Following several setbacks in a diplomatic resolution to the ongoing crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the March 23 Movement (M23) /Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) has entrenched its positions across the territories it occupies and is continuing its march westward towards Kinshasa.
M23 is continuing to consolidate its political aims with the establishment of further governing administrations in areas under its control, as well as “mining delegations” – underscoring that DRC’s estimated $24 trillion mineral wealth is a central driver for a range of parties to this conflict.
The security landscape remains highly fragmented in DRC, with Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), Wazalendo militias, and other non-state armed groups exploiting the security vacuum to carry out attacks.
State actors are also leveraging the conflict as a proxy for competition in the African Great Lakes region, increasing the risk of a broader regional spillover, with tensions between Rwanda and Burundi continuing to escalate and Uganda simultaneously providing security assistance while carving out territory.
The ongoing crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows no signs of abating and remains mired in a cycle of failed peace efforts. The latest setback to a diplomatic resolution of the Rwanda-backed M23/AFC insurgency came on March 24, when Angolan President João Lourenço announced his withdrawal as mediator. In response, 24 members of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held virtual talks to revive faltering ceasefire initiatives. Despite these blocs expanding their mediation efforts, several critical issues remain, and analysts warn that without Angola’s leadership, regional efforts may struggle to gain traction. Moreover, DRC, Rwanda, and M23 have expressed conflicting views on combined peace talks, each accusing regional bodies of bias. Furthermore, both Rwanda and M23 have previously criticized SADC military involvement in eastern DRC.
Angola’s withdrawal follows a series of failed ceasefire efforts. Talks planned in Luanda on March 18 were canceled after M23 refused to participate, citing its opposition to EU sanctions imposed the previous day on senior rebel leaders and the Rwandan government. In response to these measures, Rwanda cut diplomatic ties with Belgium. That same day, Qatar facilitated a surprise meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, where both leaders called for an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire. However, the absence of a concrete implementation plan rendered the pledge ineffective despite officials from EAC-SADC meeting the previous day to discuss a possible roadmap. Despite these efforts, M23/AFC has steadily overwhelmed the FARDC and its patchwork of supporting forces in the DRC, including pro-government Wazalendo militias.
Another round of talks is set for April 9 in Qatar between M23 leaders and DRC officials, marking their first direct negotiations. M23 has long demanded engagement with Kinshasa as part of its push for political legitimacy, a demand the DRC has consistently rejected. Given this history, mutual distrust and competing interests make a meaningful resolution unlikely, as the talks may hinge on major concessions. These could include discussions on potential power-sharing arrangements and the withdrawal of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), whose presence M23 claims continues to threaten Tutsi communities.
On March 22, M23/AFC released a statement announcing its decision to “reposition its forces” from Walikale after capturing the town earlier in the week, following a ceasefire agreement by all sides. However, by March 28, it became clear that M23 had reneged, as both the FARDC and M23 resumed hostilities under the pretext of self-defense. The FARDC reported that instead of withdrawing, M23 was reinforcing its military positions in Walikale-center and South Kivu while increasing its manpower and weaponry across occupied areas. Both sides have used ceasefires to consolidate their positions and regroup. This pattern has persisted as the conflict unfolds, with M23 similarly violating a ceasefire after seizing Goma in late January, with the group now controlling three of the six district capitals in North Kivu province.
The fall of Walikale marks a significant milestone in the insurgency, representing M23’s deepest push westward into the DRC’s interior. The town is a strategic geographic hub, serving as a junction connecting all four eastern DRC provinces. Additionally, it holds valuable natural resources, with two large gold mines and produces seven percent of tin mined globally. This capture provides the rebels with substantial financial assets to sustain their military campaign. This advance follows the recent capture of Nyabiondo, another strategically important town in North Kivu, along with several nearby villages and steady territorial gains in South Kivu.
M23 now controls a substantial territory within North and South Kivu which totals 124,000 km2, and they could quite easily expand into DRCs Tshopo and Maniema provinces. These provinces are larger and across the mineral-rich Kivus’ western borders and constitute a major advantage in M23’s objective of marching to Kinshasa and eventually securing a foothold within DRC’s central governance, with M23 leaders recently reiterating their aims to seize power in the capital city.
