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In the latest development around maritime access in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti is offering Ethiopia access to its second (potash) port, Tadjourah, to calm tensions that have emerged since the controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. This move signifies the trepidation with which Djibouti views Ethiopia’s intents in the region.
These developments reflect an intensification of uncertainty in the Horn of Africa region already renowned for its political volatility and ongoing conflicts. Over the last 30 years, we have already seen the emergence of two new states, Eritrea and South Sudan, and one de facto state in the form of Somaliland, as well as other emergent sub-national autonomous polities, such as Puntland and Jubbaland and perhaps even Tigray in Ethiopia.
Political trajectories in the Horn can be conceived in terms of new risks and threats but also in terms of new possibilities and the new imaginaries of the state, including reconfigured borders, processes of re-territorialization and new sovereign entities. In an increasingly polarised world where international norms are under considerable strain, political elites within the Horn of Africa are asking ‘where are we going?’ and positioning themselves accordingly.
In recent analyses of these developments, such as with the now infamous MoU, little attention has been paid to the underlying ethnic and clan dimensions and their intersection with state power and sovereignty. As Jethro Norman highlights in the case of the Las Anod conflict in the Somaliland-Puntland borderlands, ‘Central to these developments is the changing relationship between clan and the state’, pointing out the salience of international investment, particularly in the Berbera port and corridor.
We offer preliminary thoughts on the intersection of identity – whether ethnic or clan – and the state in relation to the juxtaposition of Oromo, Afar and Somali identities and the states of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, where maritime power is a major arena of contestation.
The MoU – maritime access or territorial expansion?
Ethiopia’s aspirations for greater access to the sea had already intensified under PM Abiy Ahmed, prior to the MoU itself, and despite the option it already had to improve its access through a 19% stake in Berbera port in Somaliland, agreed in 2018 that it ultimately did not take up. When relations were warmer between Ethiopia and Eritrea, before and during the Tigray war, the latter’s ports appeared to offer one alternative outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, albeit limited in terms of Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. That now is a distant prospect as relations have soured considerably.
Under the short-lived tripartite alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, Abiy had reportedly held discussions with ex-President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’ (2017-22), on the topic of maritime access but nothing concrete came from it. Ethiopia’s PM has also made various public statements suggesting that Ethiopia’s own Somali Regional State (SRS) should have access to the sea just as all of the other Somali regions have access. The regions he was referring to effectively included all regions of ‘Greater Somalia’ namely: British Somaliland (Somaliland), Italian Somaliland (the South), French Somaliland (Djibouti), Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (Northeast Province) and the Somali region of Ethiopia (Somali Regional State).
Ethiopia has even courted traditional elders from the Isse and Gadabursi Somali clans of present-day Somaliland with meetings organised in Harar and Addis Ababa. The Isse are present in a contiguous area linking Djibouti, Ethiopia and western Somaliland and the Gadabursi primarily identified with the latter. A delegation of the Oromo Elders Council who visited Somaliland this year stated that 40% of the current Oromo population is of Somali-Dir descent. While there are certainly overlapping identities, as we discuss below, such claims can be interpreted in relation to territorial claims. The eventual outcome of these various encounters and statements materialised in the current MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
One of the core sensitivities for many Somalis in these developments is that what is articulated as access to the sea, on the one hand, is also perceived as the territorial expansion of Ethiopia on the other, an extremely emotive subject. The division of the Somali-speaking regions of the Horn of Africa by various colonial powers, including Ethiopia, remains highly evocative in the Somali imagination. The Somalia flag itself refers to the unity of all Somalis while referencing the colonial divisions i.e. the 5 points of the star. In addition, Somalis, no matter where they might hold nationality, are entitled to a Somali passport.
