Bottom Line Up Front
The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has escalated its insurgency since January 2025, launching at least twelve coordinated attacks on military bases and infrastructure across Borno State over the last three months, in the northeast of Nigeria.
This offensive has exposed systemic flaws in Nigeria’s counterterrorism approach – with the collapse of the military’s “supercamp” strategy – highlighting ISWAP’s growing tactical sophistication and adaptability.
The group’s recent media output, use of kinetic drones, and influx of foreign fighters could suggest increased logistical support from Islamic State (IS) core, enabling greater territorial consolidation and ultimately supporting the operationalization of regional IS networks.
Parallel violence by other non-state actors, such as Boko Haram, Fulani militias and criminal outfits, combined with a breakdown in regional military bodies like the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), is accelerating the fracture of Nigeria’s broader security landscape.
Security in northeastern Nigeria is deteriorating rapidly amid a surge in violent, coordinated attacks by jihadist factions – primarily the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – a splinter group of Boko Haram formed in 2015. ISWAP has intensified operations since January 2025, with an escalation of attacks on military targets in recent weeks. This offensive has exposed both the inherent failures and the broader collapse of Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy, while underscoring ISWAP’s tactical adaptability. This escalation unfolds alongside other security challenges, including Fulani herder-farmer violence and activity by non-state actors such as bandits and vigilante groups, who exploit weaknesses in the state apparatus.
ISWAP has demonstrated an evolution in its tactics, as seen in a series of complex assaults in May 2025. Most recently, on May 16, insurgents attacked a military base in Wulgo near the Cameroonian border, resulting in casualties among both Nigerian and Cameroonian forces. Just two days later, the group attacked another base in the neighboring state of Yobe. ISWAP has found repeated success in attacking supercamps through a combination of nighttime raids, targeted isolation of bases by detonating surrounding roads and bridges, and the accumulation of a growing stockpile of looted weapons to facilitate future incursions. These supercamps have been at the core of the military’s counterinsurgency strategy since 2019, during a peak in the operations of Boko Haram and ISWAP but have now become strategic liabilities. Initially implemented to consolidate personnel and equipment into secure hubs in population centers, the strategy has left rural and less densely populated areas vulnerable – some of which are now controlled or contested by ISWAP. Many of these installations are underfunded and poorly fortified due to corruption and mismanagement, leaving them exposed to attacks and looting.
On May 11, the group overran the 50 Task Force Battalion in New Marte, in Borno State, stealing ammunition and at least 45 vehicles, abducting soldiers, and destroying key military assets. Between May 12 and 13, ISWAP launched a wave of near-simultaneous assaults across Borno, attacking bases in New Marte, Dikwa, and Rann, and road infrastructure like the Damboa-Maiduguri corridor. This string of violence caused thousands to flee. Moreover, disruption of this key supply route could facilitate ISWAP’s efforts to assert dominance over southern Borno.
This week, Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum warned of renewed escalation by ISWAP, highlighting the group’s “total control” over several local government areas (LGAs) – including Marte, which houses over 300 towns and villages – following destructive assaults on Nigerian army bases in the northeastern state of Borno and neighboring Yobe state. ISWAP’s territorial consolidation remains strongest in Borno as well as areas surrounding the town of Damboa. Additional strongholds include the Lake Chad basin, Alagarno, and Sambisa forests. The implementation of forced taxes as well as jizya – a compulsory tax for non-Muslims – ultimately sustains insurgency efforts, as further landgrabs propel fundraising efforts.
On April 30, ISWAP attempted to isolate the strategically significant town of Damboa by detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on bridges along the Biu–Damboa road, cutting off reinforcements and constraining the military’s response. These attacks reflect a sophisticated strategy of infrastructure sabotage and base encirclement, aimed at weakening the military’s logistical resilience and the additional symbolic victory of acquiring a town that hosts a strong military presence, due to its position as a key humanitarian distribution hub for IDPs fleeing from jihadist violence.
Since March 2025, ISWAP has carried out at least twelve targeted attacks on military outposts, reflecting a resumption of the group’s 2018-2019 operational tempo. During this period, it temporarily seized the town of Baga, home to the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is a regional military coalition formed to combat insurgencies in the Lake Chad region, comprised of military personnel from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin. Recent attacks suggest a shift to proactive confrontation, with equipment losses valued in billions of naira, raising concerns over the military’s already weak capacity to sustain a counteroffensive.
