Introduction

Amharas role in the establishment of the Ethiopian state and their organized longstanding patriotism put them in a rival position against colonial powers. Especially, after the crushing defeat of Italy in the Ethio-Italian war, strengths of the Ethiopian people were identified for nefarious plots, to destroy elements discretely. The Amhara People, the Ethiopian Monarchy, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Amharic Language, the green-yellow-red flag, and sentiment of pride and patriotism were identified for targeted attack.

Following the identification of elements, strategies of subversive attack, mainly weakening Ethiopia using divisive forces from within was designed. False historical narratives that antagonize Ethiopian people based on their language differences were fabricated and understanding of historical relationships were redefined in a pseudo-colonial thesis, on the basis of which many groups emerged seeking liberation out of the perceived grievances.

Based on the anti-Amhara narratives, ultra ethno-nationalist groups with vengeful aspirations have surfaced. Ethnonationalist forces, especially after seizing power in 1991, constitutionalized the anti-Amhara rhetorics and orchestrated a concerted attack to cleanse them from multiple provinces of the country. Until recently, elites of the victimized Amhara have been oblivious to the targeted attack drawing much of the focus towards grandeur national reforms. However, Ethiopianist approaches to resolve problematic narratives including the constitution, and community interactions were futile for their very vulnerability of deception and betrayal by highly extremist power blocs.

Hence, although Amhara nationalism emerged in a defensive position to the systemic attack, it hasn’t achieved any change that gives warrant to peoples’ safety and unity. The continued ethnic cleansing of Amharas allover Ethiopia and the latest full-scale genocide by the regime since 2022, gave rise to the resurgence of Fano. Now, the victim community, grassroots youth, organized their own defense with their historical and cultural heritage of Fano-organized existential struggle.

2. Methodology and Theoretical Framework

A combination of two approaches are used to make a nuanced perspective of looking at the Ethiopian war.

2.1. Historical Analysis

Is used to delve deeply into historical precedents impacting the Amhara community, tracing the roots of current issues back to past interactions with colonial powers, the inception and propagation of false narratives that demonize the Amhara people in Ethiopian society.
2.2. Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA)

Is used to assess the formation and perpetuation of discourses that portray negative stereotypes in the ethno-nationalist politics. FDA enables to look at how political figures and government officials use rhetoric (language) to express their dominance; and for perpetuating systemic inequalities in the power dynamics (M. Romero & J. Chin, 2017). Discourse is produced to govern social groups creating ethnic tensions where group identities play a pivotal role in shaping social, political, and historical narratives (Clarissa R. Hayward, 2010).

3. Historical Precedents

“… In this struggle the attacked are all the colonial powers in Africa without exception. What we are witnessing is by no means a local frontier between Abyssinia and Italy.” (Abyssinia: the powder barrel 1936: 4).

Once wining a war against Ethiopia was certainly impossible for colonialists, inflicting internal components of the kingdom and decomposing it, was strategized. Thus the oppressor and the oppressed narration of Ethiopian natives came in to effect: to divide the people and antagonize each other. The oppressor versus oppressed interaction model bore social movements that claimed victimhood in the state; and sought secession. Those secessionist movements gradually evolved onto political parties with the help of European consuls and religious missionaries.

European consuls and missionaries were predominantly engaged in recruiting members for organized rebel units against the Monarchy and supported separatist parties. Captain Esme Nourse Erskine was amongst the notable British Consuls at Gore – Western Ethiopia, from 1928 to 1936 who helped ethnic based political parties, being established in Ethiopia for the first time. Mr. Erskine supported the separatist movements to split off from Ethiopia; and even wrote and submitted an application for recognition by the League of Nations. In the aftermath of the Italian invasion 1935-1936, Erskine was behind the scenes whilst the Macha (‘The Western Galla Confederation’) chiefs were preparing to secede Welega from Ethiopia and seek British protectorate.