Furthermore, perceptions of Ethiopian expansionism can now also be conflated with Oromo expansionism, a perspective alive amongst many Somalis, including those following developments in the Oromo-Somali border areas over the last 20 years, within the region as well as in the wider diaspora. It is no exaggeration to claim that an Oromo identity and power are in the ascendancy in Ethiopia, represented by PM Abiy himself, the co-location of Oromia regional state capital and the national capital in Addis Ababa and the continuities of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) in the Prosperity Party (PP). Newly developing economic and trading relations between the Oromo and Somali actors may well also underlie these developments and perceptions.
While PM Abiy Ahmed initially signalled a new, warm and even brotherly relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, reversing the character of this relationship under the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) led EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), over time Abiy has revealed his more chameleon characteristics, ambitions and unpredictability.
Transborder identities
Djibouti is a tiny rentier-state but provides the most important maritime trade corridor for Ethiopian imports and exports. It is comprised of two major ethnic groups, the Isse and the Afar, the former being a Somali clan who have long held power over the state. Both ethnic groups are dispersed – in contiguous areas – across the borders of three states, the Isse between Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland, and the Afar between Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia. There is a history of tensions and conflict between the two groups, particularly in Ethiopia, often instrumentalised by national-level political elites.
To Djibouti, the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU represents a potential militarised corridor that could cut off the Isse of Djibouti from the wider (non-Ethiopian) Somali territories (Somalia / Somaliland). As much as the Somalis have intra, clan-based political tensions, there also exists a pan-Somali solidarity. This includes a cultural affinity, shared language and knowledge that Somalis can engage each other in dialogue in times of disagreement.
In this light, the offer of the joint management of the port of Tadjourah is notable and symbolically important for being in the Afar territory of Djibouti. Prior to this public offer, Djibouti had reportedly discussed the possibility, with Ethiopian counterparts, of trading its Afar territory with Isse territory in Ethiopia. Such initiatives and discussions reflect the exploratory trading taking place between different groups and along ethnic lines.
As alluded to above, another line of discussion that has been alive is between Oromo and Somali elites within Ethiopia. One of the permutations for identity-based reconfigurations has been the division of the Somali Region State of Ethiopia (SRS) into a Dir region and a non-Dir region. The Dir is seen as offering a potential means to access the coast for Oromo/Ethiopian interests over time (hence the Dir-Oromo common identity claims). One of the preliminary negotiating positions for the non-Dir of SRS was to be given the historical town of Harar as well as the East Harar zone that surrounds it.
Hot air, precedents or negotiations?
When it comes to Somali politics, a common expression is ‘fadhi ku dirir’ (fighting while sitting) which refers to the endless teashop discussions that men engage in about politics. An implicit and subtle meaning of the expression is that such discussions are not well-informed. In other words, it’s a lot of ‘hot air’. However, while the actual trajectory and outcome of these elite-driven discussions are as yet unclear, reflecting the uncertain political future of Ethiopia in particular, recent history tells us that reconfigured internal and external state boundaries, as well as new forms of ethnic or clan nationalisms, do materialise in the Horn of Africa.
As well as the examples of Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland, a lesser known but more recent example is the transnational mobilisation of Ogaden elites around the first federal member state of Somalia, Jubbaland. The Ogaden are themselves a transborder group, with significant numbers and political salience in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. As we have highlighted, the Jubbaland Project under its still-standing President, Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’, was enabled by the aligning of Ethiopian and Kenyan state interests with those of the transborder Ogaden, influential in the state capitals of Nairobi and Addis Ababa. Jubbaland symbolised in its early years the re-emergence of Ogaden identity and power within the Somali-speaking Horn (even if that project is less celebrated today).
Political elites in the region are mindful of this history including its risks and potential and are exploring options with each other. With the demise of Ethiopia’s EPRDF and the resultant conflicts in northern Ethiopia, the Oromo and the Somali are at the forefront of many of these discussions.
Nisar Majid is the Research Director at the LSE PeaceRep (Somalia) programme. He has been working in and on the Somali territories of the Horn of Africa since the late 1990s in various research and applied capacities.
Khalif Abdirahman is senior field researcher on PeaceRep (Somalia) and has extensive research experience across the Horn of Africa, particularly in the Somali-speaking regions.