces a sovereign army to the status of a rogue actor committing international war crimes. (6)
Sudan’s Islamists are waging a war without red lines. What does the use of chemical weapons tell us about the forces prolonging the conflict?
The Context
No international military intervention is planned or currently expected in Sudan, despite the mounting international pressure over the chemical weapons allegations. While the international community did carry out interventions in Iraq and Syria, the global response to the conflict in Sudan remains confined to diplomatic pressure, financial sanctions, and calls for independent investigations. (7) The situation in Sudan differs substantially from previous conflicts. Military dossiers, text messages, and phone records implicate Gen. al-Burhan and the SAF in developing a clandestine, improvised chlorine-gas weapons program. However, unlike the weaponised nerve agents such as sarin used in Syria, the SAF is accused of repurposing industrial chlorine sourced from civilian water-treatment facilities into crude aerial bombs. While using chlorine as a weapon is a distinct violation of the CWC and constitutes a war crime, it has not cross-cut the international community’s threshold for direct military action in the same manner as state-grade nerve agents. (8)
Until now, the international community has relied on sanctions and diplomatic leverage rather than deploying troops on the ground. Rather than considering air strikes or a humanitarian intervention force, global powers have relied heavily on economic and diplomatic penalties. The United States imposed strict sanctions directly on General al-Burhan. Further sanctions enacted under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act have restricted arms sales, export credits, and international loans to the Sudanese government. (9) In addition to targeted sanctions, institutional pressure is building up. At the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the U.S. and its allies have successfully pushed to block Sudan from executive roles, demanding that the military-backed government accept immediate, impartial international inspectors on the ground. (10)
As Sudan is in Africa, there is geopolitical disinterest in military escalation. Unlike the interventions in Iraq in 2003 or the multinational coalition operations in Syria, global powers have no appetite for entering a direct military conflict in East Africa. The war in Sudan is an incredibly chaotic, multi-sided civil war between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Because both sides stand accused of severe atrocities outside nations are wary that a military intervention against the SAF would inadvertently tip the scales in favour of another brutal faction. (11) Consequently, the response from bodies like the UN Security Council will likely remain restricted to financial strangulation, arms embargoes, and demands for ceasefire mediation rather than boots on the ground or foreign air campaigns. (12)
The chemical weapons revelations are not merely about chlorine or an individual military operation. They raise a larger question about the political and security environment that has emerged during the war in Sudan and the role Islamist forces have played in sustaining it.
The Background
The New York Times investigation is telling. The evidence presented is overwhelming that the SAF used chemical weapons during the war with the knowledge of military leadership, including Gen. al-Burhan. He cannot escape command responsibility.
The Islamist militias, especially the Muslim Brotherhood that supports the SAF, should be thoroughly investigated. The SAF has not fought this war alone. Islamist armed formations, particularly groups linked to the Bashir-era Islamist movement such as al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, have provided significant battlefield support.
What does it mean when a regular national army accused of using chemical weapons is simultaneously relying on ideologically driven Islamist militias in an internal war? In the context of the Sudanese civil war, the reliance of the regular national military, the SAF, on ideologically driven Islamist militias such as the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade and old networks of the National Islamic Front (NIF), while simultaneously facing credible evidence of deploying chemical weapons, specifically chlorine gas, signals a profound systemic crisis. (13) This paradox indicates several critical transformations like the conflict and the state itself. When a traditional national army relies heavily on informal, ideologically motivated paramilitaries, it signals severe military exhaustion, low morale, and manpower shortages. Despite its numerical advantage, the SAF lost significant territory in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan to the RSF. Turning to Islamist militias—many of them highly motivated veteran remnants of the former Omar al-Bashir regime—is an act of survival. One should never forget how the NIF of Hassan al-Turabi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, allied with Gen. Bashir, who staged a coup. Furthermore, resorting to chemical weapons, historically a “weapon of the desperate”, highlights a critical deficit in conventional battlefield efficacy. (14)
The Return of the Deep-State?
The resurgence of Sudanese Islamists did not begin in 2023. It reflects institutional networks developed over three decades under the Bashir-Turabi partnership within the military, security services, economy and state bureaucracy that were never fully dismantled after 2019.
