Tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue to rise amid the over two-year civil war as the RSF’s targeting of the Sudanese capital of Khartoum and its main airport has persisted.

Drone technology has been at the forefront of most major conflicts today, including in Sudan, and has reshaped the dynamic of the civil war as both the SAF and RSF are pivoting from static, ground-based engagements toward more sophisticated aerial operations.

Drone technology has also intensified the RSF’s 18-month siege of El-Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state, with multiple attacks on civilians in recent weeks.

Efforts to halt hostilities and design a post-war settlement have repeatedly stalled and without a comprehensive political settlement or credible power-sharing agreement, Sudan risks descending into a protracted state of fragmentation similar to that seen in Libya or Somalia.

Tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue to rise amid the over two-year civil war as the RSF’s targeting of the Sudanese capital of Khartoum and its main airport has persisted. The SAF reclaimed Khartoum from the RSF in March by recapturing the presidential palace and government headquarters that had previously been occupied by the RSF and its leader Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as ‘Hemedti.’ The Sudanese military then began repairing the airport to restore domestic air service. Although one flight successfully landed on Wednesday — the first in two years — the airport has since closed again following renewed drone attacks, even though the SAF managed to intercept the incoming drones.

Drone technology has been at the forefront of most major conflicts today, including in Sudan, and has reshaped the dynamic of the civil war. Both the SAF and RSF are pivoting from static, ground-based engagements toward more sophisticated aerial operations. According to the Africa Defense Forum, the SAF has deployed a locally produced Safaroog drone with anti-jamming technology and 600-kilometer range. The Safaroog has the capability for reconnaissance but was designed as a one-way attack vehicle (OWA). This drone is the SAF’s response to the RSF’s adoption of Belarus’ Groza-S electronic warfare system, used to “identify and jam or trick the SAF’s incoming drones.” The SAF is also backed by Türkiye, which has provided the SAF with Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones. These drones have played a critical role in the SAF’s push to reclaim Khartoum from the RSF.

The RSF has also expanded its drone warfare capabilities, including increasingly deploying Chinese-made FH-95 kamikaze drones from its base in Nyala, South Darfur. These drone and other Chinese weaponry including GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers have allegedly been supplied by the RSF’s main backer, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though the UAE denies this. Long-range drone attacks launched from Darfur have hit strategic sites such as an airstrip in Port Sudan, where the SAF had stored its Bayraktar drones before moving them underground. RSF drone strikes have also targeted civilian infrastructure such as power stations in Omdurman, an oil refinery in Khartoum, and even a hospital and residential neighborhoods in El-Obeid have been hit in recent weeks.

Drone technology has also intensified the RSF’s 18-month siege of El-Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. Drone strikes have ramped up in El-Fasher in recent weeks with multiple drone attacks on civilians, including a strike on a mosque in late September that killed approximately 70 people and another on Dar al-Arqam displacement center in mid-October that killed approximately 60 people.

The ensuing humanitarian crisis from the siege has grown as the RSF has increased its tempo and intensity of attacks. Ongoing clashes between the RSF and SAF have trapped thousands of civilians in El-Fasher as 90 percent of homes have been destroyed, according to The Guardian. A report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan to the UN found that throughout the siege of El-Fasher, the RSF “used starvation as a method of warfare and deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, medicine and relief supplies.” The report also mentioned crimes committed by the RSF such as murder, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced displacement. On Monday, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 1,510 people were displaced from El-Fasher between October 15-19 as insecurity continues to rise. In El-Fasher and nearby areas, the RSF and its allies have deliberately targeted non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, and Tanjur.

Efforts to halt hostilities and design a post-war settlement have repeatedly stalled, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of a coherent transition in Sudan. Regional powers, including the UAE, have stepped into the diplomatic arena: in September 2025 the UAE, together with the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Egypt, backed a “roadmap” calling for a permanent ceasefire, followed by a nine-month transition to a broad-based civilian government. Yet the process remains deeply compromised: the SAF has rejected mediation that includes the UAE, citing its alleged backing of the RSF. Meanwhile, the RSF has gone a step further by announcing a parallel government, further undermining prospects for a unified negotiation.

Without a comprehensive political settlement and credible power-sharing agreement, Sudan risks descending into a protracted state of fragmentation similar to that seen in Libya or Somalia. Historically, temporary power-sharing arrangements in Sudan have collapsed under the weight of competing military interests, weak institutions, and a lack of accountability mechanisms. The SAF and RSF, both vying for control over lucrative economic assets and political influence, are unlikely to disarm or integrate easily, making the formation of a unified national army improbable in the near term.

In the absence of a durable peace framework, post-war Sudan could resemble a patchwork of semi-autonomous zones governed by armed groups and local militias, with the central government exercising limited authority outside Port Sudan. The country’s political landscape would likely fragment along ethnic, regional, and economic lines, further complicating humanitarian recovery and reconstruction. The failure to implement inclusive governance structures and transitional justice could entrench cycles of revenge and marginalization, especially in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile.