Houthi-Israel Clashes Threaten to Escalate and Expand

Houthi-Israel Clashes Threaten to Escalate and Expand

Israel and the Houthi movement in Yemen continue to exchange missile and air strikes in the aftermath of a U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, which did not include Israel.

Israeli retaliatory strikes on Houthi-controlled airports in Yemen have prompted Houthi threats to attack Israeli passenger jets.

The Houthis might potentially use their deepening ties to the al-Shabaab terrorist organization based in Somalia to attack Israel-linked assets.

The clashes have the potential to expand throughout the region, potentially including U.S. or Israeli action against Iran, the main backer of the Houthis.

An early May ceasefire between the U.S. and the Houthi movement in Yemen (Ansarallah) ended a two-month campaign of U.S. strikes on Houthi military sites, ports, and energy plants (“Operation Rough Rider”) that only partially achieved U.S. objectives. The Houthis pledged to cease their attacks on U.S. warships and most commercial shipping in the Red Sea, restoring a measure of freedom of navigation through that key chokepoint. The truce did not apply to Israel or Israel-linked shipping, but the group has refrained from any new attacks on ships transiting that waterway. Explaining why they did not insist the ceasefire apply to Israel, Trump officials told journalists they did not assess the Houthis would ever halt attacks on Israel. Trump’s team, experts argue, opted to stop expending significant U.S. military resources and expensive advanced munitions on an air campaign in Yemen that was unlikely to yield substantial additional results.

Some observers are more positive about the outcome of the U.S. strike campaign, noting that, in addition to halting Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the U.S. attacks also pressured Iran to withdraw its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) military advisers from Yemen. That pullout, if confirmed and sustained, will diminish Houthi capabilities going forward. A senior Iranian official explained to journalists that Iran’s withdrawal was intended to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. and the risk of Iranian casualties. Iran might also have sought to limit regional flashpoints with the U.S. as the two countries were engaged in talks to forge a new nuclear agreement. An Iranian withdrawal from Yemen would offer further affirmation that Iran’s regional geostrategic position has been weakened since mid-2024, and the regional balance of power has shifted toward Israel and the U.S. Even if Iran has taken its IRGC-QF personnel out of Yemen, Iran is still providing the Houthis material support by shipping weapons and weapons technology to the group, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials.

While refraining from new strikes in the Red Sea, Houthi leaders have implemented their threats to continue attacking Israel as long as its operations against Hamas in Gaza continue. Last week, the Houthis’ paramount leader, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, stated: “No matter the size of Israeli aggression and no matter how often it repeats, it will not affect our people’s stance in supporting the Palestinian people. The Israeli enemy remained in a weak position following the cessation of American aggression due to its failure…The Israeli enemy is trying to restore deterrence through this repeated aggression on civilian facilities in our country.” Since March 18, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) resumed its offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis have launched 42 ballistic missiles and at least 10 drones at Israel. A May 4 missile impacted inside the grounds of Ben Gurion Airport, causing no discernible damage but nonetheless prompting most foreign carriers to suspend their flights to and from Israel. Most of the other Houthi missile and drone launches were intercepted.

Israel has retaliated for Houthi attacks that cause disruption and, as experts expected, the continued exchanges and threats have escalated, increasing the potential for spill-over to other parts of the region. Last week, the Houthis fired two ballistic missiles toward Israel, both of which were intercepted by Israel’s sophisticated air defenses. To try to establish deterrence, last Wednesday, Israel struck Sanaa International Airport for the second time in a month. Khaled al-Shaief, General Director of the airport, posted on social media that the strike had completely destroyed the last of the civilian planes operated by Yemenia Airways from the airport. Affirming that attacks on Yemen’s limited civilian transportation infrastructure will worsen an already dire humanitarian situation in the country, the Houthis asserted that the targeted aircraft was being used to carry out medical evacuations to Jordan. Aviation data reviewed by Arab media outlets reported that the Yemenia plane was scheduled to take those performing the Muslim Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. An Israeli retaliatory strike on that airport earlier in May destroyed its main terminal and six planes, and left craters on its runway, closing the airport for 11 days. Also in May, Israel targeted the Houthi-controlled Hodeida and Salif ports in Yemen – key infrastructure needed for the importation of food and medicine, but which the Houthis also use to bring in Iran-supplied weapons technology. On Thursday, one day after the latest strike on Sanaa International, the Houthis launched another ballistic missile at Israel, which Israeli air defenses successfully intercepted, marking the Houthis’ sixth attempted attack on Israeli territory in a week.

Unbowed, the Houthis have threatened to escalate their attacks against Israel further. Last week, Houthi representatives warned they would impose a “naval blockade” on the Israeli port of Haifa in response to Israel’s expansion of its military offensive in Gaza. Sources from the group told Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper last Friday that, in response to the latest Israeli strike on Sanaa International Airport, it would target planes belonging to Israel’s national carrier, El Al, and other Israeli airliners. The sources added: “upcoming operations will differ in quantity and substance from the previous operations” against Israel. It is presumed – although the Houthis have not clarified – that their threat would only apply to passenger aircraft on the ground, and not carrying a planeload of passengers in flight. But, a spokesperson for the group claimed to Newsweek that it had obtained “new weapons” capable of enforcing an “aerial blockade” on Israel – a comment that might imply an intent to target Israeli aircraft in flight. The Houthis have shot down at least seven U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones – all of which are purely military targets and unmanned.

The Houthi vow to strike at Israeli civilian aircraft raises the possibility that the group might use its external alliances to expand the battlefield beyond Yemen, Israel, and the Red Sea. Over the past few years, the Houthis have cultivated increasingly close relations with the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, a Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate that operates throughout East Africa. El Al and other Israeli carriers fly regular routes to East Africa, most notably major cities in Kenya, putting their passenger jets potentially within reach of al-Shabaab, were that group to undertake operations on behalf of the Houthis. UN sanctions experts documented two recent meetings between al-Shabaab and the Houthis; the last involved the Houthis sending an explosives expert to Jilib, al-Shabaab’s de facto capital, according to U.S. diplomats citing U.S. intelligence. An April 16 U.S. airstrike on two unflagged vessels off the Somali coast targeted a shipment of surface-to-air missiles from Yemen, according to a senior Somali security official. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) declined to provide details, but its news release said the boat carried “advanced conventional weapons.” The potential threat of a Houthi-Shabaab operation against Israel comes as U.S. officials have expressed concern that U.S. disengagement from its military relationship with Somali government forces might fuel al-Shabaab’s expansion into neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia and enable al-Shabaab to strengthen relations with the Houthis further. As U.S. involvement in Somalia has waned, Turkiye has superseded AFRICOM as the primary military support mission for Somali forces. Ankara has sought to step into the vacuum left by U.S. disengagement or inconsistency in several theatres, including in European defense investment.

A Houthi military or Houthi-backed terrorist attack on Israeli civilian aviation would almost certainly widen regional conflict considerably. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump have each threatened to respond to Houthi attacks by targeting their main backer, Tehran. Operation Rough Rider was publicly advertised by Trump and his aides as a “message” to Iranian leaders to resolve U.S. concerns about its nuclear program. A severe, mass-casualty Houthi attack on Israeli civilians – either in Israel or outside it – would seemingly provide Prime Minister Netanyahu the justification he seeks to carry out a major attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, with or without U.S. approval. And, experts assess that a Houthi attack that kills many Israeli civilians would put considerable pressure on Trump to respond on Israel’s behalf. In that scenario, many experts assess that Trump would “green light” an Israeli attack on Iran, and perhaps even order U.S. forces to join the strike.