Assistance from Russia and expanding ties to terrorist organizations are enabling the Houthi movement in Yemen to emerge as an increasingly serious threat to regional and global security.
The Houthis are seeking more advanced weaponry from Russia to try to attack U.S. and allied warships and deter Western attacks.
An alliance with al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate, might enable the Houthis to escalate their attacks on commercial and military ships operating in the Red Sea.
The Houthis have expanded cooperation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to consolidate control over additional Yemeni territory.
A new confidential 537-page report by a United Nations panel of experts to the Security Council Committee monitoring global compliance with UN sanctions on war-torn Yemen portrays an expanding threat to international commerce and to regional stability posed by the Houthi movement (Ansarallah). According to the UN report, the Houthis are building working relationships with Moscow as well as Sunni Islamist terrorist groups operating in Yemen and in the Horn of Africa. The ties to Russia, a major exporter of advanced weaponry, hold the potential to escalate the Houthi threat not only to commercial shipping in the Red Sea but also to the Western-led warships that are seeking to secure the critical maritime chokepoint from Houthi attacks. Operational links to major terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia, expand the Houthis’ regional reach in and around Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa.
U.S. and allied officials are particularly concerned about the growing ties between the Houthis and the Kremlin, which apparently sees the Yemeni group as an instrument through which to retaliate for and deter Western support for Ukraine. In its past reports, the UN panel of experts has repeatedly cited Iran-led attempts to smuggle 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, AKS-20U assault rifles, and other weapons to Yemen – all with Russian specifications and markings. According to a Wall Street Journal report in late October, quoting several European defense officials, Russia provided satellite targeting data for the Houthis to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea with missiles and armed drones in early 2024. Moscow passed the targeting data through officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) embedded within the Houthi military structure. According to other reports, advisers from Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU, are now working in Houthi-controlled Sanaa under the guise of humanitarian aid workers.
In exchange for the Russian help, the Houthis have reportedly guaranteed safe passage for Russian ships passing through the southern Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint. Numerous reports have also emerged of Yemeni youth being recruited to serve in the Russian army on the Ukraine battlefield. The growing Houthi-Russia cooperation illustrates that Russia’s actions in the region are a reflection of the expanding ties between the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic. Having become dependent on Iranian arms supplies for its war against Ukraine, Moscow is being increasingly drawn into Tehran’s orbit in the Middle East and is accordingly building ties to Iran’s Axis of Resistance partners in the region.
Perhaps most worrisome for U.S., European, and regional leaders are the reported efforts by Iran – the main backer of the Houthis and increasingly an ally of Moscow as well – to broker the sale by Russia of sophisticated anti-ship missiles and other weapons to the Houthis. Numerous sources report that Moscow is contemplating, but has not yet decided on, transferring to the Houthis the Yakhont missile – also known as P-800 Oniks. Experts say that weapon would not only enable the Houthis to strike commercial vessels in the Red Sea more accurately but also would increase the threat to the U.S. and European warships defending them. To date, the Houthis have used Iran-supplied missiles and armed drones to target both U.S.-led maritime coalition warships as well as commercial ships. The Houthis have hit many and sunk a few commercial ships, but their efforts to strike naval vessels have all been intercepted or otherwise failed. The elevated Houthi threat to allied warships that the Yakhont would pose could cause U.S. partners to exit the Red Sea defense mission and further disrupt global shipping routes. In late October, Germany re-routed one of its naval frigates to avoid the Red Sea because it lacks adequate defenses against Houthi anti-ship capabilities.
Because of the heightened threat that would be posed by the Yakhont and other Russian systems, U.S. and allied regional officials have undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to dissuade the Kremlin from completing sales of sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis. According to experts, the Houthis could potentially use the Yakhont as a land-attack weapon, which Saudi Arabia would undoubtedly see as a threat. In the summer of 2024, several U.S. media outlets reported that the Kremlin declined a Yakhont transfer to the Houthis in response to pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has worked cooperatively with Russia on global oil exportation policy, and the Kremlin is reluctant to risk a rift with Saudi leaders by selling advanced weaponry to the Houthis. Senior U.S. officials believe the Kremlin is using the threat to provide the system to the Houthis as leverage to compel Washington to maintain restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range U.S.-supplied weapons against targets deep inside Russia.
The UN panel of experts’ report honed in on the strategic benefits the Houthis have accrued by expanding ties to regional militant movements. The report assessed the Houthi rebels have grown “from a localized armed group with limited capabilities to a powerful military organization,” with the help of tactical and technical training as well as arms from “…the IRGC-QF, Hezbollah, and Iraqi specialists and technicians…” According to the report, the Houthis conducted at least one joint attack with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, a coalition of pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, on Israel’s Haifa port.
In recent public statements, U.S. officials, including the Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, have claimed the Houthis are providing weapons to al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia but active throughout East Africa. Corroborating the U.S. assertions, the UN experts report stated: “Additionally, increased smuggling activities, involving small and light weapons (SALWs) are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier.” The UN report also quoted sources as saying, “The Houthis are evaluating the available options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast, in order to expand the scope of their area of operations [by working with al-Shabaab].” Coordinated attacks between the Houthis and al-Shabaab against ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea could compound the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping, further raising the costs of maritime shipping, and potentially frustrating U.S. attempts to combat the attacks.
Within Yemen, the Houthis appear to have forged an alliance with a Sunni jihadist group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to battle their common adversaries, including the UN-recognized Republic of Yemen Government and the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC). According to the UN experts’ report: “Both (the Houthis and AQAP) have agreed to cease internal conflict (against each other), transfer weapons, and coordinate on attacks against the forces of the Government of Yemen.” According to the report, as well as Yemen Government sources, the Houthis are providing AQAP with armed drones, thermal rockets, and reconnaissance equipment and releasing key AQAP figures from jail. On the ground, local residents say the two groups no longer engage in skirmishes with each other, a clear sign they are working together. In an era of great power competition where the United States and its allies have curbed the resources dedicated to counterterrorism, a revived and well-armed AQAP is a dangerous scenario.
The Houthis see cooperation with AQAP, which operates predominantly in southern Yemen, as integral to their efforts to control more physical territory in Yemen. For its part, AQAP accepts the Houthi’s help, despite its ideological differences with the Zaidi Shia Houthi movement, in order to establish a safe haven in Yemen. The southern provinces of Yemen offer both groups unobstructed access to a large coastline and land corridors to north Yemen and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf – better positioning the Houthis to exert leverage on the latter. Although cooperation with AQAP as well as al-Shabaab offers the Houthis strategic benefits, the alliances also cement the Western perception of the Houthis as a terrorist movement. AQAP has conducted several attacks on commercial passenger aircraft and other targets outside Yemen, and al-Shabaab has conducted numerous major terrorist attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and elsewhere, sometimes with substantial loss of civilian lives. The Houthis’ association with these groups potentially complicates global efforts to mediate an end to the destructive and long-running internal conflict in Yemen. It also gives two al-Qaeda affiliates an opportunity to increase their respective profiles and gain traction, posing a formidable threat to the region and beyond.