Egypt has announced a new security arrangement with Somalia, which would see Egyptian soldiers stationed in Somalia and cooperating directly with their Somali counterparts. The stated goal is to shore up regional security in line with the renewed African Union stabilization force in Somalia. The security deal comes at a time of heightened tension and instability in the region. In particular, Ethiopia has strongly criticized the deal, claiming that certain actors are “taking measures to destabilize the region.” The announcement also comes fresh off the heels of a bilateral meeting between the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al Sisi and his Somali counterpart in August.

Water Conflict at the Heart of Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions

Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia are nothing new and are typically rooted in water conflict. In 1959, Egypt signed the Nile Waters Agreement with the newly independent Sudan. The deal sought to govern the supply of water flowing through the Nile River. Ethiopia, however, was not present at the summit that led to the inking of the deal.

With the Nile River’s flow on Sudan’s territory secured by treaty, Egypt was able to develop its Aswan High Dam beginning in 1960, one year after it signed the Nile Waters Agreement was signed. The dam was a developmental game-changer in Egypt, unlocking the country’s agricultural potential and generating hydroelectric power.

Ethiopia sought the same kind of developmental gains with its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a mega-project on the Blue Nile that was completed in 2023. Like all hydroelectric dams, the Grand Renaissance Dam extracts a certain volume of water to fill its reservoirs and rotate its turbines, reducing the amount of water available to downstream countries at a rate roughly equal to the volume of the reservoir. In the case of the Grand Renaissance Dam, this translates into around 74 billion cubic meters of reduce downstream flow at any given time.

So far, the completion of the dam and filling of its reservoir has not spelled complete disaster for Egypt. Yet the consequences by mid-century could be far worse. Egypt is projected to be home to over 160 million people by 2050, putting a strain not just on potable water supplies but also other essential resources. In terms of geopolitics, the Grand Renaissance Dam transfers control of Egypt’s vital water resources to an external partner. The dam allows the Ethiopian government to reduce or increase the flow of the Nile as it deems fit, according to its own developmental interests.

This places Egypt in an extremely vulnerable position, as its very existence is linked to the Nile. For example, according to Egypt’s foreign ministry, a mere 2% reduction in water from the Nile translates into a loss of roughly 81,000 hectares of irrigated land. Yet for Ethiopia, the dam is essential in meeting its ever-growing energy demands and maintaining its explosive growth in GDP per capita.

Expanding Geopolitics of Egypt-Ethiopia Tensions

The geographic scope of Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry is now expanding as their water conflict comes to a head. In January, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway state of Somaliland, a region recognized by the international community as part of Somalia. In response, Egypt expressed outward support for Somalia, on top of the security pact and recent high-level meeting, with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi insisting that his country would stand by a fellow Arab country. Though Somalis are by and large a distinct ethnicity with its own language, the widespread use of Arabic and cultural similarities with the Arab world grant both it and the Somali-majority state of Djibouti membership in the Arab League.

By aligning with Somalia, Egypt looks to increase pressure on Ethiopia. One particularly sensitive issue stems from the demographic cleavage of ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of southeast Ethiopia, which contrasts with the primarily Oromo and Amhara peoples that otherwise constitute the majority of Ethiopia’s population. This region was engulfed in a brief war toward the end of the 1970s when Somalia’s then president Siad Barre attempted to unite the Ogaden region with the rest of Somalia. Though Somalia ultimately lost the war, Soviet and Eastern Bloc support for Ethiopia under the Derg military council was critical in ensuring the defeat of Barre’s forces. It was this failure of Barre that triggered a subsequent rebellion in 1978 and ultimately saw the fall of the Barre regime in 1991.

Despite rising Egypt-Ethiopia tensions, a full-blown war is unlikely to break out. The two countries are separated by over 800 kilometers of Sudanese territory, making a land incursion through war-torn Sudan and the Sahara Desert impossible. Ethiopia has no direct sea access, and thus no naval assets with which to threaten Egypt, or vice versa, making aerial platforms the only viable military option. Large air incursions would have to cross either Sudanese or Eritrean airspace – an untenable possibility at the moment. Toward the south, Somalia is engulfed in an Islamist insurgency in its southern regions against Al-Shabaab and its allies. Ethiopia’s mountainous central geography meanwhile serves to limit the amount of control over its desert Ogaden territory, which is disconnected from Ethiopia’s geographic heartland and consequently its ability to significantly project power towards Somalia. In essence, geography limits the types of responses that each party has at its disposal.

Somaliland’s Unclear Status Raises Specter of Proxy War

For these reasons, a limited or proxy conflict is more likely than a full-blown war. Against Somalia, Ethiopia would only have Somaliland as a significant potential proxy. Though the central Somali government has relied on local militias in the federal states of Puntland and Jubaland, neither of these units’ denizens seek independence by and large. Within Ethiopia, ethnic cleavages leave it more vulnerable to outside influence. If Egypt, wanted, it could try to play on sectarian tensions in Ethiopia to its ultimate advantage. If the Tigray war is any guide, however, Addis Ababa would take a hard line on any major anti-government unrest, especially if supported by a foreign power. In that case, the conflict would almost certainly escalate. An Egyptian incursion into Ethiopia from Somalia is also unlikely in the near-term due to the geographical separation and low numbers of Egyptian troops expected to be stationed under the recent deal.

Though there currently exists a low-intensity war between Somaliland and Mogadishu-aligned regional actors, a full-scale conflict involving these entities is unlikely. Any overtly aggressive acts would cause rebuke from Somalia’s international backers, on which it heavily relies, even though Somaliland is recognized as part of Somalia. External stakeholders like the AU, the United States, and others are mostly interested in fighting the Islamist insurgency to the south, not Somaliland. As mentioned before, an operation needed on that scale is unlikely to materialize and would implicate the African Union’s Transitional Mission (ATMIS) troops currently stationed in the country.

The issue over Somaliland’s de facto independence is a polarizing one, especially given Somalia’s reaction to Somaliland’s port deal with Ethiopia. Somalia does not have the resources to take control of the entirety of Somaliland by force. On the other hand, any incursion from Somaliland into Somalia proper risks meeting with disapproval from the international community as an immensely destabilizing act. This is a community whose approval Somaliland has been courting for decades. However, though both Somalia and Somaliland have reasons for not wanting to embark on full-scale war, a miscalculation or misidentification of interests remains a possibility.

Other powers also have interests in the wider region. Though Turkey signed its own security agreement with Somalia, Ankara still maintains close ties with Ethiopia and has sought to mediate between the two. The UAE has interests in both Somaliland and Somalia, but their interests in Somaliland are of greater weight, as the port of Berbera in Somaliland sits closer to a critical juncture of the Red and Arabian Seas. This puts the UAE at odds with the interests of its long-time partner Egypt, a bilateral relationship that has seen its share of bumpy roads as of late. Specifically, the Emiratis are acting alone in allegedly supporting the RSF in the Sudan civil war and are bankrolling a controversial new Egyptian city of Ras El Hekma on the edge of the Mediterranean, bringing them ever so slightly out of lockstep.

And as always, the more regional powers enter the arena, the lesser the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement between the core issues driving Egypt-Ethiopia tensions.