An attempted coup in Benin and a military takeover in Guinea-Bissau underscore the continuous exploitation of deteriorating security conditions, socioeconomic grievances, and institutional backsliding in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
The security situation in the Sahel and West Africa remains dire, forming the epicenter of terrorism casualties and Islamist insurgencies, with al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups wreaking havoc throughout the region.
In Benin, the military coup was thwarted through loyal armed forces and an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) standby force spearheaded by Nigeria, which struck the putschists with air strikes.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has faced criticism in recent years regarding the need for reform to ensure its continued relevance, and it appears increasingly aware of this.
In the past month, a failed coup attempt in Benin and a successful but suspiciously executed military takeover in Guinea-Bissau underscore the continuous threat of putschists in West Africa, exploiting deteriorating security conditions, socioeconomic grievances, as well as democratic and institutional backsliding to come to power – often further weakening security institutions that seek to counter the mosaic of Islamist insurgencies in the region. However, the successful disruption of the coup in Benin also points to a more assertive Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has in recent years been criticized for failing to address security threats and economic concerns adequately and only providing symbolic responses to the succession of coups d’état that have rocked the region since 2020 and further aggravated the Islamist insurgencies.
On December 7, a group of soldiers, in an all-too-familiar display, announced on national television that Benin’s outgoing President Patrice Talon had been deposed and that the constitution had been dissolved. Talon, whose term is set to end in April after the 2026 Beninese presidential elections, was criticized by the soldiers for the worsening security in the north of Benin, which has been rocked by attacks in recent years, predominantly from al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Spillover violence has plagued the region and raised concerns that previously stable countries, including Ghana and the Ivory Coast, could be at growing risk of jihadist terrorism if JNIM and Islamic State affiliates in the region continue to spread.
Swiftly, ECOWAS, the regional bloc of West African States, intervened to disrupt the coup. Spearheaded by Nigeria, ECOWAS standby forces were deployed to strike rebel positions. French special forces provided additional logistical and intelligence support, but notably only served a supportive, non-widely advertised role, as anti-French sentiment and colonial legacy continue to be a commonly held grievance in the Sahel, weaponized by many of the military regimes that have taken hold since 2020.
The coup was thwarted, but Benin’s democracy remains fragile, with many opposition parties excluded from politics since Talon packed the Constitutional Court with loyalists, who ruled that the principal opposition party be barred from participating in the 2026 presidential election. Additionally, the country has a veritable challenge in its North that continues to pose a significant threat to its long-term stability. In 2025, high-casualty attacks were carried out by JNIM against military posts in Parc du W National Park, with a high-profile attack in April killing 54 soldiers. Bordering Niger and Burkina Faso in the North, Benin is also experiencing the effects of the failed counterinsurgency campaigns by these neighboring junta states, which have been more concerned with power consolidation than counterterrorism.
Just ten days prior in Guinea-Bissau, some 2,000 kilometers northwest, the military seized power—only a day before the official general election results were due. Opposition groups within the country, alongside external analysts, consider the takeover suspicious, accusing incumbent President Embaló of orchestrating the scheme to prevent the opposition candidate from being sworn in. The official reason given by the military, however, references a plot by national leaders working with drug cartels that purportedly sought to manipulate election results. Since the early 2000s, Guinea-Bissau has been an important transit country for South American cocaine destined for Europe and has effectively been branded a narco-state.
Many politicians in Guinea-Bissau are bankrolled by drug traffickers, whom they offer protection in return. While ECOWAS had deployed a stabilization force during the elections in Guinea-Bissau to maintain order, it did not issue any standby forces to counter the putschists. Online, as observed in a survey by The Soufan Center, rumors and propaganda-like images are already circulating that Guinea-Bissau seeks to join the Alliance of the Sahelian States (AES), comprising the juntas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Juntas in the region have cut deals with Russian mercenaries in a quid pro quo that offers the regimes ‘coup-proofing’ in exchange for access to minerals and precious metals. First, the Wagner Group, and now Africa Corps, have only served to exacerbate the terrorism problem in the Sahel through a scorched-earth approach, which has included rampant human rights abuses.
These two disquieting signs of continued political instability come as the Sahel experiences another year as the most terrorism-struck region in the world. President of ECOWAS Commission Omar Alieu Touray cited 450 attacks and over 1.900 deaths across the region between January and November 2025 and also deplored the economic warfare waged by the Islamist insurgents, causing further life-threatening harm to civilians. The consistently deteriorating security situation and the expanding ‘coup belt’ have led to urgent calls to reform ECOWAS, including by Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the president of Nigeria. His call for reform is especially important, as Nigeria has for decades been an essential player in regional security but is increasingly stretched thin fighting the insurgency in the North.
ECOWAS has stepped up its efforts this year, responding to this heightened threat landscape, according to Touray, accelerating the deployment of its standby force, starting with 1,650 personnel and scaling up to 5,000. However, fragmented counterterrorism efforts and intelligence mechanisms, coupled with high levels of distrust among regional actors, continue to play an essential role in hindering greater stability.
