Al-Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa, has made significant territorial gains in central Somalia since it launched its Shabelle offensive in February of 2025.

Al-Shabaab has rapidly expanded its foothold, exploiting the Somali Armed Forces’ overstretched resources, obstacles to the full implementation of the African Union mission to curb the group, and a steady inflow of weapons through its pragmatic partnership with the Houthis and various revenue streams.

The Trump administration has ramped up airstrikes in Somalia, targeting both Islamic State Somalia Province and al-Shabaab in an aggressive escalation designed to cripple the militant groups.

Türkiye has become a key partner of the Somalian Federal Government in the fight against al-Shabaab, with the most recent bilateral agreement including personnel from the Turkish Private Military Company (PMC) SADAT deploying to Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab’s 2025 Shabelle offensive has achieved significant territorial gains and racked up key operational successes in the Shabelle regions of Somalia since its initiation in February. The group’s advances have left Mogadishu scrambling for reinforcements, seeking international support from the United States, Türkiye, and the African Union to bolster its defenses. The current Somali threat landscape is complex with incursions of al-Shabaab militants into regions around the country’s capital and continued attacks by Islamic State-Somalia (IS-S) branch in the mountainous Northeast Puntland region of the county. Somalia has been a fragile, if not failed, state for decades, allowing violent non-state actors to acquire substantial firepower and destabilize successive governments with impunity.

The al Qaeda-linked group al-Shabaab has ramped up its operations, launching around 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 compared to its 2024 average in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, according to data from ACLED and the Institute for the Study of War. The recent offensive has led to the capture of key strategic towns and even a temporary takeover of a Somali Armed Forces military base, as the government’s military is overstretched, fighting al-Shabaab on multiple fronts in the southern and central parts of the country. This surge has also included an assassination attempt on Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on March 18 and the recapture of several towns lost during the 2022 Somali government offensive against the militants. While concerns have been raised about incursions into the outskirts of Mogadishu, Caleb Weiss, an expert on jihadism and political violence in Africa, warns that the developments in Middle Shabelle are particularly alarming and could ultimately impact the security of the capital.

Since 2022, the Somali government’s counterterrorism strategy has involved military operations bolstered by international support, alongside alliances with clan militias dissatisfied with al-Shabaab’s rule. However, the strategy has shown signs of fragility, as the government struggles to maintain control over the territories it has regained, and al-Shabaab recruits new members. Additionally, clan militias’ involvement in counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab has proven contentious, with militias engaging in political infighting. In December 2024, clashes between Somalia’s federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubaland region broke out, raising further concerns that the government’s resources are overstretched to deal fully with the threat posed by al-Shabaab.

While al-Shabaab is heavily sanctioned, with the UN Security Council recently further expanding the sanctions regime to authorize member states to intercept vessels transporting banned items to and from Somalia, the militants are not isolated. Recent analysis from Militant Wire highlights the Chinese weapons al-Shabaab dons in its propaganda videos. Additionally, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis have expanded their support for al-Shabaab and IS-S in recent months in a pragmatic quid pro quo. The February report from the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team highlighted that al-Shabaab and the Houthis have established a transactional relationship with the Houthis providing al-Shabaab with arms in exchange for increased Houthi piracy operations off the coastline of Somalia. Al-Shabaab boasts a robust war chest despite it being heavily sanctioned. Much of its revenue comes from a widely diversified revenue portfolio that includes customs duties, forced taxation, extortion, collection of zakat, illicit trade of goods such as charcoal, sugar, heroin, and livestock, as well as investments and remittances.

The offensive comes at a time when the future of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), launched on January 1, 2025, remains tenuous. AUSSOM aims to strengthen Somali security forces in their fight against al-Shabaab and facilitate a gradual transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali Federal Government by 2029. However, the mission is plagued by many of the financial challenges faced by its predecessors and is heavily dependent on external donors. Internal disputes among contributing nations have further jeopardized the mission, with Burundi withdrawing over disagreements regarding its troop allocation. Recent increased Ethiopian-Somali cooperation in combating al-Shabaab may prove fleeting, with tensions following Ethiopia’s 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. The Somaliland-Somalia rift, stemming from Somaliland’s secession in 1991, has strained relations with the Somali government in Mogadishu, further highlighting the vulnerability of the mission.

Since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January, the United States has vastly increased the operational tempo of airstrikes against both al-Shabaab and IS-S. Many of these strikes have been carried out in coordination with local forces, including the Somali National Army and the Puntland Security Force. On March 15, AFRICOM conducted a strike in the Shabelle region targeting al-Shabaab fighters. On March 29, AFRICOM carried out another airstrike, this time targeting IS-S positions in the Cal Miskaad Mountains of Puntland. Under Trump, the rules of engagement have been relaxed, pushing authorities down the chain of command, and allowing for more initiative by commanders with a dynamic understanding of the tactical tit-for-tat with jihadist groups on the ground in Somalia.

In addition to its ongoing counterterrorism partnership with the United States, the Somali federal government has increasingly turned to Türkiye for support. Following the recent assassination attempt against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the Somali leader traveled to Ankara to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an to strengthen security cooperation, particularly in the fight against al-Shabaab. In response, Türkiye pledged to enhance its military assistance, including providing more training, sharing intelligence, and supplying crucial military equipment. Türkiye has long been a key ally of Somalia, offering aid since the early 2010s. Recently, it has positioned itself as a dominant force in the Horn of Africa, expanding its influence in military support, trade, security, and economic development, while also playing a key role as a mediator. Türkiye has sought to position itself as a key regional power in the Horn of Africa, significant due to its strategic location near critical maritime trade routes such as the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Since 2017, Türkiye has maintained its largest overseas military base, Camp TURKSOM, in Mogadishu, reinforcing its presence and commitment to the region. The latest security agreement between Türkiye and Somalia includes the deployment of up to 5,000 personnel from SADAT International Defense Company to Mogadishu. The Turkish SADAT is an opaque PMC close to President Erdogan, known to have deployed Syrian mercenaries in key conflicts including in the Sahel and the Nagorno-Karabakh.