A coalition of armed movements in Sudan has appointed a ‘civilian government’, but will this legitimise Hemeti and his Rapid Support Forces?

In August, the so-called Tasis (or ‘founding’) government, a coalition of armed movements, civilian activists and political parties allied with General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka ‘Hemeti’, was inaugurated in Nyala, south-west Sudan.

This move shows Hemeti and his Rapid Support Forces (RSF) want to legitimise themselves and position the group to negotiate over the terms for a post-war transition with Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s administration in Port Sudan.

Though widely criticised for serial human rights abuses in the current civil war, Burhan’s administration won titular recognition from the UN last year when he attended the General Assembly. This year, Burhan sent his civilian prime minister, Kamil Idris, a former UN official, to New York for the annual gathering.
‘Credible negotiator’ with blood on his hands

Hemeti hopes to present himself as a credible negotiator, to escape accountability for the ethnic cleansing and genocide committed by his RSF in Darfur, and other crimes in central Sudan.

The disconnect between Hemeti’s RSF messaging – for instance, falsely claiming Sudan’s civil war started because Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) were planning a coup – and actions has not fooled the Sudanese people into thinking the RSF are honest negotiators as Hemeti had hoped.

Hemeti has looked for political narratives to justify the war, including through the Tasis alliance. International security analyst Mutasim al-Haris suggests that the alliance wants to pressure Burhan to start peace talks and include Hemeti in Sudan’s subsequent transition.

Splintering Sudan?

The Tasis government has focused on regional and international de facto recognition, ignoring United Nations Security Council and African Union (AU) resolutions that advocate against splintering Sudan.

Nazar Abdel Aziz, secretary-general of the Broad National Front (BNF), said the AU condemned Tasis, seeking to discourage similar splits in Africa. However, some African regimes might go against the AU’s resolution.

Although Sudan has not yet fully splintered, Hemeti and his RSF continue their threats of partition…

Tasis seeks a fait accompli like Khalifa Haftar’s authority over eastern Libya, and Somalia’s breakaway region Somaliland. Diplomats say Tasis wants to achieve this by providing education, healthcare, passports and other services to its population, as well as establishing economic relations with neighbouring countries.

African risks

The precedent of a recognised Tasis government could prompt imitators in the region, including in Chad, where Mahamat Deby’s regime risks a rebellion similar to Sudan’s.

Deby is backed by his own community, the non-Arab Zaghawa, a tribe which extends into Darfur. Arab tribes in Chad, which also extend into Darfur, are marginalised, and see the Zaghawa as natural enemies.

With brutal bombardments, the RSF is trying to capture El Fasher – capital of North Darfur and the entire region. The Zaghawa form a significant part of the population in El Fasher and are the last bastion for Burhan’s SAF and its supporters in Darfur’s three provinces, which are about half the size of western Europe.

Deby’s prior support for the RSF was criticised, and he has made an effort to improve relations with Burhan and the SAF since December 2024, for instance, returning looted cars smuggled into Chad by the RSF.

Meanwhile, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan are concerned that factions in Burhan’s regime will support domestic opposition groups. Reports indicate that Burhan has provided aid to the opposition in Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s regime in the CAR.

Similarly, he has armed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), the rebel group led by South Sudan’s former vice president Riek Machar, against President Salva Kiir’s regime.

Burhan and his allies’ support for CAR and South Sudan opposition groups seeks to disrupt the RSF’s logistical network that transfers fuel, mercenaries and weapons to support its war efforts.

Touadéra promised Burhan that the CAR would halt support for the RSF. Following the RSF’s expulsion from Khartoum State, CAR’s head of intelligence, Henri Wanzet Linguissara, visited Sudan in May.

However, Juba’s ability to halt support for the RSF is complicated by the group’s threat to the pipelines carrying South Sudan’s oil, which accounts for 80% of its international trade.

Global implications

After the RSF’s capture of Sudan’s north-west corner bordering Libya and Egypt – a key route for would-be people smugglers – European governments are focusing more on how Sudan will affect migration flows.

Hemeti has worked before with European governments on ostensible efforts to control illegal immigration: in the Khartoum Process of 2014, his RSF received EU training from a $5bn fund for African countries to address illegal immigration. But in 2021, he warned that Europe and the US may see a surge in refugees if they do not support a Sudanese military government.

Simultaneously, Burhan and his government continue to hedge between Russia and the US, allowing Russia to use a naval base on the Red Sea until Hemeti and the RSF are defeated. The US, UK, France and Germany want to keep Russia out of the Red Sea to protect their trade and counter China’s assertiveness.

Sudan’s future: peace or division?

Although Sudan has not yet fully splintered, Hemeti and his RSF continue their threats of partition in order to be part of a post-war transition arrangement. However, a split is possible if the war continues indefinitely.

Such a reality might only be stopped by active involvement of the Sudanese people and international community, to pressure both sides to hand over power to credible and democratic civilian transitional authority.