3.1. Historical Narratives

The proliferation of pseudo-stories and false historical narratives in the 1930s and 1940s, deliberately crafted to distort Ethiopian history portraying Amhara as an oppressor of other ethnic groups, gained traction among Oromos and Tigrayans. On the foundation of these false narratives and deep seated hatred towards Amhara, the Oromo and Tigre ultra-ethno-nationalist groups came up with liberation fronts using the roadmap that foreigners’ forged to destabilize Ethiopia from within.

They have been fueling anti-Amhara sentiments and inciting hatred and vengeance towards the Amhara community, ever since.The two ethno-nationalists (OLF- Oromo Liberation Front and TPLF – Tigray People’s Liberation Front) asserted the thesis of national oppression, enshrining it in the preamble of their constitution with the statement:

“… Fully cognizant that our common destiny can best be served by rectifying historically unjust relationships and by further promoting our shared interests.”

The ‘historical unjust relationship’ is the narrative that blames the previous Amhara rulers which Workneh 2023 asserts, now has shifted to accusing all Amhara. The blame to rulers of past regimes has been eventually shifted, by the ethno-nationalists, from the Amhara ruling class to all Amhara” (Workneh, Yilkal. 2023:12 [KIIP2, 9 October 2020]).

3.2. Discourses

The attack on Amhara has been justified by three discourses that make up the colonial thesis of viewing Ethiopians’ common past.

Amhara Domination Discourse: used to stoke ethnic tensions, foster resentment and grievances amongst who felt oppressed or marginalized under the perceived Amhara rule.
Amhara Settler Discourse: this stereotype shaped perspectives that significantly influenced group dynamics at the grassroots level interactions and castigated native Amharas.
Amhara Expansion Discourse: has been instrumental in accusing Amharas of land grabbing and resource competition on the basis of false premises. The narrative of Amhara expansionism, which predates the settler profiling, ultimately led to ethnic cleansing. This ideological propaganda justified the eviction of Amharas from their homelands.

Conversely, the ultra-ethnonationalists who cleanse Amharas have demonstrated aspirations for territorial expansion and hegemonic power, rooted in deep cultural practices. In line with the expansion discourse, the traditional Geda administration system is based on territorial expansion; mainly through forceful assimilation of non-Oromo groups and neighboring communities.

A little further on Expansionism

Besides historical evidences, genetic examinations on environment adaptation revealed that those who accuse Amharas of expansion have been expanding and occupying highland territories in Ethiopia. There has been massive research (Cheng et al 2016; Getu A. 2022; Beall et al 2002, 2006, 2021; Brutsaert et. al 1999) conducted on the highland residents of Ethiopia that asserted the fact that Amharas are the earliest inhabitants of Ethiopian highlands spanning over 70,000 years. A prominent study on the ‘Genetic architecture of adaptations to high altitude in Ethiopia’ obtained phenotype data in the two distinct, but closely related ethnic groups – the Amhara and the Oromo.

The research confirms that ‘Ethiopian Amhara and Oromo differ in adaptive phenotypes’ (Alkorta-Aranburu, et al., 2012). In this study, all sampled individuals were born and raised at the same altitude. These samples allowed comparing phenotypes across altitudes within ethnic groups as well as across ethnic groups; and helped sort out the possible factor(s) of differences. Hence, the researchers identify the length of time that the study subjects stayed or settled at these altitudes/plateaus, affects the measurement(s) significantly. The researchers argue, phenotypic differences between Amhara and Oromo highlanders are unlikely to be due to independent genetic adaptations in these ethnic groups; rather they are likely to reflect genetic adaptations that evolved in the Amhara, due to their longer residence at high altitude (HA); while Oromos didn’t have this sufficient time to be evolved, because, the earliest time they arrived in these highland areas is only 500 years ago.

Further more, the presence of Oromos in almost all eastern African countries is a simple proof of expansion while on the other hand, Amharas live nowhere else as a native community other than their own homeland – Ethiopia. It asserts their aloof in territorial expansionism. This is a fact that even the earliest proponent of anti-Amhara narratives, R. Prochaska, noted,

“What has thrust Abyssinians into the forefront of everyday politics is not greed for expansion or craving for conquest but the innate interests of the natives, economic considerations of a worldwide nature, and genuine concern for peace.” (Procházka, 1934:6).

