Introduction

On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the breakaway region of Somaliland. The memo will grant Ethiopia naval and commercial access to ports along Somaliland’s coast in the Red Sea corridor. In return, Somaliland would receive a stake in state-owned Ethiopian Airlines. (1)

Ethiopia indicated that the MOU is for commercial and military purposes; however, Muse Bihi Abdi, the breakaway region’s president, announced it as a prelude to diplomatic recognition. The diplomatic furor that erupted after the signing of the MOU has and will continue to have far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa and has galvanized the Somali population across the region, particularly the Somali politicians known to be perennially squabbling.

While Somalis have been galvanized, it is about long past the time of waking up to the dangers of the dismemberment of Somalia. It is commendable that the Federal Government of Somalia has engaged in diplomatic efforts to protest the violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. From February 6 to August 25, 2023, Somaliland military forces have been shelling the city of Lasanod, Sol, Somalia. (2) In an attempt to exert a fallacious jurisdiction, it was never agreed upon with the locals. Finally, on August 25, 2023, the breakaway region’s forces were ejected from all their military bases in Sol, Sanag, and Cayn Khatum (SSC-K). Unfortunately, the FGS had a tepid response and was often silent about war crimes committed by the Somaliland forces in Lasanod. The silence on the Lasanod war crime was the most damaging to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, not only within Somalia but on the international stage. The war crimes committed in Lasanod, Sol, by the Somaliland militia and tepid responses by the FGS and international community have emboldened the Somaliland administration. Tragically, the recent MOU shows that appeasement of the FGS of the Somaliland administration is futile, and it needs to go further in dealing with the secessionist movement of Somaliland.

FGS Financial Levers:

The FGS can no longer appease the breakaway region and needs bold and calculated steps to deal with Somaliland’s emboldened administration.

The FGS should revoke the SSA (Somaliland Special Arrangement) framework, which has seriously violated all standards. This arrangement has disadvantaged the other Somali federal member states, as Somaliland politicians were given an undeserved amount of international aid that rightfully belonged to Somalia.
The FGS must terminate Somaliland’s special privileges in all ongoing financial frameworks, including the Somali New Deal Compact funds financing and the Somalia Compact financial mechanisms.
The FGS should discontinue all international funding for Somaliland and suspend the Somaliland authority management of the current Somali Multi-Partner fund mechanism shares.

After reaching the Completion Point of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, Somalia is moving away from grant-based multilateral funding arrangements and to more concessionary financing terms; however, it can influence Somaliland’s bilateral funding, which it has been using as a source of funds to destabilize and impoverish SSC regions and Somalia at large.

FGS Political Levers:

Somalia, long viewed as a vulnerable state marred by insurgency and instability, is displaying indicators of an impressive transformation. (3)

Recently, Somalia received the approval of $4.5 billion in debt forgiveness from the IMF and the World Bank through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which represents a significant stride toward economic revitalization. This debt relief alleviates Somalia’s financial pressures and reflects global faith in the nation’s reform efforts and governance.  
Moreover, lifting the arms embargo on Somalia by the UN Security Council enhances the country’s standing. This decision enables the Somali government to strengthen its military capacity, crucial for upholding internal security and confronting insurgent organizations such as Al-Shabaab. It signifies a show of faith in the Somali government’s capability to prudently oversee its military operations, a vital element of sovereign autonomy and regional impact.
In late November 2023, Somalia acceded to the East African Community (EAC). While the benefits are a mixed bag, it shows the country is on the mend and is recovering, albeit slowly.

All the above progress indicates that Somalia is gradually recovering from a history of violence, devastation, and hopelessness and is now rebuilding its national institutions. However, the administration of the breakaway Somaliland is determined to hinder this hard-won progress. As the recent MOU with Ethiopia demonstrates, Somaliland politicians and their secessionist agenda are an existential threat to the Horn of Africa regional peace and stability.