The international community is concerned that there is a resurgence of the Turabi-Bashir-era “Deep State”. The reliance on Islamist brigades marks the re-Islamization of the Sudanese security apparatus. Following the 2019 ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan attempted a fragile democratic transition. The integration of these militias into the SAF’s frontlines indicates that the military leadership, led by General al-Burhan, has formally aligned with the old regime’s political-religious network to secure its own survival, functionally reversing the gains of the 2019 revolution. (15)
The erosion of the legitimacy of the Sudanese state is evident. The SAF has consistently defended its actions globally by claiming it represents the sole legitimate, institutional “backbone” of the Sudanese state against a rebel paramilitary group. However, this duality shatters that narrative. (16)
Operating hand-in-hand with sectarian militias strips the SAF of its identity as a neutral national institution, reducing it to one faction among many in a fragmented warlord ecosystem. (17)
The Future
Sudan faces a severe risk of long-term fragmentation. These dynamics replicate the exact mistakes that birthed the current war. The RSF itself began as a state-sponsored militia, the Janjaweed, created by the government to fight its internal battles. By empowering new, highly ideological Islamist militias to win an immediate war, the SAF is creating autonomous parallel power centres. Even if the SAF defeats the RSF, it risks becoming a hostage to the radical elements that enabled its victory, making a future return to stable, secular, civilian democratic governance virtually impossible. (18) In short, it means the state is cannibalising its own institutional identity and international standing, defaulting to lawlessness and sectarian alignment just to prevent total military collapse.
The SAF-Islamist nexus and the RSF present a long-term security threat. The transformation taking place within the SAF-led coalition following the new chemical weapons revelations should be carefully monitored.
What is evident is that the Islamists are more than auxiliary forces. The war has brought Islamist networks back from the political margins and restored their military and political relevance after the fall of General al-Bashir in 2019.
Sudan’s war is a vehicle for Islamist political restoration. For elements of Sudan’s former Islamist establishment, defeating the RSF is not the only objective. Prolonged conflict can weaken civilian political forces, increase the army’s dependence on Islamist fighters, and create a pathway for Islamist networks to return to the centre of the state.
Islamist and regional connections to the SAF reveals Iran’s hand. In addition to training, arming and financing the SAF, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) supports the Sudanese Islamist networks. IRGC has built an arms corridor to Sudan and neighbouring countries. These developments shape the trajectory and evolution of the conflict and regional security. The Islamist interest in prolonging the conflict is deep and far-reaching. A negotiated civilian settlement could threaten the influence these networks have regained during wartime. Continued fighting, by contrast, preserves their military utility and political relevance.
Given Sudan’s geopolitics, its militias present a post-war threat that will destabilise both the Middle East and Africa. A Sudan in which the regular military, Islamist armed networks, unconventional weapons capabilities and external military partnerships increasingly overlap would have consequences far beyond Sudan, particularly for the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East. Even after the conflict eventually ends, Islamist militias will threaten Africa, especially. The militias possess greater combat experience, stronger organisational structures and deeper access to state security institutions than they had before the war.
Sudan is likely to produce a more militarised version of the Bashir-Turabi era Islamist order. Rather than simply restoring the old regime, the war could create a more heavily armed and battle-hardened Islamist ecosystem embedded within the state.
Conclusion
With the use of chemical weapons in Sudan, should the International Community turn a blind eye or intervene? The International Community should treat the use of chemical weapons as a dangerous escalation. The Sudanese conflict has moved beyond conventional warfare and militia mobilisation toward the violation of one of the most important international prohibitions: the use of chemical weapons.
Islamist militias should be investigated to determine if they themselves used chemical weapons. The stronger argument is that the military accused of using them is fighting with the substantial support of Islamist militias, raising questions about the nature and future of this military-political coalition.
The longer-term concern is not only the use of chemical weapons today. It is whether expertise, access to dual-use materials and unconventional military capabilities could remain within an ideologically connected military-militia ecosystem after the war.
Endnotes:
Declan Walsh and Ronen Bergman, “Secret Dossier Adds to Evidence of Chemical Weapons in Sudan,” The New York Times, September 5, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/05/world/africa/sudan-chemical-weapons-war.html.; The National, “Bomb Tests and Dead Scorpions: New Evidence Exposes Al Burhan Forces’ Chemical Programme in Sudan,” The National, September 6, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/09/05/new-evidence-points-to-chemical-weapons-use-by-sudans-army/.
The National, “Bomb Tests and Dead Scorpions: New Evidence Exposes Al Burhan Forces’ Chemical Programme in Sudan.”; N R Stephen, “Sudan Army Chemical Weapons: Secret Dossier Reveals Chlorine Bomb Programme,” Gulf News: Latest UAE News, Dubai News, Business, Travel News, Dubai Gold Rate, Prayer Time, Cinema, September 6, 2026, https://gulfnews.com/world/africa/sudan-army-chemical-weapons-secret-dossier-reveals-chlorine-bomb-programme-1.500664850.
Greg Miller and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Trove of documents reveals alleged chemical weapons stockpile in Sudan,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/05/trove-documents-reveals-alleged-chemical-weapons-stockpile-sudan/.; The National, “Bomb Tests and Dead Scorpions: New Evidence Exposes Al Burhan Forces’ Chemical Programme in Sudan.”; Stephen, “Sudan Army Chemical Weapons: Secret Dossier Reveals Chlorine Bomb Programme.”
