Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has increased its operational tempo in northern and central Mali, conducting a series of complex attacks on military installations in Timbuktu and Boulkessi – and in the process, further exposing the limitations of junta-led security forces.
JNIM’s recent assaults, including its seizure of population centers and its propaganda output, constitute a broader strategy to degrade public confidence in state forces, boost recruitment, and expand operations into littoral West Africa.
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has undermined regional coordination and facilitated expanded influence of countries like Iran and Russia in the Sahel – developments that ultimately subvert efforts to counter jihadist offensives.
State-sanctioned ethnic violence – especially targeting Fulani and Tuareg communities – has exacerbated grievances and played into jihadist narratives, driving JNIM’s expansion.
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) – an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel – has increased its operational tempo in northern and central Mali against hard targets in recent weeks, following several devastating attacks in Burkina Faso. On June 2, JNIM militants launched concurrent complex assaults on military positions in the strategic city of Timbuktu in northern Mali. A military base and three checkpoints were targeted in the northern and eastern parts of the city; a simultaneous attack was carried out on a Malian military airbase hosting Russian mercenaries. At least sixty Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) personnel were confirmed dead, as the insurgents’ capabilities appeared to outmatch state forces. Financial constraints have compounded the issue: news reports have indicated that FAMa’s drone missile supply is depleted, with footage of resupplies entering the country the day after the attacks. JNIM has exhibited formidable tactical capacity with militants able to rapidly penetrate deep into bases, preventing the Malian air force from intervening due to the risk of hitting civilians. Overall, this underscores the growing asymmetry between insurgent forces and the junta’s security apparatus.
The day following the Timbuktu siege, a 30-day curfew was announced in the Segou region – a large administrative area in central Mali that comprises approximately 5 percent of the country – as armed activity against government forces has increased in the last two weeks. This could further inflame popular dissatisfaction with the ruling junta – which seized power in 2020, led by Colonel Assimi Goita on the basis of promises to restore order in a country grappling with a growing jihadist threat since 2012. Increasing high-profile attacks by JNIM are likely to create conditions fertile for further coups, part of a broader strategy to undermine the state apparatus and deter civilian cooperation with military leadership. Moreover, with so little attention and resources devoted by the United States and its allies to countering terrorism in this part of the world, it seems more than likely that jihadist groups will continue to gain ground, destabilizing an entire region.
The last major assault on the Timbuktu base occurred in 2018, when the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed there. In that incident, JNIM militants infiltrated the base disguised as United Nations peacekeepers. The recent attack bears striking similarities: footage shows JNIM fighters wearing FAMa uniforms to gain access to the city, and reports indicate the use of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) to breach defences – again, echoing the tactics used in 2018.
Timbuktu is a strategically significant target. It hosts both military bases and the Timbuktu airport, serving as a key hub for supply routes across northern Mali. Attacks on the city undermine the Malian state’s ability to receive aid and military reinforcements. Timbuktu was also the site of Operation Serval, a joint effort with French forces launched in response to Ansar Dine’s 2012 occupation. While the operation brought relative stability, it was suspended following the 2020 coup. JNIM’s growing foothold in Timbuktu now also offers access to the Senegal River – a critical transportation artery – augmenting the group’s operational mobility and logistical capabilities across the region.
On June 1, within 24 hours of the Timbuktu attack, insurgents attacked a military base in Boulkessi, roughly 10 km from the Burkina Faso border. Of the 280 military personnel stationed there, at least 60 were confirmed killed, and the remainder taken hostage. According to JNIM media, the group seized 174 Kalashnikovs and three vehicles – loot that will significantly bolster future operations. Evidence suggests JNIM is distributing ghanima – war spoils captured from armed adversaries – across its wilayats. This strategy allows weapons and equipment from any major attack to strengthen its wider network. Given JNIM’s recent pattern of targeting multiple military installations, this redistribution supports their broader ambition to expand operations into littoral West Africa. JNIM’s use of mortars – likely looted from previous attacks – to heavily shell the Timbuktu airbase highlights the efficacy of this strategy.