Having gotten a token slap on the hand in previous attacks in Sool, Sanag, and Cayn (SSC) regions (Kalshale, Taleh, and Lasanod in 2007 and 2023) and the indiscriminate killings of SSC civilians, the breakaway Somaliland Administration has gotten away without severe repercussions from the FGS, regional governments, and the International Community. Therefore, the FGS and international community should stop calling the breakaway region a “government” or “The Republic of Somaliland,” as was the case in the recent press conference of the Minister of Interior of Somalia with the minister of interior of the breakaway region. (4) The United Nations Charter’s Chapter 7 deals with Somalia. “Powers to maintain peace” belong to the UN Security Council. Somaliland’s disestablishing actions (signing of MOU, war crimes committed in Lasanod and other SSC regions) fall under the UN’s Chapter 7 categories of “Threats to the Peace, Peaceful Breaches, and Aggressive Acts.” Indeed, a contradiction exists in how Chapter 7 Article is applied to Somalia. Although the Security Council considers the threats to global peace posed by transnational terrorism, it fails to address the situation of Somaliland politicians who are bent on getting recognition based on a fallacious interpretation of colonial borders. (5)

From February 6 to August 25, 2023, Somaliland military forces have been shelling the city of Lasanod, Sol, Somalia. The Federal Republic of Somalia’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Abukar Bale, made statements on February 2023 that addressed the Security Council, which condemned the breakaway Somaliland Administration, saying, “What is happening in Lasanod is a crime against humanity.” (6) In addition, an investigation by Amnesty International showed that Somaliland forces have committed war crimes; therefore, sanctions and legal action will be the most effective measures to hold Somaliland accountable. (7) Such substantive steps will provide tangible consequences to Somaliland and could discourage future acts of violence, impunity, and destabilizing actions, as evidenced by the MOU.

Recent fighting in towns like Buqdharkayn and Meygagle in Sol, Somalia, shows that the Somaliland administration is waging a war of attrition to keep the nascent SSC Administration embroiled in constant conflict; therefore, the IC and Somali partners who have been traveling between Halane and Hargeisa must realize that Somaliland has only received a symbolic punishment for previous attacks in Lasanod, Sool region which has only emboldened it to continue to destabilize Somalia and the Horn of Africa at large. The parliament of FGS should speed up the process of accepting SSC-Khatumo State as a fully-fledged FMS, as it already declared its loyalty to the unity of Somalia. A new tentative Federal Member States (FMS) road map for Awdal, North Central, and SSC-Khatumo States should be issued. It is crucial to distribute international aid equally and fairly in order to achieve unity and stability in the country. In addition, the FGS should establish military bases and station Federal troops in SSC areas, mainly where Somaliland forces have been ejected, as this will serve the FGS’s commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Somaliland’s portrayal as a bastion of democracy, peace, and good governance is nothing but an illusion. It is a carefully crafted image aimed at garnering international support. However, the truth is that breakaway Somaliland has an abysmal human rights record, with the recent Lasanod war exposing the extent of its barbarity. Despite claiming to be a stabilizing force in the region, successive breakaway Somaliland administrations and its militias have consistently fomented armed conflicts and instability in the regions of Somalia. The MOU with Ethiopia provides ample evidence of this. It is clear that Somaliland is far from the oasis of stability it claims to be.

The MOU signed between the regional administration of Somaliland and Ethiopia should serve as a wake-up call for all Somalis to unite and guard the territorial integrity of Somalia. Moreover, this MOU with a foreign government reminds the FGS that it can no longer ignore the breakaway region’s desires to dismember the country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. The decision to lease 20km of Somalia’s coastline to Ethiopia for 50 years in exchange for Ethiopia agreeing to engage in an “in-depth assessment” of the question of Somaliland’s recognition is a betrayal of the Somali people. This move would allow Ethiopia to establish its naval forces in the region, seriously affect Somalia’s sovereignty, and lead to the dismemberment of Somalia. (8)

The FGS and the Somali people have several options to counter Ethiopia’s territorial infringement on Somalia. These options could have dire consequences on the region’s socio-political and security situation and could inflame violence and conflict between clans in the northern region of the country. Nonetheless, FGS could invite Egypt or Turkey to assist and establish naval bases in safeguarding Somalia’s territorial waters.

The FGS has already diplomatically engaged many partners who have affirmed Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other steps that can be taken to dissuade the implementation of the MOU include questioning the legitimacy of the MOU, given that Somaliland is a breakaway regional state of Somalia with no recognition.