M23’s political ambitions are clear, as the group functions as the armed wing of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) , a coalition of anti-government factions seeking regime change in Kinshasa. In the territories it has seized, M23 is actively implementing state-like governance structures, prioritizing control over strategic, mineral-rich regions. This not only finances its operations but also positions the group as a key player in global supply chains for critical minerals. Given the vested interests of multiple actors in DRC’s vast mineral wealth and the international community’s muted response to the conflict, M23 could plausibly entrench itself within broader geopolitical and economic frameworks.
In South Kivu, M23 has established an administrative system that includes mining ministries, tax enforcement mechanisms, and local police forces. The group has also appointed a “mining delegate” in North Kivu, according to a UN Security Council briefing on March 27. M23’s resurgence has been driven in part by its ability to consolidate power at the local level, securing funding through various means, including household taxation, forced labor, and levies on local populations. This assertive push to formalize parallel governance structures will only strengthen its grip on the region, especially if left unchecked.
In response to the ongoing crisis and viewed as coming from a place of desperation, DRC has proposed leveraging its mineral wealth in exchange for U.S. security assistance. Congolese Senator Pierre Kandi Kalambayi reached out to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in early March, suggesting that U.S. firms be granted mining concessions in return for military training and equipment for the Congolese army. Washington may view this as a strategic opportunity to counter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) dominance in Africa’s mining sector, particularly in DRC, where China controls approximately 72 percent of the country’s cobalt and copper mines. These resources are vital to global semiconductor and battery supply chains, positioning China as a dominant player in these industries. DRC is abundant in valuable minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold – collectively known as 3TG. With vast untapped reserves, the country’s natural wealth is estimated to be worth approximately $24 trillion.
The security landscape in eastern DRC remains highly complex, with various local armed groups exploiting M23-linked instability to carry out attacks on civilians, including systemic looting and sexual violence, further prolonging the conflict. In recent days, clashes between M23 and pro-government Wazalendo (self-defense) militias have intensified, despite pressure from regional mediators to end the fighting. These forces operate opportunistically, leveraging the chaos to carry out criminal activities. Such conditions are a key element for the so-called crime-terror nexus.
M23’s offensive has not only justified the escalating extortion of civilians but has also deepened interference in the local economy and governance. Rather than curbing the expansion of armed groups, the DRC government has effectively legitimized the Wazalendo movement, particularly through legislation that formalizes an “army reserve.” This week the convicted war criminal Thomas Lubanga announced the formation of a new rebellion movement, the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), based in Ituri province. The United Nations has accused Lubanga of historically providing support and mobilizing individuals for M23 and Wazalendo militias, citing their main objective as ousting President Tshisekedi — an agenda that aligns with M23. While it remains unclear whether this new group will pose a credible threat, its emergence nonetheless risks exacerbating the violence in eastern DRC.
Additionally, confrontations between the Ugandan Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) – an ethnic militia comprising a coalition of Lendu groups – have also escalated in Ituri, resulting in 19 casualties on March 18. CODECO has carried out massacres, ethnic violence, village destructions, and deliberate attacks on Hema civilians for over ten years. The UPDF has been reinforcing its presence in the region following a renewed deployment requested by DRC to counter the growing influence of ISCAP. In response, Operation Shujaa – a joint task force between the Ugandan and Congolese forces initially formed to counter ISCAP – has now expanded its mandate to target CODECO, as of March 29.
Under the premise of Operation Shujaa, Ugandan forces last month seized Bunia, the capital of Ituri. However, M23’s simultaneous advance toward Butembo, en route to Bunia, has fueled suspicions of possible coordination between M23, Rwanda, and Uganda. Moreover, high-ranking Ugandan generals and senior government advisors have publicly expressed support for M23’s cause. This was made evident this week when the head of the Ugandan army, and son of Uganda’s president tweeted “UDPF will not oppose M23’s seizure of Kisangani. But they better move quickly otherwise we will do it ourselves.” While he is known for his controversial remarks on X, this statement reinforces the perception that Uganda is not a neutral actor in the conflict.