As news of more mass atrocities committed by the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) circulates, the Islamic State has again called for jihad in Sudan. In this week’s Al Naba newsletter, the global jihadist organization made its second call to arms for Sudan this year, while also encouraging foreign fighters to migrate to the country.

“Among the remnants of nationalism produced by contemporary ignorance is the denial, neglect, and disavowal of the wounds of Muslims, as long as they do not affect the original homeland in which that ‘nationalist’ being was raised,” the Islamic State’s editorial began. The group claimed that nationalism is the reason that Sudanese Muslims suffer within the current conflict.

“Nationalism compels the people of each region or country to attend to their own problems and issues […] while attending to the issues of another country is considered interference in its affairs and a violation of its sovereignty,” the piece stated. Therefore, the Islamic State argued, “The tragedy of Sudan does not obligate the Muslims of the world to act because it is an internal Sudanese matter!”

The Islamic State’s editorial board also chastised various world governments for their inaction due to “their political interests,” arguing that this causes inaction from their citizenry as nationalistic interests align with those of the state. This sentiment is meant as a sharp rebuke of various Middle Eastern regimes, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Iran (among others), that have taken opposing sides in the Sudanese conflict.

The jihadist group’s editorial argued that Muslims should disavow nationalism, turn inward towards Islam, and lean on the Ummah [worldwide Islamic community]. “The Libyan Muslim cares about the plight of the Muslims of Sudan just as the Chechen Muslim cares about the plight of the Muslims of Syria, and the Nigerian Muslim grieves for the wounds of his Iraqi Muslim brother […] this is the Islam we know,” the newsletter stated.

Further, it argued, “This Islamic unity, which makes a Muslim rise up for the suffering of his brother wherever he may be—in Burma, Gaza, or Sudan—can only be achieved by dismantling its obstacles and breaking down the borders and restrictions that prevent it.”

Thus, the Islamic State claimed that the time for jihad in Sudan is now. “It is incumbent upon the Muslims, especially the Islamic youth in Egypt and Libya, to strive for liberation from the shackles of their homelands and to take serious action to support their brothers in Sudan,” the editorial stated.

It continued, “They [fighters from Egypt and Libya] must exploit this turbulent and open environment to pave the way for a prolonged jihad. […] Sudan is a fertile ground, if it ignites, it will have a profound impact on the entire region.” The editorial also argued that a Sudanese jihad would help expel the foreign interference in the country.

The group’s specific mention of foreign fighters from Egypt and Libya is likely due to their geographic proximity to Sudan and because Islamic State networks in Sudan have previously supported Islamic State groups in both countries. Thus, the jihadist group’s leadership is asking for these fighters to return the favor in Sudan.

“So, heal your wounds with monotheism and jihad, cast off the garments of nationalism, and follow the prophetic footsteps,” the editorial concluded.

The second call for jihad this year

This week’s editorial is the second time this year that the Islamic State has called for jihad in Sudan. In January, another editorial in Al Naba was quite explicit in calling for the downfall of both the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as well as their respective leaders, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and Abdul Fattah al Burhan.

Both the RSF and SAF were instruments of power under the regime of former dictator Omar al Bashir. Following Bashir’s deposition in early 2019, a transitional government led by both civilians and the military headed Sudan until October 2021, when the SAF removed all civilian leadership and declared a state of military rule. The SAF and RSF then vied for power and influence under the military regime, until the tensions finally turned to open bloodshed in April 2023.

Both the SAF and RSF have been accused of committing mass atrocities and grave human rights abuses since the civil war began. Earlier this week, the RSF, which is heavily armed and funded by the UAE, took the strategic city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. Since then, videos have emerged of RSF fighters deliberately killing civilians, atrocities that have been so large that they can be seen from orbit.

The Islamic State’s previous editorial in January explicitly stated that “[Abdel Fattah] al Burhan and [Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo] Hemeti are enemies of Islam, as such they must be opposed, disbelieved in, and neither of them should be relied upon, no matter the outcome of the war between them.”

However, the earlier editorial was more directed at Sudanese Muslims. For instance, it stated, “This is a message to the Muslim youth and mujahideen inside Sudan about working diligently to exploit the situation for the benefit of jihad, either through recruitment or preparation, in order to establish a nucleus that confronts the short-term dangers and help establish a long-term jihad.”