3.3. Ethnic-Identity Politics

In the aftermath of the 1960s students’ movement, ethnically organized Oromos and Tigrayans took advantage of the fragmented Ethiopianist elite, once proponents of Marxist ideology.

In an interview to one of the early Marxists who later joined founders of TPLF, the respondent explained that the ethnic oppression thesis and ethnic liberation as a political agenda was picked accidentally, even within TPLF. He states:

”We were Marxists initially. All of us were. However, upon thorough examination of the dynamics of class struggle, we reached a consensus that the traditional Marxist concept of ‘class’ does not exist in Ethiopia. This realization stemmed from the absence of a robust industrial sector and a distinct proletariat. Consequently, we pivoted towards a new direction, delving into ethnic struggle, as the conventional class conflict prescribed by Marxism found no foothold in our societal landscape.”

Moreover, he claimed himself to be ethnic Amhara, despite the political struggle he joined, was powered by accusations to Amhara. Many of alike too, jumped onto the bandwagon, without proper evaluation of the pros and cons of the ethnic frontier. Ultimately, they ended up having no political space and influence in the frontier; because, the groups they subscribed to were already organized based on kinship and bonds that are even deeper than ethnic identity.

Hence, Amhara elites, even those who engaged ethnic politics in its earliest stage, had no substantial importance; while the other majority were not interested or stood against this paradigm, generally. The ‘majority’ Amhara elites used national patriotism as an excuse for not fostering identity based political pathway; even though it was evident with the collaboration of Oromo Liberation Front, Eritrean Liberation Front and Tigray Liberation Front, that the central Ethiopian political landscape was on the brink of crisis. This was a testament of the naive Amhara – Ethiopianists of the time. Neither the Ethiopianist Amharas nor those Amharas who joined other ethnic liberation fronts were mindful of their positions.

3.4. Elite Myopia

The so-called Ethiopian elite had no effort to control the dissemination of narratives, even when they were based on falsehoods and aimed at inciting hatred towards Amhara. Rather, these narratives exerted full influence over the elite, leading to the emergence of two distinct factions: a group of oblivious Ethiopianists – mainly consisting of ethnic Amhara intellectuals; and hyper-active extremist ethno-nationalists.

The ethno-nationalist faction successfully implemented damaging policies, while the other faction failed to grasp the gravity of the situation. The Amhara elite, in particular, failed to recognize the broader implications and long-term repercussions of the measures taken against themselves. For example, Waleligne Mekonnen stands out as a prominent Marxist in the Ethiopian students’ movement and advocate of ethnic politics in the country, paradoxically portraying the Amhara as oppressors despite being part of the Amhara community himself. He wrote the famous article “Questions of Nationalities in Ethiopia” that served as a conceptual framework for ethnic extremists to stake anti-Amhara establishments, including liberation political parties. This reflects a form of self-deception or an inability to fully comprehend the imminent dangers. To this day, Ethiopianist elites exhibit a sense of complacency and false security, potentially obscuring their true understanding of the situation.

On the other hand, the hate for Amharas within ethnonationalist factions has been escalating. Specifically, how extremist Oromo elites dictate their interests and how non-Oromo intellectuals interpret it, is bizarre. The governing ideology of contemporary Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed, is by design genocidal. “Oromumma eliminates differences that may emerge because of religious plurality or regional differences” (Asafa Jalata, 2012:12). Nonetheless, scholars have been lenient to perceive the magnitude of the consequences of such a political framework.

