Analysis: Egypt’s growing military alliance with Mogadishu is causing alarm in Ethiopia, with fears Somalia could become the theatre for a proxy conflict.
Following major recent shifts in military and security cooperation between Cairo and Mogadishu, speculation is growing as to whether Somalia could become a proxy battlefield in mounting tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.
On Sunday, an Egyptian ship delivered a consignment of military equipment to Somalia, security officials said, including artillery and anti-aircraft guns. It was the second such delivery in a month.
Tensions have been growing between Somalia and Ethiopia since earlier this year when Addis Ababa signed a memorandum of understanding with the self-declared republic of Somaliland to lease part of its coastline for a military base in return for recognising the region’s independence.
Following the arms delivery this week, Ethiopia, via Djibouti, reportedly sent a warning to Egypt that if its military presence harms Addis Ababa’s interests in Somalia it will be met with a reaction.
In response, Egypt said that it is ready to respond forcefully to any attempt to harm Egypt’s presence in Somalia or Somali interests.
A new map of alliances
Conflicting geopolitical interests have seen tensions soar in the Horn of Africa in recent months, with Somalia and Ethiopia’s ties at their lowest point in many years.
Last October, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared that obtaining a sovereign sea outlet for his landlocked country was an “existential matter”.
Months later, in January, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to recognise the separatist region in exchange for leasing Addis Ababa a strip of coastal territory for the construction of a military base.
Somalia considered the move an infringement of its national sovereignty and announced it would work to undermine it through all means. Cairo was among the first stops in a visit by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to form a support front against Ethiopia, with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announcing his country’s support for Somalia’s unity and sovereignty.
For its part, Egypt has been involved in a diplomatic conflict with Ethiopia for years over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Shortly before Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland, Cairo had announced an end to the negotiations track with Addis Ababa over the dam and reiterated its right to defend its water and national security.
Egypt and Somalia’s new alliance culminated in the signing of a joint defence agreement in mid-August. Shortly afterwards, Egyptian military aircraft arrived in Mogadishu carrying Egyptian equipment and technicians to implement the terms of the deal, while thousands of Egyptian soldiers are expected to replace their Ethiopian counterparts in an African peacekeeping force operating in Somalia early next year.
Ethiopian Chief of Staff, General Berhanu Jula, responded to these developments by saying his country would not stand idly by in the face of attempts by external forces to spread instability in the region. Ethiopian reinforcements, meanwhile, were dispatched to the border with Somalia.
In the same month, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed announced that his country’s dam project was expected to be completed by the end of the year. Egypt’s foreign ministry called the statement “completely unacceptable”, with rising tensions between the three parties prompting fears of a move towards militarised conflict in the region.
The Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict through a Somali lens
In 1991, Somalia began to experience a downward spiral with the collapse of state institutions and the onset of a civil war. The country has been unable to recover from these severe divisions and their effects, as evidenced by its consistent position among the bottom two ranks of the Global Fragility Index between 2008 and 2024.
This fragility is reflected by Somalia’s numerous challenges in effectively combating the terrorist group Al-Shabab and establishing security across the country.
The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has added further complexity to the situation for decision-makers in Mogadishu.
According to Somali journalist Nor Gedi, transferring the Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict to Somali territory could bring certain political and security benefits for Mogadishu, especially considering its relative weaknesses compared to Ethiopia.
Gedi told The New Arab that Mogadishu seeks to leverage Cairo’s support to help rehabilitate the Somali army and enhance Somalia’s political position in regional issues, in addition to economic benefits.
For example, the terms of the defence agreement stipulate that Cairo will train Somali military and security personnel and exchange intelligence information. Cairo is also expected to participate in an African peacekeeping force in Somalia early next year, which will allow thousands of Egyptian soldiers to be stationed in Somali states bordering Ethiopia.
This will enable Egypt to carry out intelligence activities in the region and communicate with rebel groups inside Ethiopia.
Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Maalim Fiqi stated in mid-September that unless Addis Ababa backs down from the memorandum of understanding with what he described as “Somali separatists,” his country will establish relations with Ethiopian rebels.
A path to armed conflict?
Shadi Ibrahim, an Egyptian researcher in security studies and international relations at Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, believes that while there is a possibility of a confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia within Somalia, it is still quite unlikely.
Any potential confrontation is not solely tied to Cairo or Addis Ababa, as other influential forces in Somalia would strive to prevent such a scenario from unfolding, he told The New Arab.
Ibrahim explained that Turkey holds significant influence in Somalia and is leading mediation efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia at the request of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
This “indicates that Ankara will apply pressure and attempt to prevent any escalation of tension” in the region, the researcher said.
For his part, Ethiopian political analyst Abdushekur Abdusemed Hassen believes that the possibility of an Ethiopian-Egyptian war in Somalia is “very small.”
International and regional actors wouldn’t tolerate a new conflict in the region, which is surrounded by ongoing wars in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Gaza.
“Any such conflict would inflame the entire Horn of Africa,” Hassen told TNA.
Despite the tense atmosphere, many observers indicate that the two countries are not prepared to wage a direct war on Somali territory, as Cairo is going through a sensitive security situation with the wars raging in Sudan and Gaza, together with a domestic financial crisis.
Ethiopia, meanwhile, is suffering from the costly economic repercussions of the Tigray War (2020-2022) in addition to major security disturbances as rebel movements in the country expand their activity.
Egypt and Ethiopia’s cards in Somalia
Despite the absence of armed conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa on Somali territory, it is anticipated that they will engage in other forms of ‘battle’ to gain the greatest level of influence in the country. In this context, both countries have their own distinct advantages.
Egypt’s presence will be backed by an official agreement with the Somali government, and internal divisions within the country regarding Egypt’s actions will create a supportive environment for Cairo.
In addition, both countries need mutual diplomatic support in their respective concerns. Egypt aims to obtain Somali support for its position on Ethiopia’s dam project and change Mogadishu’s position, which chose neutrality in 2020. Somalia, meanwhile, will benefit from its growing relationship with Cairo in supporting international initiatives to preserve peace and rebuild the country.
Gedi believes that Egypt’s support and training for Somalia’s security sector, as well as its involvement in an African peacekeeping force, will strengthen the Somali government’s ability to combat terrorist groups like Al-Shabab. However, this assistance may also lead to an increase in Cairo’s influence in Somalia from a military and security perspective.
The Somali journalist believes that Addis Ababa will continue to strengthen its relations with semi-autonomous federal regions in Somalia, such as Puntland and Somaliland, which will enable it to build channels of influence independent of the central government in Mogadishu.
There is also a possibility that Ethiopia may seek to improve relations with the Al-Shabab movement to counter Egyptian influence and preserve stability along the shared border.
In recent weeks, however, there have been disagreements between Somali central government officials and regional states that reject Egyptian intervention and demand the continued presence of Ethiopian forces. In addition, there have been popular demonstrations in some cities calling for the same outcome.