Executive Summary:

The line between banditry and jihadism is narrowing, raising the risk that Nigeria will face the same hybrid insurgency dynamics already destabilizing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin.
Lakurawa bandits are enabling Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s (JNIM) expansion into Nigeria, with recent attacks and cross-border activity showing growing cooperation between Sahelian jihadists and local armed groups.

A possible relationship is being established between Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Arabic: جماعة نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين, JNIM) and a Nigerian bandit group called Lakurawa (From French: les recrues via Hausa, “the recruits”). This comes as JNIM appears to be expanding operations into Nigeria. JNIM is believed to be in cahoots with Lakurawa, which killed 10 herders in Kebbi State along the border with Benin (Daily Trust, October 27). Lakurawa is believed to be in cooperating with local jihadists, including JNIM.

Local village leaders in Nigeria initially invited Lakurawa into the country to combat banditry. Before long, the “self-defense group” fell out with its hosts, turning into bandits themselves while also adopting some element of jihadist ideology (Al Jazeera, March 9, 2024).

Nigerian officials claim Lakurawa’s origins are in Mali. This would explain the group’s transnational cooperation and ties with IS–SP or JNIM despite being based in Nigeria, along with the latter group’s entry into Nigerian territory (Al Jazeera, January 10).

JNIM militants appear to have finally penetrated Nigeria. In July, the group released a video of seven militants who claimed to be in Nigeria, which matched a possible trajectory of JNIM fighters crossing the border from Benin (X/@BrantPhilip, July 7). The video provided the hardest visual evidence to date of a JNIM presence in Nigeria. On October 30, JNIM attacked a military post in Kwara, Nigeria (X/@BrantPhilip, October 30).

The border area between Nigeria and Benin is becoming a flashpoint in Nigerian security affairs. Lakurawa, like most bandit groups, remains shrouded in mystery, but is believed to be cooperating with the Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS–SP, formerly Islamic State–Greater Sahara) and JNIM. Similarly, JNIM and Ansaru, another local group with origins as an al-Qaeda, are believed to be collaborating.

It is unclear whether “Lakurawa” is a distinct group. It is entirely possible that the term has become a catch-all label to refer to bandits. Similarly, it is unclear to what extent the group possesses any cohesive leadership, structure, or organization. In one of Lakurawa’s largest likely attacks prior to Kebbi, bandits killed 13 hunters in Sokoto State, but no claim of responsibility was issued. The attribution to Lakurawa was based on official speculation around the tactics the bandits used, which media attributed to Lakurawa (Daily Trust, May 5). As Lakurawa does not have a spokesman or claim attacks like Boko Haram, there is often little basis to ascribe an attack to the group beyond its general modus operandi. This still applies to the latest attack in Kebbi (X/@VincentFoucher, October 27).

Banditry in Nigeria now frequently rivals jihadism in scale and lethality. Prior to Lakurawa’s emergence over the past year, banditry had already become a security crisis rivaling that of Boko Haram in many areas, with kidnapping cases involving the abduction of dozens of schoolchildren, execution of dozens of civilians, or hijacking and derailing of major passenger trains. One explanation for this rise in capabilities, just like Boko Haram’s own rise in 2012–2013, is that JNIM, if not also IS–SP are likely supporting bandits, and locals are simply referring to such jihadist-assisted groups as “Lakurawa” (Jihadology, October 15). This lends credence to the hypothesis that JNIM and IS–SP are actively operational in Nigeria. Therefore, it was only a matter of time until JNIM, IS–SP, or a different Sahelian jihadist configuration confirmed an attack in Nigeria.