For instance, Semir Yusuf (2019:14) argues, “Oromo’s effort to end the past power imbalance worries Amhara nationalists that a new imbalance of power is looming”. The scale completely vanishes in the perception of the magnitude of the essence. One party’s preparation for committing genocide is merely equated to an effort to end previous power imbalances. The premise ‘past power imbalance’ is itself a false historical narrative that the writer tends to validate and the perception of Amhara nationalists is ridiculously simplistic. Because, a genocide scheme should weigh much more in the discourses than looming political imbalance. Architect of the Oromumma ideology A. Jalata (2023), further clarifies how the differences can be eliminated. He authoritatively wages the ‘intra-ethnic democracy and inter-ethnic dictatorship’. This must concern everyone, irrespective of any status, more than just a worry about new imbalance of power in the making. It is weigh more than power imbalance. It is catastrophic!

4. Amhara Nationalism
   4.1. All Amhara Peoples’ Organization-AAPO

Amhara nationalism traces its beginning to the establishment of All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) in 1993. AAPO was established to defend Amharas who were targeted for ethnic cleansing in Oromia. It generally tended to be a reaction to the Amharas’ demonization and the security dilemma of Amharas living for a long time across the country. Although AAPO was established having Amhara as its social base, it was cleaved to Ethiopianism because, it promoted the idea of Ethiopian unity, arguing that much emphasis to ethnic federalism undermined national cohesion and stability.

Hence, its emphasis was opposing ethnic federalism and envisioning a more unified national identity and governance structure that transcends ethnic lines. AAPO, for the reason it lacked a clear vision and strategies as an ethnic party, resulted in the outgrowth of factions such as All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP). Technically, it didn’t have a clear vision and strategies for Amhara Nationalism, specially in comparison with ethno-nationalist movements of secessionist Oromo and Tigray parties. Because, ethnic politics was not its agenda AAPO was not an ethnic nationalist party by intent and design.

Hence, it is deducible that AAPO had little contribution to Amhara Nationalism, in its ethnic identity essence. Much of AAPO’s effort was exerted to defend Ethiopian nationalism through the mobilization of marginalized, targeted and victimized Amharas under the governing ethnic federalism.

4.2. National Movement of Amhara-NaMA

The National Movement of Amhara (NaMa) came into being in June 2018 with a motto ‘One Amhara to all Amhara; all Amhara to one Amhara’. The interest of the party to grassroots level engagement and its commitment to inculcate the movement of Amhara nationalism had a wide range of support including the diaspora and many activists of Amhara origin.

Nonetheless, it was shortly infiltrated by non-Amhara members of the top management and ended up in the disenfranchisement of mobilizing its social base. Currently, NaMA is chaired by Belete Molla – an ethnic Oromo; while the real ethnic Amhara leaders and founders of the party, namely Christian Tadele, Kassa Teshager, and others, are suffering in jail. NaMA leaders were abducted from their offices and homes without any charge of criminal offense or a court order, despite their immunity being members of the federal parliament.

Even though NaMA articulated the political, economic, social, legal, and cultural problems of the Amhara people, it has not been able to stand as a viable mechanism to save the people from annihilation amidst these challenges. The regime’s effort to castrate the movement of Amhara Nationalism was amongst the prominent precedents of the ongoing genocide. It was expressed not only with attacks on NaMA leaders and members, but also higher officials of its own administration who portrayed their sympathy to victimized Amharas.

Leaders of Amhara region such as the region’s president Dr. Ambachew Mekonnen, adviser of the president Mr. Ezez Wasie, Attorney general of the region Mr. Megbaru Kebede, and the region’s special force leader General Asaminew Tsige, were assassinated by the federal government. Assassination of Amhara officials was instrumental for the regime to destroy the Amhara region.

Following the assassination of the leaders, the Amhara Special Force was disbanded and the Amhara people were left completely defenseless. The ongoing genocide on Amhara people is a consequence of considerable precedents that can be summarized as: prevailed false historical narratives that demonized the Amhara, the rise of extremist ethno-nationalist movements and parties with hate to Amhara, passive involvement of Amhara elites in political initiatives that matter, and futile Amhara ethno-nationalism.