Given that little has happened with regard to the Islamic State in Sudan since the group’s first call to arms, the plea likely fell on the deaf ears of many Sudanese Muslims. Thus, the Islamic State may now be focusing its efforts on getting foreigners to start the Sudanese jihad instead.

Jihadism in Sudan

Though the Islamic State is just now publicly calling for jihad inside Sudan this year, it has quietly operated in the country with a dedicated cell since at least 2019—though recruiters and facilitators had been active before then. Sudanese fighters were among the largest foreign component of the Islamic State in Libya during the group’s height in 2016, for instance.

Sudanese authorities previously attempted to quash the relatively small network by periodically announcing raids or arrests of Islamic State members, such as in September and October 2021, when authorities arrested over a dozen members and killed several others across Khartoum.

Nevertheless, the Islamic State’s Sudanese network has persisted. However, it does not yet appear to be a network for attacks; rather, it is used for finances, procurement, and logistics that support other Islamic State wings.

The United Nations Sanctions and Monitoring Team has periodically reported on this network. In July 2023, its report noted that the Islamic State’s network in Sudan contains between 100 and 200 people and is headed by a veteran Iraqi jihadist, Abu Bakr al Iraqi, who is a blood relative of former Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

Under Iraqi’s leadership, the network has been described as a “logistical and financial base […] from which transit and investment would take place.” The report also noted that Iraqi operates and maintains an array of businesses across Sudan and Turkey, from which the profits are used to support the Islamic State throughout Africa, most notably its West Africa and Sahel Provinces.

Though the UN report doesn’t mention this, it is likely the Sudan cell also helped support the Islamic State’s Somalia Province, as Sudanese fighters represented a significant component of that group’s foreign fighters. The terrorist group’s Sudan network may assist additional Islamic State wings in Africa as well, though this support is unclear.

Not much else is known about the Islamic State’s activities inside Sudan. However, with the group’s now-open call for jihad inside the country, a close eye should be kept on this network, as it may transition from a support role into an operational/attack one.

The Islamic State clearly already has a skeleton in place from which it could build a new so-called ‘province’ within the overall group’s structure. However, whether or not the Islamic State feels confident enough to transition to open warfare in Sudan remains a significant question. Since its first call to arms in January, not much has come to fruition for the group in Sudan.

Al Qaeda, the Islamic State’s rival, has also tried to foment jihad inside Sudan. For instance, in October 2022, Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani, a veteran member of Al Qaeda, released a booklet in which he called for jihad, providing a guide that prospective jihadists could use to form a unified group in his native Sudan.

So far, however, nothing has seemingly come from Al Qaeda’s call to jihad either—at least, publicly. That said, the group has often operated more secretively than the Islamic State and thus could have some sort of clandestine cell.

It is also worth noting that Islamists are already fighting alongside the SAF, particularly the Al Baraa bin Malik Battalion, and other groups within the broader “Popular Resistance” umbrella under the tutelage of Sudan’s military. Jihadists and other Islamists have also been freed in prison breaks since the civil war started.

Al Qaeda has a longer history inside the country than the Islamic State, as it was once based there in the early 1990s. The terrorist group has maintained various cells in Sudan throughout the years, including in Salamah, a suburb of Khartoum, in 2007; a cell in the Dinder National Park in 2012; and two organizations, Ansar al Tawhid and Al Qaeda in the Land of Two Niles, in the late 2000s to early 2010s.

In more recent years, Al Qaeda has not been particularly active inside Sudan. However, as Abu Hudhayfah al Sudani’s booklet made clear, the group obviously wishes to be. Whether or not the group makes a more concerted public effort in the face of the Islamic State’s separate call to arms remains to be seen. Regardless, both global jihadi giants are currently floundering in attempting to mobilize a public armed presence in the conflict. It remains to be seen how effective the Islamic State’s new pitch to foreign fighters will be.

Both global jihadist organizations have now openly called for jihad in Sudan, and the Islamic State is known to already have an active network structure inside the country. As the Sudan’s civil war continues to drag on and deteriorate into additional chaos and atrocities, these jihadist groups may find more opportunities to publicly latch onto events and catapult themselves into the conflict.