In addition to hard targets, JNIM has also targeted several population centers, indicative of a low-cost strategy aimed at draining state resources without attempting to implement parallel governance structures. A major attack on the city of Djibo – a provincial capital in the Sahel region in northern Burkina Faso – located 45 kilometres from the Malian border, saw JNIM seize the town for several hours. At least 100 civilians and 200 military personnel were killed, according to footage released by JNIM. The group also posted disparaging footage depicting militants posing on a central roundabout and inside administrative buildings. This type of imagery clearly undermines the credibility of Burkinabe forces and the ruling junta.
The current pace of JNIM’s operations is proving to be no match for the junta-led governments in these states, which all left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) last year to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) following transitions to military rule. In 2023, Malian authorities also took the decision to expel MINUSMA. These moves have ultimately reduced the capacity for coordinated regional security responses and international oversight, worsening the security crisis. With the democratization of advanced combat drone technology in recent months across Africa, the impetus for regional coordination has never been more pressing, with a clear example being the recent use of drone attacks with advanced weaponry in the Sudan civil war.
The move away from regional security bodies also underscores a broader trend: a concerted pivot from Western-led security infrastructure, with countries like Iran and Russia stepping in to fill this gap. With Sahelian regimes facing severe instability and systematically suppressing free speech, conditions have been ripe for Russia to increase its influence. Anti-imperial and pro-Russia bot farms have leveraged the security crises to churn out pro-regime messaging and entrench its influence, most clearly evident in the proliferation of disinformation surrounding Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s junta leader.
The ongoing attacks by JNIM and its contingents on both hard and soft targets across the Sahel are indicative of the inherent vulnerabilities faced by junta-led states with weak military infrastructure. Further, it underscores the obstacles to international security cooperation in the region that have deepened since the coups in the AES countries. At least 400 soldiers have been killed by militants in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali since the start of May, according to Reuters. If current trends continue, next month could mark the first time total fatalities linked to JNIM operations surpass 1,000 in a single month. Just last week, General Michael Langley, the head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), warned of the increasing capacity of terror groups in Africa, especially JNIM, to launch attacks on U.S. soil. Nevertheless, counterterrorism budgets and personnel continue to be rolled back and reassigned, respectively, and a general sense of ‘terrorism fatigue’ seems to have set in across the U.S. government, despite repeated warnings of a growing threat to the homeland and U.S. interests abroad.
The security environment is further undermined by indiscriminate violence perpetrated by state forces, private military companies such as the Wagner Group, and self-defense militias, which have received systematic support from the state amid its limited capacity to maintain order. These militias are often organized along ethnic lines and with its members primarily drawn from sedentary communities, leading to the systematic exclusion of nomadic groups like the Fulani. The militias are also frequently implicated in retaliatory attacks against Fulani and Tuareg populations, who are often perceived as sympathetic to jihadist groups. Such dynamics fuel jihadist recruitment, as groups like JNIM exploit grievances rooted in ethnic discrimination and state violence to appear as protectors for targeted communities.
This trend is evident across the region. In Burkina Faso, for example, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) have been implicated in massacres targeting Fulani civilians, with over 130 Fulani civilians summarily killed in Burkina Faso’s western Boucle du Mouhoun region in March 2025, according to a recent Human Rights Watch report. Under Traoré, a mass recruitment drive aimed at bolstering the VDP – a core tenet of its counterterrorism strategy – resulted in the enrollment of over 100,000 poorly trained civilian auxiliaries in the short span of three years, many coming from pre-existing Koglwéogo vigilante groups with links to ethnic violence. This has significantly worsened security in Burkina Faso, where jihadist groups now control roughly 60 percent of the country. Moreover, the use of Wagner Group for counterinsurgency operations in Mali has led to documented human rights violations, including alleged summary executions and unlawful killings of civilians, according to human rights groups. These alleged war crimes and human rights abuses have not been limited to Mali, with similar reports of such atrocities in the Central African Republic.