5. Amhara Genocide

Amhara genocide has been going on covertly for three decades and overtly since Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018. Muluken Tesfaw 2022 argues, there has been an Amhara holocaust in Ethiopia since 1991. Ethnic Amharas have been cleansed from several parts of the country, including complete annihilation in some areas. Continued targeted attack has been recorded and is still going on allover Oromia region, Kamash and Metekel zones – Benishangul Gumuz region, Gura Ferda & Tepi – south western Ethiopia region, West and East Hararghe, Derra in north Shewa of oromia region and urban areas surrounding Addis Ababa, west Arsi; and several districts in Afar, Somali and Sidama regions.

The federal government’s war against Tigray, the northern most region of the country, used Amhara Region as a battle field with the intention to destroy infrastructure, industrial establishments, development institutions; and above all, Amhara lives that out number the total causalities of the two fighting parties combined. When the two parties agreed to cease hostilities with their Pretoria pact, the war against Amhara continued till the date of compiling this report. The war between the two parties cost Amhara lives as both collateral damage and direct victimization, with both combatants’ gross human rights violations.

The November 4, 2020 attack on the northern command of the federal army by TPLF, selectively massacred ethnic Amhara soldiers while it incarcerated others. TPLF, not only selectively murdered Amharas in the military, but also organized a youth mob known as ‘the Samre group’ and deployed them arming machete and hand guns in Maikadra town to exterminate ethnic Amharas.

The Samre group on midnight 9–10 November 2020, committed a house-to-house massacre indiscriminately. According to the Amhara Association of America (AAA) 2021 report, at least 1,515 Amhara civilians were massacred by the Samre group, overnight. The massacre of civilian Amharas at Agamsa, Chenna, Kobo, Gashena, Shewarobit, Ataye, Kombolcha and Gobye-Robit sum up tens of thousands. Besides the lives of civilians, the official report of the federal government revealed that, the two years war took back Amhara Region to its status of 30 years ago (Hone Aug. 4, 2023).

5.1. Economic genocide

Movable properties worth of more than $622 billion were burnt down or looted by TPLF (Samuel G., Aug 23,2023). Amhara administrators have told local press, just after the cessation of hostilities agreement, the estimate cost to rebuild the war-ravaged Kombolcha industrial park alone was half a trillion birr. Kombolcha used to contribute more than a fifth of the total national GDP in the preceding years. Now, this site has been turned in to ashes. Demolition of industrial zones, educational facilities such as universities, and health service facilities allover Amhara Region devastated the region’s socio-economy, as a part and parcel of Amhara genocide.

Following the Pretoria agreement and cessation of hostilities against TPLF, the federal government decreed a state of emergency allover Amhara region and attempted to grip and silence all voices that revealed the atrocities on civilians and the crimes against humanity. Tens of thousands of Amhara activists, journalists, elites, writers and public figures were jailed en masse. Internet and electricity have been completely shut down. Banks, health facilities, government offices, markets, religious rituals and literally every social service has been closed.

Amhara development associations, different social organizations, private companies owned by ethnic Amharas, Amhara business persons and so forth, their bank accounts were frozen and the individuals were jailed. The region’s administration was overhauled; leaders were fully substituted. Then, the regime deployed an allied army of Oromo Special Force, Federal Police Commando, and the National Defense reserved forces; and invaded Amhara region. The deployed forces burnt down Orthodox Christian Monasteries, health centers and hospitals including physicians, schools and students, rural villages, crops and cattle, residential neighborhoods of towns, heritage sites and monuments, infants and elderly, and literally everything that is associated with Amhara people.

Drone strikes have been observed destroying public transportation buses and goods trucks on daily bases, besides the lives of civilians. Robel Alemu 2024 reports, the total massacre of nuns and monks, orphan children and the faithful at Debre-Elias monastery. The drone strike at Dembecha and Finote-Selam towns, the door-to-door massacre of civilians at Merawi attested the Amhara holocaust by the regime.Amhara people have been ‘killed like chickens’. The genocide has been going on day and night under the watch of the world.

