A sudden outbreak of militia violence on 12 May shook Tripoli, undermining the tenuous calm in western Libya.
The trigger was the targeted assassination and killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), at the Tripoli base of the rival 444th Brigade.
This sparked intense clashes between al-Kikli’s militia and the 444th Brigade, a group loyal to Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the internationally recognised administration in Tripoli.
Although both militias are technically aligned with the GNU, the SSA had often acted independently and were viewed as a challenge to Dbeibah’s authority, whereas the 444th Brigade remained more directly loyal to him.
In response, the Special Deterrence Force (SDF), another pro-GNU faction, oversaw the evacuation of key facilities under Dbeibah’s directive, including the Transport Authority and Open Prison.
The SDF quickly mobilised, reaching out to armed factions in surrounding areas, organising protests and roadblocks in Tripoli as a cover for repositioning toward strategic locations like the al-Rajma compound.
The violence resulted in at least eight deaths, including al-Kikli, and sparked widespread unrest in Tripoli’s Abu Salim district. The clashes prompted the suspension of schools and universities and led to evacuations by foreign nationals. Gunfire and explosions echoed through the city, and prisons were breached as armed groups sought to assert control.
“The killing of Ghinaywa and the subsequent move to neutralise the SSA will have a profound impact on power dynamics, politics and security in and around the capital,” Rhiannon Smith, Managing Director of Libya-Analysis LLC, told The New Arab, adding that “the risk of renewed escalation remains high”.
A tenuous grip on power
The fighting quickly eased, but the situation remains volatile and uncertain.
As the armed clashes appeared to subside, Prime Minister Dbeibah’s government declared a “ceasefire,” claiming a military operation had successfully restored order in the capital, ordering a reshuffling of security services within Tripoli, encompassing even prison guards and anti-illegal migrant units.
Al-Kikli’s death had shifted the power balance in Tripoli, reducing the defiant SSA’s influence. And after the week of instability, Dbeibah called for an “ongoing project” to dismantle militias in Tripoli, in a televised speech on 18 May.
“We will not spare anyone who continues to engage in corruption or extortion. Our goal is to create a Libya free of militias and corruption,” he said.
While the ceasefire prevented an immediate descent into chaos, Dbeibah’s hold on power remains fragile. Thousands of demonstrators, with growing dissatisfaction over the socio-economic and political situation, called for the resignation of Dbeibah, who has stayed in power long after the postponed elections of December 2021.
Under that pressure, several ministers resigned from Dbeibah’s government, including Economy and Trade Minister Mohamed al-Hawij, Local Government Minister Badr Eddin al-Tumi, and Minister of Housing Abu Bakr al-Ghawi.
“There have been calls among civil society and municipal councils demanding Dbeibah step down,” Claudia Gazzini, Libya analyst at the International Crisis Group, told The New Arab, suggesting that Dbeibah’s rule is looking increasingly fragile, despite his attempts to signal otherwise.
Over the past decade, Libya has been mired in a political quagmire, with competing factions, regional actors, and armed groups vying for control. Militia groups hold considerable sway over decision-making processes, and courting them is seen as a necessity for power.
Indeed, long-time leader Muammar Gaddafi maintained control over Libya by creating a system built on tribal loyalty while he institutionalised the militia system, building on long-standing and pre-existing tribal structures.
Following the Libyan revolution against Gaddafi in 2011, supported by the NATO intervention, the lack of follow-up state-building efforts by the international community left Libya’s future in the hands of militia factions, leaving the nation open to a power struggle over its resources, particularly in Tripoli.
Leaders like Khalifa Haftar, who commands the self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in the east, an umbrella of militias under the Haftar family’s command, clearly seek to leverage militias to stay in power.
Shifting power dynamics
For Libya to transition toward a unified state, analysts argue that far-reaching reforms would be needed, including the disbandment of rival armed groups, a task that seems increasingly challenging.
Indeed, the entrenched power of militias like Rada and the 444th Brigade shows that overcoming Libya’s militia-driven structure will require significant reforms, perhaps pushing for a political solution that can counterbalance the militias’ influence.