Following the assault on the New Marte military base, on May 19 ISWAP released a 15-minute long, high-quality propaganda video titled “Fight Them, Allah Will Punish Them By Your Hands.” This is significant because the group has not released video propaganda in several years. The video showcases executions, footage of IEDs targeting army patrols, and stolen weapons from the New Marte assault, as well as disparaging scenes of the Nigerian military’s retreat. The sophistication of the media reflects the communication mode of IS core and suggests a concerted effort to appeal to local populations and boost recruitment, with the use of Hausa subtitles. Analysts suggest that IS advisers may have been deployed to assist ISWAP fighters on the ground, claims supported by the group’s evolution in battlefield strategy and renewed media output.
In addition, ISWAP has leveraged explosive-rigged off-the-shelf commercial drones with increasing frequency. Initially used for reconnaissance and propaganda dissemination, drones have since been rigged to drop explosives – a trend that has been observed since late 2024 across West Africa more broadly. The growing use of kinetic drone technology points to external support and increased funding, likely from Islamic State’s central leadership. The transition to this method of warfare, as well as possibly increased support from the core, has proven to be a decisive factor in the group’s recent wave of tactical successes.
The Nigerian military is now deployed across two-thirds of the country, stretched thin by the simultaneous threats of jihadist insurgency, criminal groups, and communal violence. Moreover, the merging of ideological extremism with economic motives and criminality in Nigeria makes it increasingly difficult to identify perpetrators or respond effectively. The military remains overstretched, underfunded, and hampered by internal dysfunction. Embezzlement of arms procurement funds, poor troop welfare, and logistical sabotage have weakened its ability to retain land or respond effectively. As a result, security is often outsourced to local vigilante groups and criminal actors, further undermining stability.
International military cooperation across the Lake Chad Basin has also deteriorated. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 – following its 2023 coup – has compromised intelligence sharing efforts and disrupted joint military operations across porous borders. Chad also threatened to exit the alliance in 2024, highlighting the challenges in maintaining this alliance. Moreover, strained diplomatic relations between Abuja and Niamey following Niger’s transition to junta-leadership have created operational vacuums along the Niger-Nigeria border. The collapse of their joint military presence has been exploited by jihadist and criminal groups.
A lull in fighting between ISWAP and Boko Haram may have enabled ISWAP to co-opt fighters and establish dominance. In addition, scores of foreign fighters – often more ideologically rigid and militarily proficient – have joined ISWAP in the Bosso region – adjacent to Borno and in close proximity to the Nigeria-Niger border – strengthening their operations. Their presence, combined with kinetic drone capabilities, could support expansion southward. Southern Nigeria is the country’s economic powerhouse, and its penetration would expose densely populated towns and cities to risk. ISWAP’s significance in the IS global network – evidenced by hosting the Islamic State’s Maktab al-Furqan (West Africa office) – could significantly advance the strategic objectives of the Islamic State core if they continue on this path. Moreover, in Nigeria’s northwest, the steady rise of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)-linked Lakurawa group with origins in Mali and Niger – designated a terrorist organization by Abuja in 2024 – evidences the impacts of militant spillover as terrorist networks strengthen across porous borders.
The effects of Boko Haram’s 16-year insurgency – aggravated by periods of violent confrontations with ISWAP – have reverberated beyond northeastern Nigeria. In the country’s agrarian so-called “Middle Belt” – notably Benue, Plateau, and Delta states – there has been a spike in violent attacks by nomadic Fulani Muslim pastoralists against Christian farming communities. Since 2019, the clashes have claimed more than 500 lives in the region and displaced over 2.2 million people, according to SBM Intelligence. There have been over 156 fatalities in these regions last month alone. While these disputes are rooted in long-standing competition over land and resources, climate change and drought, combined with the security vacuum created by the ongoing jihadist insurgency, have exacerbated violence between the communities. Both groups fleeing the terrorist threat have moved southward into concentrated areas, compounding herder-farmer confrontations in an already complex security landscape.