6. The Resurgence of Fano

The existential threat that the Amhara people faced gave rise to Fano movement and armed struggle. Historically, Fano are understood to be armed groups from the Amhara region which see themselves as defending the interests of their population. The origin of the term goes back centuries, and in Amharic refers to ‘someone who travels of their own volition’ or a ‘band of leaderless soldiers who were not accountable to anybody’ (Atrsaw & Yared, 2024:2).

Fano is a youth group that emerged, first within the Amhara ethnic group, for struggles against injustice and foreign invaders during the 1936-1941 Ethio-Italian war; and during the 1960s student movement against the monarchy. According to Girma Berhanu 2022, it has features of reminiscent of classical political, religious, or even social movements that drive youthful frustrations into acts of agitation until they achieve a measure of reform.

The contemporary Fano movement started with the 2016 demonstrations that condemned identity-based attacks against the Amhara. The peaceful demonstrations were shortly transformed into fierce protests across the region, with the intensified aggression of TPLF to silence them. The persisted Fano protest took the TPLF regime from federal government position down to its state, Tigray. When TPLF assaulted the northern command of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), intending a coup d’État against the new government, war broke out. Fano participated in the war for the reason that the battlefield was the very place that Fano gives protection. Fano sided with the federal government in the war against TPLF, because the latter was the aggressor.

Nonetheless, the ethnic cleansing of Amharas in Welega – Oromia and Addis Ababa areas was parallelly going on. Fano was informed that the federal government was complicit in the ethnic cleansing and even supported the perpetrators – Oromo Shené, with vehicles, arms and food. Hence, the cause of Fano protest had yet to be addressed. Thus, while the federal government was at war with TPLF, Fano used the opportunity to build camps, recruit and train fighters, and utilize the logistics, security, and administrative networks of the government. This in turn enabled them to widen their societal networks, attract new members, and strengthen their military capacity.

Atrsaw & Yard 2024 reported the growing stature of the Fano, and their defense of Amhara interests, has alarmed the federal and regional governments, which see their existence outside of the official security architecture as a threat. Consequently, the government attempted to demobilize, disband and reintegrate the groups into the community. This was strongly opposed by the Fano. Fano had profound evidences on federal government officials involvement in identity targeted attacks on Amharas, and could’t trust the government, before demobilizing itself.

After the cessation of hostilities (COHA) agreement in Pretoria between TPLF and the federal government, the true intent of the government regarding Amhara people was explicitly stated. The ENDF chief of staff gave a press release to the national television about their plan to eradicate the Amhara groups within two weeks (borkena.com march 9, 2024). For this operation to succeed, a state of emergency was proposed; and the federal parliament automatically approved it. Amhara peoples’ representatives in the federal parliament were already apprehended and there was no significant opposition from the parliamentarians regarding the proclamation.

‘The two weeks operation’ plan lasted at least until the compilation of this report, which is more than a year; and the then few hundreds Fano has become now few hundreds of thousands army, organized under 4 commands. The Gojjam command alone has 13 divisions and 54 brigades.

7. The Prospect of the Existential Struggle

There are few determining Factors for the current struggle. The success of the current existential struggle depends on three factors: –

1. First is the preservation of Fano’s virtues as a public identity, protecting it from parties that seek to own it as their exclusive property.
2. Second is the strategic decision regarding the utilization of Amhara nationalism. Whether it should be a tactical tool or strategic direction requires mutual understanding and agreement. Further divisions can be prevented through meticulous debates and discussions. The dialectic view on Amhara nationalism— 1) using it as a means of organizing support until seizing power; and 2) as a strategic sociopolitical organization—is likely to make a lasting impact on the current existential struggle.
3. Third is the structural distinction of the military and political wing of Fano. This prevents potential authoritarianism. Unless the political wing is led by a politician and the Fano is led by a military staff; the compressed power of both falls in the hands of one person. Competitions to take that centralized power has been observed. Regardless of who will be elected to be a Fano leader, in its present structure, any one of the candidates will end up an elected dictator. This potential authoritarianism is preventable!

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