The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

DRC. M23 has intensified its offensive operations against pro-Congolese government fighters in North Kivu province in recent weeks. M23 seeks to clear parts of Rutshuru district of these fighters and prevent attacks on the rebel group’s positions and logistic routes. M23 has separately conducted a large-scale effort to demographically reshape areas that it controls in North Kivu province.
Assessments:

DRC
Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have intensified their offensive operations against pro-Congolese fighters in North Kivu province in recent weeks. M23 has been fighting pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters and suspected fighters from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—an ethnic Hutu militia group opposed to the Rwandan government—in Virunga National Park and Rutshuru district since late March 2025.[1] M23 has increased the tempo of its offensive operations against these groups in at least four densely populated areas in Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru district since May 14.[2] M23 has tried to regain control of key locations in Bwito chiefdom that it previously held.[3]

M23 has likely increased its offensive operations to clear the area of pro-Congolese government militias and prevent attacks on M23 positions and logistic routes. M23 has relied on Rutshuru district as its center of gravity and rear supply base since the rebel group resurged in late 2021.[4] M23 controlled parts of four village clusters in Bwito chiefdom and around 20 percent of the Tongo population there before increasing its offensive operations.[5] Pro-Congolese government militia fighters entrenched themselves in Bwito chiefdom and repeatedly attacked M23 positions after M23 decreased its presence in 2024.[6]

Figure 1. M23 Increases Operations in Rutshuru: April 2025–May 2025

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 may have targeted an ethnic Hutu Wazalendo faction in Bwito chiefdom that has previously attacked the rebel group in Rutshuru and in Goma. The Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP) group launched “well-coordinated” attacks on M23 positions in Goma—roughly 50 miles south of Bwito chiefdom in Rutshuru—using light and heavy weaponry in a failed attempt to retake the provincial capital on April 12.[7] Two leading research institutions on the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) described the CMC-FDP as an ethnic Hutu extremist group that is a key part of the Wazalendo alliance in Rutshuru district and Goma and has “deep ties” to the FDLR.[8] M23 claimed that the FDLR also participated in the attack on Goma.[9] Congolese media reported on numerous occasions that M23 attacked Wazalendo CMC-FDP fighters in Bwito chiefdom in late April and May.[10]

M23 also increased its offensive operations against pro-Congolese government fighters likely to secure its supply lines in Rutshuru and Masisi districts. Increased M23 operations against Wazalendo and FDLR fighters in Bwito chiefdom would help M23 connect its supply lines from its stronghold in western Rutshuru district to other parts of Rutshuru and Masisi districts. Increased control of key roads in the Bwito chiefdom, including the RP1030, would allow M23 to move reinforcements and military equipment between Masisi and Rutshuru districts and limit pro-Congolese government fighters’ ability to ambush M23 and disrupt the rebel group’s supply lines.[11] The RP1030 is a major road in North Kivu province that links the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru district to the southern and northern areas of Masisi district where M23 also conducts operations.

M23 conducted an arrest campaign against pro-Congolese government individuals in Goma and repatriated thousands of civilians to Rwanda in May to eliminate potential opposition to M23 control and address persistent insecurity. M23 conducted clearing operations in search of armed or “suspicious” fighting-age males in several densely populated neighborhoods in Goma and Sake between May 10 to May 13.[12] M23 President Bertrand Bisimwa said on social media in mid-May that M23 conducted the operations to secure Goma and nearby areas and “recover weapons [that were] distributed to the civilian population” by the DRC government.”[13]

M23 officials said that the operations were successful and claimed to have confiscated over 1,700 weapons and arrested nearly 300 people, including Congolese army soldiers and police officers, Wazalendo fighters, suspected FDLR members, and “criminals.”[14] The DRC government denounced the clearing operations and claimed that M23 kidnapped 4,000 “civilians wrongly identified with the FDLR, FARDC [the Congolese army], or Wazalendo” in Goma and Sake.[15] Amnesty International reported in late May that M23 has arbitrarily detained and tortured suspected pro-Congolese government fighters in “inhumane” and overcrowded detention centers in Goma since capturing the city in late January.[16]

M23 will likely continue to face challenges securing Goma, however, which will undermine M23’s public image as an effective governing force. Goma and its peripheral areas have faced persistent insecurity since M23 captured the North Kivu provincial capital in late January. Large numbers of Wazalendo fighters and FARDC troops blended into the population in Goma in January and contributed to spikes in violent crime after M23 captured the city.[17] M23 has lacked the law enforcement capacity to fully secure the provincial capital, and the rebel group has forcibly conscripted young people and sought to absorb FARDC and local police units in both cities to address surges in homicide, looting, and other crime.[18] Congolese and French media reported in late May that M23 still faced challenges in fully securing Goma and reducing violent crime.[19] CTP previously assessed that persistent insecurity around Goma and other key M23-occupied cities undermines M23’s public image as a stabilizing force that can govern and provide more security and opportunity to large population centers better than the DRC government, which M23 denounces as “corrupt” and “incompetent.”[20]

M23 has also arrested and repatriated thousands of Rwandan refugees, some of whom reportedly have links to FDLR, since early May. M23 has repatriated at least 1,800 Rwandan refugees from the Goma and Sake area with UN oversight since May 17.[21] French media reported that most refugees that M23 has repatriated since May 17 were from a village north of Sake in North Kivu province that is considered an FDLR stronghold.[22] Senior M23 and Rwandan officials claimed on social media that many of the repatriated refugees were family members of FDLR fighters.[23] The DRC government denounced the repatriations as a “targeted manhunt” against civilians and claimed that the repatriations are part of M23’s effort to reshape local demography in areas that it controls.[24]