Armed clashes among forces of the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli benefit the Tobruk-based eastern administration dominated by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army.
Russia and Türkiye are taking advantage of a divided and unstable Libya to improve their geostrategic positions in Africa and the Mediterranean.
Russia is cementing its ties to Haftar with major weapons deliveries and deployments, whereas Türkiye is making inroads to Tobruk through the use of soft power.
Türkiye’s ties to all major Libyan factions position Ankara to potentially broker unity in the country, after years of failed efforts by U.N. mediators.
In mid-May, Libya’s continuing division into two rival administrations – a U.N.-backed Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and a Tobruk-based, Haftar-dominated House of Representatives (HOR) government – manifested as violent clashes that caught civilians in the crossfire. Violence in Tripoli broke out when allies of GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah put down a revolt by one of the armed militias his administration relied on – the Stabilization Support Apparatus (SSA). U.N. officials reported that the Tripoli combat killed eight civilians, and another 58 bodies were later found in a hospital under the SSA’s control. The head of the SSA was killed in the battle. Hanan Salah, Libya researcher and associate director in the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, told Deutsche Welle: “The sheer recklessness of the warfare that Human Rights Watch documented in the middle of civilian neighborhoods shows the blatant disregard these armed groups have for the life and livelihoods of civilians.” The fighting ended with an undisclosed agreement between the militias and Dbeibah’s administration, but it was followed by popular protests and the resignation of several ministers who supported protesters’ calls for Dbeibah to step down.
The SSA revolt was sparked by Dbeibah’s effort to consolidate his control over all western militia forces, which he judges necessary to match the degree of control Haftar exercises in eastern Libya. Haftar long ago consolidated control over the various militias within his territorial sphere of influence, ruling with an iron fist. The elected HOR (parliament), which nominally runs the eastern administration, is loyal to Haftar, as is the appointed Prime Minister Ossama Hammad. With backing from Russia, as well as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Haftar’s forces nearly captured Tripoli in 2019 before Turkish military shipments and advice helped the western forces repel the attack. Since then, U.N. officials have been visiting the country continuously, in what has thus far been a fruitless effort to persuade both administrations to dissolve, form a unified national government, and ultimately yield to leaders chosen in new national elections.
Western powers, including France, Italy, and the United States, have supported U.N. conflict resolution and unification efforts, but Russia and, to a lesser extent, Türkiye have taken advantage of Libya’s divisions to promote their separate geostrategic interests. Moscow has largely ignored U.N. stabilization efforts and instead expanded its military relationship with Haftar, viewing his territory as an ideal platform to compensate for its diminished influence in and access to post-Assad Syria. Russia’s arms deliveries to the LNA and access to the bases it controls provide Russia with strategic depth in Africa and the ability to project power into the Sahel. There, Russia seeks to capitalize on Western setbacks, including the forced French withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Senegal, and the U.S. departure from Niger. The Kremlin not only wants to displace Western influence in Africa, but also to control key resources, including Libyan oil, Sudan’s deposits of gold, and uranium mining in Niger.
Moscow also sees Haftar as an avenue to build a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean – a long-standing Kremlin ambition that requires year-round port access and the ability to deploy naval assets. Naval basing, as well as other deployments, will help Russia control or influence transit routes from Libya, positioning Russia to pressure Europe over vital energy and infrastructure routes. Eastern Libyan leaders in Tobruk have cited the coastal city as a potential location for a new Russian naval base. In February, satellite imagery showed Russia’s development of the Maaten Al Sarra airbase in southern Libya, where it had shipped S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Nearly 1,000 Russian military personnel have also relocated to Libya from Syria since Assad’s collapse.
The added forces complement the former Wagner mercenaries—officially incorporated into Russia’s military as the Africa Corps following Wagner founder Yevgeny Prighozin’s death in 2023—already embedded within the LNA. For his part, Haftar views the Russian military deployments – which provide the LNA access to Russia’s logistical networks and its military installations in the country – as leverage against Tripoli. As a sign of the expanding strategic relationship, Haftar and his son and heir apparent, Saddam, visited Moscow in early May to attend ceremonies marking victory in World War II. On May 12, the Kremlin press service announced simply that, “The president (Vladimir Putin) met with the commander in chief of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar.” Haftar’s delegation also met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, who is said to have praised his “critical efforts” in curbing terrorism and “preventing further instability.”
At the same time, Haftar’s unbridled ambition to control all of Libya has led him to begin building ties to Türkiye, Moscow’s rival for geostrategic positioning in the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has long been bereft of influence in eastern Libya – viewed exclusively as the military guarantor of the GNU in Tripoli, which it still arms and advises, and an ally of the GNU-linked Islamist militias that are anathema to Haftar’s anti-Islamist forces. However, more recently, Haftar has been willing to respond to Ankara’s overtures, in the process enhancing his leverage over Moscow. Haftar and his allies appear to appreciate Türkiye’s use of “soft power” to build influence in the east – a clear contrast to Moscow’s military-centric approach. After Storm Daniel and the collapse of Derna’s dams in September 2023—described as “Libya’s 9/11”—Türkiye provided swift humanitarian assistance and opened channels of communication with authorities in the East. In April, Ankara hosted a visit by Saddam Haftar for meetings with the Turkish defense minister and other military officials in Ankara, where they discussed supplying equipment and providing training to LNA forces. By engaging both sides of the Libya divide at the highest levels, Türkiye appears to be positioned to engineer the political solution to Libya’s divisions that has thus far eluded U.N. negotiators.
Türkiye’s expanding engagement with eastern Libyan leaders has begun to pay dividends for Ankara’s geostrategy. The nominal governing authority of the east, the House of Representatives, is reportedly preparing to ratify a controversial maritime agreement with Türkiye. This development could significantly alter the strategic balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean in Ankara’s favor. A 2019 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Türkiye and the GNU delineated maritime boundaries and granted Türkiye access to a vast economic zone in the Mediterranean. However, the deal was challenged by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the eastern administration in Tobruk, which does not recognize the GNU’s authority to sign pacts with outside powers on behalf of all Libyans. Speaker Aguila Saleh of the HOR previously denounced the agreement as null and void and a violation of Libyan sovereignty. Recent reports suggest the HOR has formed a committee to review and potentially ratify the agreement. Approval of the accord would align all major Libyan factions – in both the west and the east – with Türkiye’s maritime claims, in the process countering Greece’s bilateral maritime deal with Egypt. In the view of many analysts, the potential ratification of the maritime agreement by Libya’s eastern parliament might prove pivotal in ongoing disputes over Mediterranean energy resources and regional influence.
The Türkiye-Libya maritime agreement, if ratified by the HOR, would not necessarily put Moscow and Ankara at odds. The two powers have established in Libya what analysts characterize as a “managed rivalry” or “adversarial collaboration,” as previously seen in other theaters where their interests simultaneously collide and overlap, such as Syria and the South Caucasus. On the other hand, the expanding Turkish and Russian influence in Libya has caused experts to question whether Washington has ceded influence in North Africa to other powers, Russia in particular. Perhaps in part to reassure its allies in Europe and in the Middle East, in March, the U.S. Air Force conducted a “training visit” in Libya, including by B-52 bombers. The visit represented an effort by U.S. generals to present Libyan leaders, particularly Haftar, with a strategic alternative to hosting an ever-increasing number of Russian troops stationed in LNA-controlled bases in Libya.