• In late July in northern Mali, Wagner Group mercenaries, currently known as Africa Corps, were ambushed and routed by Tuareg rebels and al-Qaeda militants.
• Tuareg rebels began reaching out to international actors by the end of 2023 early 2024 and, according to multiple sources, Ukraine demonstrated interest and granted limited assistance.
• Rather than focusing on potential Western targets, the latest official communications by JNIM commanders have focused on attacking juntas, Russia, and Türkiye, the latter being described as “an ally” of the military regimes in the Sahel due to the use of Turkish made drones and ammunition by Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou.
• The unprecedented number of Wagner mercenaries killed on African soil during the late July battle will not lead to their disengagement from Mali, nor Moscow’s influence and presence in Western Africa.

Following the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) a year ago, the Malian military (FAMa), supported by Russian mercenaries, began an offensive to secure former MINUSMA bases in the Tombouctou region. The return of the Malian army to this region, which had previously been patrolled by MINUSMA and French forces, resulted in a resumption of hostilities between Tuareg separatists and government forces. Three months later, FAMa and Russian mercenaries, formerly under the banner of Wagner Group and now reflagged as Africa Corps, had captured the town of Kidal— the historic “capital” of the Tuareg dominated rebel movements of the north. After a series of successful tactical victories, FAMa and Africa Corps fighters found themselves able to operate in areas that had been rebel-controlled for years, although they remained unable to hold the territory in a significant way.

Emboldened by their temporary success, FAMa and Africa Corps decided to operate even closer to the Algerian border, a move that would help them promote a strong image for propaganda and information operations. By operating along the border, the joint forces also sought to cut off some of the income earned through smuggling routes used by rebel factions gathered under the banner of the “Cadre Stratégique Permanant pour la Défense du Peuple de l’Azawad” (CSP-DPA), as well as forcefully secure control of the gold mines in the area. The CSP-DPA is composed of two main Tuareg dominated factions the “Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad” (MNLA), headed by Bilal Ag Acherif and the “Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad” (HCUA), headed by al-Ghabass Ag Intalla.

In late July, a joint FAMa-Africa Corp convoy departed Tessalit for the settlement of Tinzawaten along the Algerian border. The convoy initially faced minimal resistance, in the form of scattered improvised explosive devices believed to be emplaced by jihadists from al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch, Jamaa’t Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Once the convoy reached the outskirts of Tinzawaten, approximately 7 km from the border town, the joint force encountered organized resistance from rebel forces joined by local inhabitants and backed by two vehicles of jihadist JNIM fighters nearby.

Once the convoy was forced to stop and reverse course, it was subsequently harassed and attacked by fighters from the CSP-DPA. Poor weather conditions prevented air support, either Turkish made TB2 drones or helicopters, from assisting the embattled units on the ground. It remains unclear if the remaining forces were deliberately pushed into JNIM territory, but the retreating convoy’s final stand occurred on July 27 in the heart of a longtime al-Qaeda stronghold. Already weakened from two days of fighting, at least 50 Wagner mercenaries and dozens of Malian soldiers were killed before eventually being overrun by JNIM fighters and rebels. No mercenaries were taken alive by the jihadis. Rebel forces captured two mercenaries who ran out of ammunition after finding refuge in a nearby hill. The Tinzawaten incident was Wagner’s most significant defeat in Africa and could have implications for how the group continues to operate on the continent as Africa Corps.

Some rebel political figures denied JNIM’s involvement in the last day of the three-day battle and claimed that they killed “84 Russian mercenaries”. The CSP-DPA participated in the heaviest fighting, and the group, understandably, does not want to be associated with an al-Qaeda offshoot. Despite this, accounts of the ambush clearly indicate a degree of tactical coordination between JNIM and the northern rebel factions that had not been observed since the signing of the 2015 Algiers Accords. In 2012 Tuareg rebels allied themselves with jihadist groups to defeat government forces and seize key cities in northern Mali. Consolidating their victory, the coalition of jihadist groups, united under the banner of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), sidelined the Tuaregs to pursue a hardline Islamist agenda.. Although there is evidence of cohabitation between rebel groups and the jihadists, the relationship remains tense and at times violent. In early April, fighting between JNIM and the rebels broke out near the Mauritanian border, when the latter entered JNIM territory. Bilal Ag Acherif – a Tuareg leader – refused to personally meet JNIM representatives. JNIM’s decision to avoid the fight for the town of Kidal last November, in order “not to save the rebels capital and show the locals that the path of jihad is the only good path,” the rebels ended up leaving the town without a fight.

A comparison can be made between Russia’s moves in Mali with how Moscow has operated in Syria. A decade ago, and before attacking Islamic State in Syria, Russia directed its military effort against rebel factions. In the case of Mali, Moscow is trying, through Wagner, to corner the international community and regional actors in a similar way. Mali has an Islamic State problem in Ménaka in the east and an entrenched, yet still growing JNIM presence in the center and south bordering the Gulf of Guinea countries. However, Western policymakers should note one major difference between the two cases: while terror attacks were staged and monitored from Syria, the dominating jihadi faction in the Sahel, JNIM, denied publicly any ambition to target Western countries on their soil. The latest official communications by JNIM commanders, either in Mali or Burkina Faso, have focused on juntas, Russia, and Türkiye, the latter being described as “an ally” of the military regimes in the Sahel due to the use of Turkish made drones and ammunition by Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou.

After the swift defeat of Wagner in Tinzawaten on July 27, Ukraine surprisingly declared publicly that they helped the CSP-DPA win the battle. CSP-DPA representatives began reaching out for assistance to international actors in late 2023 and early 2024. Due to its ongoing war with Russia and prior involvement in Sudan, rebels identified Ukraine as a candidate for potential support. According to multiple sources, Kyiv showed interest and provided limited amounts of financial aid to the rebels. Ukraine also provided medical and mini drone training to a few rebels on its own soil and sent at least one trainer to northern Mali. Despite the fact that rebels used one-way-attack drones in the first two days of the battle, their use was not determinant for the outcome. Nevertheless, Kyiv going public about its relationship with the rebels – coupled with the documented role played by JNIM – unwillingly played into accusations by the Malian forces that the rebels and the jihadis were “the same foreign backed terrorists.”

After the capture of two Russian geologists by JNIM on July 19, Wagner’s prospecting for gold mines in neighboring Niger began poorly. Nevertheless, considering the low-cost investment and the strategic benefits, it is quite certain that Russia will maintain and sustain its presence on the African continent through Wagner or bilateral defense and mining agreements. Military tactics will probably be adapted, and convoys will likely not venture again into the desert without reliable air support. Reinforcing propaganda, Russia will be able to brag about spilling the blood of its nationals in battles where Western armies are accused of being reluctant.

Since 2013, 58 French soldiers have died during various operations in the Sahel against both al-Qaeda and Islamic State. While fighting Islamic State Sahel Province alongside Niger’s army, four U.S. Army green berets were killed in 2017. After less than three years of involvement, the number of Wagner mercenaries killed in action in the Sahel is nearing these figures. Rather than a sign of the highest sense of sacrifice, it indicates military inefficiency and tarnishes Wagner’s reputation on the continent. Despite achieving a series of victories against the comparatively weaker Tuareg rebel groups, Wagner has had mixed results countering Jihadist forces and remains most successful at inflicting mass civilian casualties and terrorizing local populations accused of supporting Jihadist groups. Such a strategy has played directly into the hands of the Islamists, deepening societal divides in Mali and providing fodder for propaganda and recruitment.