In early 2025, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—faces a critical turning point in the political and security landscape of West Africa.
Formed in the wake of successive coups between 2020 and 2023, the AES presents a unified front against what its leaders describe as neo-colonial interference and regional instability. This alliance faces significant structural economic weaknesses and deprivation, along with increasing opposition from both regional and other African states. The thesis argues that the AES represents a bold effort toward self-determination and collective security. However, its dependence on governance and military strength, along with a fragile economic foundation, threatens to undermine its credibility and may worsen the very crises it seeks to resolve.
Since the 2020 coup in Mali, which was followed by similar events in Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023, these countries have experienced repeated shocks to governance and security. By 2025, the World Bank estimated that the combined GDP of the AES member countries had contracted by 3.8 percent in 2024, in contrast to an average regional growth of 2.1 percent for West Africa. Inflation rates soared to 12 percent in Niger and exceeded 15 percent in Burkina Faso, while food insecurity affected nearly 25 percent of households across the Sahel, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. These economic indicators highlight the Alliance’s limited capacity to provide public services and secure broad-based legitimacy among citizens struggling with hunger and unemployment.
Militarily, the AES has committed to joint operations against jihadist groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). To date, approximately 1,200 AES troops have participated in cross-border patrols and counterinsurgency raids. However, a February 2025 report from the United Nations Secretary-General indicated that violent incidents in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area rose by 18 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, raising concerns about the Alliance’s operational effectiveness. Additionally, command structures remain ad hoc due to limited logistics and intelligence sharing. Military expenditures, which averaged 5% of GDP, have already strained national resources and budget allocations for development and social spending across AES member countries in 2024.
The Politically Explicit AES rejects the authority of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which suspended Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in August 2023. ECOWAS then imposed targeted financial sanctions on key military figures and froze the three governments’ access to regional development funds. Despite these measures, ECOWAS’s mediation efforts have made little progress; by March 2025, no credible roadmap for a civilian transition had been established. The Alliance’s leaders point to ECOWAS’s threat of military intervention—especially against Niger—as evidence of Western-backed coercion. However, this stance has only deepened their diplomatic isolation. The African Union, cautious due to past precedents, has largely deferred to ECOWAS, issuing statements that “encourage inclusive dialogue” but stopping short of clearly supporting the AES’s anti-intervention stance.
Reactions from other African states beyond ECOWAS have been mixed. Guinea’s authorities praised the Alliance’s opposition to external interference in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, publicly condemned coups, and warned of potential broader destabilization. By 2025, Gulf of Guinea coastal states had increased joint naval patrols to deter the spillover of militant groups. These differing responses highlight a larger geopolitical contest: while some leaders resonate with anti-colonial rhetoric, others fear that economic collapse driven by sanctions or the expansion of jihadist operations could undermine regional security.
On the international stage, Mali and Burkina Faso have deepened their ties with Russia, formalizing support from the Wagner Group in late 2024 for training in security and logistics. In January 2025, Niger announced a barter agreement to exchange uranium concessions with Russia for military equipment valued at an estimated USD 150 million over three years. In response, Western partners have curtailed aid: France suspended bilateral development projects worth €200 million, and the European Union redirected its Sahel support funds into humanitarian channels, bypassing governments. While the United States continues its counterterrorism efforts, it has restricted partnerships and security assistance to non-state actors due to concerns about potential diversion of weapons. As a result, members of AES are projected to face an estimated aid gap of USD 350 million by 2025.
Internally, the cohesion of the Alliance is under strain due to ideological differences. Mali prioritizes the neutralization of rapid militant threats, while Burkina Faso’s military leaders justify the continued use of force against civilian protests. A March 2025 survey by the African Center for Strategic Studies found that 62 percent of Nigeriens distrust the military government’s ability to improve conditions, and only 28 percent believe that membership in the AES will reduce insecurity. These popular sentiments, along with the lack of clear roadmaps for elections, contribute to risk fragmentation. As a result, local commanders in the Tillabéri and Sahel regions have started negotiating directly with international organizations, bypassing the central directives of NGOs.
The Ultimate Alliance of Sahel States represents a paradoxical military coalition: although they may temporarily fill power vacuums, they seldom promote durable or sustainable development. The AES’s combined forces are under-resourced, its economies are contracting, and its diplomatic approach tends to attract sanctions rather than support. Troublingly, the lack of transparency of civilian engagement undermines domestic legitimacy and could fuel further dissent or splintering.
In conclusion, to prevent a worsening AES crisis, member states should actively re-engage with ECOWAS and the African Union to establish a clear timeline for returning to civilian rule, along with verifiable benchmarks for security sector reform. At the same time, they must diversify economic partnerships beyond security-focused barter deals by opening up to conditional development aid linked to human rights guarantees and governance improvements. Building institutional capacity through joint civil programs, military cooperation, and strengthened regional judicial collaboration will be essential for translating military successes into social stability. Enhancing early warning systems for food insecurity, supported by humanitarian corridors, can mitigate the humanitarian impact of sanctions while providing tangible benefits to local communities. By balancing sovereignty with accountability and military needs with a resilient economy, AES can evolve from a fragile alliance of convenience into a credible regional actor. In doing so, the Sahel may find a path toward security and development that reconciles self-determination with the imperatives of collective responsibility.