Walsh and Bergman, “Secret Dossier Adds to Evidence of Chemical Weapons in Sudan.”; The National, “Bomb Tests and Dead Scorpions: New Evidence Exposes Al Burhan Forces’ Chemical Programme in Sudan.”
Department of State, “Imposition of Additional Sanctions on Sudan Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991,” Federal Register, July 20, 2026, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/20/2026-14568/imposition-of-additional-sanctions-on-sudan-under-the-chemical-and-biological-weapons-control-and.; Daryl G. Kimball, “Sudan Army Said to Use Chlorine as Weapon | Arms Control Association,” Arms Control Association, February 2026, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-01/news/sudan-army-said-use-chlorine-weapon.; Walsh and Bergman, “Secret Dossier Adds to Evidence of Chemical Weapons in Sudan.”
Ottilie Mitchell and Cecilia Macaulay, “US Says Sudan Used Chemical Weapons in Civil War,” BBC News, May 26, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwynkdyk14zo.; Shravishtha Ajaykumar, “Chemical Weapons Allegations in Sudan’s Escalating Conflict,” orfonline.org, November 28, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chemical-weapons-allegations-in-sudan-s-escalating-conflict.; Kimball, “Sudan Army Said to Use Chlorine as Weapon | Arms Control Association.”; Matteo Boccia, “How Chemical Weapons Allegations Could Change Sudan’s War Stances and the World’s Response,” Fair Observer, January 27, 2026, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/africa/how-chemical-weapons-allegations-could-change-sudans-war-stances-and-the-worlds-response/.
The Arab Weekly, “US escalates pressure on Sudan army over chemical weapons allegations,” July 13, 2026, https://thearabweekly.com/us-escalates-pressure-sudan-army-over-chemical-weapons-allegations.
Mercy Mangum, “Chlorine Warfare in Sudan’s Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis – UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog,” University of Alabama, November 14, 2025, https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2025/11/14/chlorine-warfare-in-sudans-ongoing-humanitarian-crisis/.; Walsh and Bergman, “Secret Dossier Adds to Evidence of Chemical Weapons in Sudan.”; UA.News, “In Sudan, Witness Recounts People Struggling to Breathe After Alleged Chemical Attack,” UA.News, September 6, 2026, https://ua.news/en/world/u-sudani-svidok-rozpoviv-pro-liudei-iz-utrudnenim-dikhanniam-pislia-imovirnogo-khimichnogo-napadu.; The National, “Bomb Tests and Dead Scorpions: New Evidence Exposes Al Burhan Forces’ Chemical Programme in Sudan.”; Asharq al-Awsat, “Syria Says Begun Destroying Assad-Era Chemical Weapon Materials,” Asharq Al-Awsat, September 3, 2026, https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5314365-syria-says-begun-destroying-assad-era-chemical-weapon-materials.; The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”
The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”; Declan Walsh and Julian E Barnes, “Sudan’s Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, January 16, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/16/world/africa/sudan-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html.; Jim Thomas, “Documents Point to Secret Sudan Chemical Weapons Stockpile,” Yahoo News, September 5, 2026, https://www.yahoo.com/news/world/articles/documents-point-secret-sudan-chemical-154321276.html.
The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”
Walsh and Barnes, “Sudan’s Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say.”; The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”
The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”
Africa Defense Forum, “Rise of Armed Groups Complicates Sudan’s Brutal Civil War,” June 10, 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/06/rise-of-armed-groups-complicates-sudans-brutal-civil-war/.; Africa Center For Strategic Studies, “Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict,” Africa Center, August 27, 2026, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sudan-conflict-armed-actors/.; Miller and Dwoskin, “Trove of Documents Reveals Alleged Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Sudan.”
Kimball, “Sudan Army Said to Use Chlorine as Weapon | Arms Control Association.”; Africa Center For Strategic Studies, “Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict.”
Africa Center For Strategic Studies, “Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict.”; The Arab Weekly, “US Escalates Pressure on Sudan Army over Chemical Weapons Allegations.”; Africa Center For Strategic Studies, “Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict.”
Christopher Tounsel, “Sudan’s civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict,” The Conversation, December 18, 2025, https://doi.org/10.64628/aai.3cqd36dau.; Boccia, “How Chemical Weapons Allegations Could Change Sudan’s War Stances and the World’s Response.”
Boccia, “How Chemical Weapons Allegations Could Change Sudan’s War Stances and the World’s Response.”; Africa Defense Forum, “Rise of Armed Groups Complicates Sudan’s Brutal Civil War.”
Tounsel, “Sudan’s Civil War: A Visual Guide to the Brutal Conflict.”; Africa Center For Strategic Studies, “Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict.”; Africa Defense Forum, “Rise of Armed Groups Complicates Sudan’s Brutal Civil War.”