Declaring solidarity and full support for Hamas after the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis—a Zaydi Shia group, also known historically as Ansar Allah and currently in control of large parts of Yemen—launched missile attacks on Israel on 19 October 2023. They soon realised that while direct attacks on Israel garnered publicity, their ineffectiveness meant this strategy would lead to rapidly diminishing returns.
With a record of relative success in the maritime domain during ‘Operation Restoring Hope’—a military campaign undertaken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) between 2015 and 2022 against Yemeni rebel forces—the Houthis began targeting Israeli-owned or -linked merchant ships from November 2023 onwards. The scope of the attacks was subsequently expanded to include vessels associated with the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and other nations supporting Israel’s military operations.
By April 2025, over 325 attacks had been carried out on commercial and naval vessels using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. The majority of these attacks occurred in the southern Red Sea, with fewer incidents in the Gulf of Aden, the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait, and the western Arabian Sea. While the success rate remained low, two ships were sunk. A few incidents involving the hijacking of vessels and their diversion to Yemeni ports were also reported.
From November 2023 onwards, piracy and armed robbery resurfaced in these waterways—phenomena that had been largely under control for the past eight to ten years. The Houthi attacks were a key contributing factor to this resurgence, which has witnessed over 50 such incidents. The combination of attacks on maritime vessels and piracy compelled many shipping companies to reroute their ships around the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant economic impacts and supply-chain challenges.
Defensive Military Operations to Support Freedom of Navigation
Defensive military missions were launched to secure merchant shipping and uphold freedom of navigation. These included ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’, led by the US, the UK, and other partners, and the European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Aspides, led by the EU. Operations under the Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF)—a 46-member consortium with five task forces—were also intensified. (India had joined the CMF as an associate member in July 2022 and became a full member in November 2023.)
India’s own ‘Operation Sankalp’, which had previously focused on the Gulf of Oman and adjacent areas, was expanded to cover the emerging threat zones. Several other countries also enhanced their naval deployments in the region. Coordination for these defensive efforts was primarily facilitated through the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activity (CGIMA)—a rechristened and expanded version of the Contact Group for Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), established in 2009 under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1851.
Offensive Military Operations to Restore Freedom of Navigation
In parallel, a few countries initiated offensive military actions, including retaliatory Israeli strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. The US and the UK launched ‘Operation Poseidon Archer’ in January 2024 and conducted periodic strikes against both mobile and static targets. However, these offensive operations did not majorly degrade Houthi capabilities, and the combined offensive and defensive campaigns failed to deter continued attacks.
Acknowledging the relatively limited impact of the cautious, intermittent approach adopted in Operation Poseidon Archer, the US President Donald Trump announced the launch of a “decisive and powerful military action” against the Houthis on 15 March 2025, under the codename ‘Operation Rough Rider’. The stated objectives were to compel the Houthi ‘terrorists’ to cease attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, restore freedom of navigation in these strategic waterways, and pressure Iran to withdraw its support for the Houthis. An unstated but plausible objective is also further to accentuate Iran’s declining support base in the region and persuade it towards the negotiation table.
The US strikes in Yemen were led by the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group operating in the northern Red Sea, supported by other regional assets. The USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group was repositioned from the US Indo-Pacific Command, and B-2 Spirit bombers were forward-deployed to Diego Garcia. In an official update on Operation Rough Rider on 28 April, the US Central Command stated that over 800 targets—including command-and-control facilities, air defence systems, industrial complexes, and weapons storage locations—had been struck. Numerous Houthi leaders and fighters were reportedly killed, and the Ras Isa port’s fuel-handling capability was destroyed.
The statement acknowledged that the Houthis continued to attack US vessels during the operation but noted a 69 percent reduction in ballistic missile launches and a 55 percent decrease in one-way drone attacks. It also mentioned that “we will continue to ratchet up the pressure until the objective is met.”
Unofficial estimates claimed that between 500 to 600 Houthi personnel were killed. Civilian casualties were also reported, though no reliable figures are available. The US was unable to establish air supremacy and suffered notable losses, including at least seven MQ-9 Reaper drones from mid-March. Estimates suggest that between 15 and 22 Reapers have been lost since January 2024 to rudimentary Houthi air defence systems. These drone losses have raised concerns regarding their survivability, especially against modern air defence systems, as well as the cost-effectiveness—each Reaper drone costs around US$ 30 million. Reportedly, a few F-35s and F-16s had a close shave. Additionally, two F/A-18 Super Hornet jets were lost at sea—one fell overboard when the aircraft carrier undertook a sharp manoeuvre to evade a Houthi attack, and the other was lost when an aircraft coming in for recovery failed to catch the arrestor wires.
The Ceasefire and Key Takeaways
In the final phase of hostilities, the Houthis launched a ballistic missile on 4 May 2025 targeting Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, signalling their intent to continue targeting Israel. Israel retaliated, claiming the destruction of Sana’a International Airport. On the same day, 6 May, President Trump declared victory and announced a ceasefire, mediated by Oman. It was confirmed by Oman, stating that both sides had agreed not to target each other in the Red Sea. There was no immediate statement from Houthi authorities on the ceasefire, but Yemeni-linked social media handles claimed victory.
During the 52 days of Operation Rough Rider, the Houthis sustained damage to critical infrastructure and nodes, war reserves and some key personnel. However, they still retained adequate capabilities to sustain operations at a lower level. Their assembly and supply lines for replacements and replenishment would be reactivated quickly, enabling them to regroup and rearm. The US Navy ships also came under attack in a restricted sea room for carrier operations. Drone and aircraft losses at regular intervals contributed to reassessment regarding the continuation of the operation.
It is also important to note that while the US objective was to halt Houthi attacks across both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the ceasefire only covered the Red Sea. Restoring freedom of navigation meaningfully would require no attacks or threat of attacks through the entire stretch, including the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab-El Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden. In the short term, transits through the Suez Canal and activity at Red Sea ports may improve, though broader security concerns remain. The assertion by Houthis that Israeli ships, including those in the Red Sea, would continue to be targeted would still need to be factored into maritime traffic.
Politically, the Houthis’ control over their territories has remained firm, and whether this operation has influenced Iran’s strategic calculations remains uncertain.