“I believe that as long as the underlying drivers of conflict in Libya remain unaddressed – namely the centralisation of wealth and decision-making in Tripoli and the absence of an agreement on the equitable distribution of resources – the capital will remain vulnerable to violent power grabs from powerful armed groups within the city and those from other cities and regions,” Stephanie Williams, former UN Special Adviser on Libya, told The New Arab.
She warned that the “zero-sum” approach towards power among Libya’s elites will continue to exacerbate the nation’s instability.
“On the one hand, you have a Prime Minister in Tripoli who has extended his rule well past its natural expiration date, and he is joined by the two legislative assemblies, which have also exceeded their term limits by many years. On the other side of the country sits a powerful warlord who seeks to return Libya to the days of a military dictatorship and rules the territory he controls with an absolute iron fist,” Williams added.
There is also the potential slide into a civil war, breaking the fragile ceasefire between the eastern and western governments since the UN-brokered ceasefire in late 2020. That saw the Tripoli-based government engaged in an uneasy truce with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) led by Prime Minister Ossama Hammad and backed by Haftar’s forces.
The Eastern authorities saw an opportunity to exploit Tripoli’s chaos. The HoR issued public statements condemning the Tripoli violence and even accused the GNU of misconduct amid the chaos. This included allegations that a pro-Dbeibah militia attacked the central bank headquarters in Libya.
Moreover, in an official letter to the Central Bank Governor on 18 May, the speaker of the HoR parliament, Aguila Saleh, ordered a freeze of “all bank accounts of public entities funded by the treasury, except salaries,” effectively halting budgetary disbursements, putting more economic pressure on the Tripoli government.
So far, there has been little indication that Haftar’s forces will march into Tripoli once more. Yet currently, these economic moves seek to weaken Dbeibah’s grip, without firing a bullet, and also aim to legitimise the eastern authorities and divert more wealth from Tripoli to the east.
Rhiannon Smith of Libya-Analysis LLC added that “the fresh instability in Tripoli increases the chances of renewed oil blockades in the coming period”.
In the past, Haftar or his sons have used oil blockades on western Libya to gain concessions from the Tripoli authorities.
Smith also said international companies – including those in the energy sector – are likely to be more wary of investment in Libya given such flare-ups, potentially worsening the economic situation.
This would leave Libya in a catch-22: without stability, there is reduced investment, and with less investment, the economic situation worsens, creating the conditions for more instability.
Stalemate or return to violence?
The recent clashes in Tripoli show that Libya’s political landscape is increasingly untenable. Despite years of diplomatic efforts, the international community, especially the UN, has struggled to resolve Libya’s divisions.
Often, the UN has taken a hands-off approach to Libya and its factions, only acting when flare-ups threaten to crack the tenuous ceasefire, rather than addressing the underlying structural issues. Indeed, whether Dbeibah reasserts control or his administration is replaced, such changes would likely only address the symptoms, rather than the root cause.
Key issues like electoral reforms and oil revenue distribution remain unresolved. External actors such as Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and Russia have long had differing interests, with Turkey traditionally backing Tripoli’s authorities, while the latter three have supported the eastern government.
The UN-led peace process may continue to stagnate unless the United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) can persuade these various international powers to align behind a peace agreement. These include European actors which have invested in the oil sector and attempted to work with Libyan authorities to stem migration.
Claudia Gazzini of the International Crisis Group suggested to The New Arab that the latest violence may create an opening for the UN to once again push for a lasting political solution.
However, the recent events serve as a reminder that talks must work to push for a stable political solution to unify the country beyond the ambitions of elites and militias.
“The tragic events witnessed in downtown Tripoli highlighted the fragility of the status quo and should be a wake-up call to Libyan actors to put aside their personal ambitions for the sake of their compatriots and get behind the UN political process. International actors should also cease their competition over the Libya file and support the efforts of the UN envoy,” Stephanie Williams said.