The US strikes against the Houthis came in light of the developments in the war in the Gaza Strip, and the indirect role of the Houthis in it, and these strikes coincide with the return of the policy of “maximum pressure” pursued by US President Donald Trump during his first administration against Iran, as these strikes seek to separate the Houthis from Iran, not only separate them from the main arena of war in the Gaza Strip.
The Yemeni arena is entering a new chapter of the conflict, after the United States launched a series of military strikes that began on March 15, 2025 and continue until the moment, during which it carried out dozens of air strikes on Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen and targeted some of the movement’s leaders. These strikes indicate a fundamental shift in the US approach and response towards the Houthis, after the previous Biden administration followed a defense-based approach, while the administration of US President Donald Trump seems to be adopting an offensive approach, at a time when Israel is resuming the war in the Gaza Strip after negotiations stalled in moving to the second stage, and increasing indications of a possible escalation between the United States and Iran after Trump gave Tehran two months to reach a new nuclear agreement. This raises a major question about the US strikes against the Houthis in Yemen as an American move to put an end to the war that erupted in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, or a desire for broader US military action targeting Iran and its remaining proxies around the region?
The Changing U.S. Engagement Pattern
The US strikes came in light of the developments in the war in the Gaza Strip, and the indirect role of the Houthis in it, who resumed their attacks against Israeli-linked merchant ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on March 11, 2025, and on March 18, 2025, the Houthis for the first time since entering the first phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip on January 19, launched a missile attack against southern Israel on March 18, 2025, followed by Israel’s interception of five rockets during the period 20-25. March 2025.
While former President Joe Biden focused on the defensive response by directing attacks against missile storage sites, radars, and related Houthi military infrastructure used in attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea, he also kept the door open to political or diplomatic options, and treating the war on its main front in the Gaza Strip as a gateway to stopping Houthi attacks, but President Donald Trump has shifted the confrontation with the Houthis. In the beginning, Trump issued an executive order to reclassify the Houthis as a “foreign terrorist organization” on January 22, 2025, after the Biden administration had only included them in the global terrorist lists, which target only economic aspects, while the former cancels any economic or political dealings and delegitimizes the organization in the areas under its control in Yemen.
On the other hand, the administration of President Donald Trump has expanded the list of attacks and their scopes to include Houthi infrastructure and leaders, and in general the US strikes refer to the lessons learned from the Israeli war with Hezbollah, which clarified how it is possible to eliminate or reduce irregular armed organizations and factions, through the intensive targeting of the chain of command and weapons storage areas, especially since the US army targeted the special security commander of Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the commander of the navy in the organization, Mansour Al-Saadi, in addition to the chief expert rockets in the group, and a number of prominent military commanders. In addition to the fact that the US attack was supported by extensive intelligence activity involving American and British spy planes and advanced air reconnaissance and surveillance systems, it seems that this perception is what prompted Donald Trump on January 19 to vow to eliminate the Houthis completely, and this may indicate that the US strikes may target Houthi leaders and senior officials in the organization’s command structure.
US strikes in the context of escalation with Iran
The US strikes against the Houthis in Yemen coincide with the return of the policy of “maximum pressure” pursued by US President Donald Trump during his first administration (2016-2021) against Iran, in one of the most important variables and entrances to read and interpret the US strikes, especially as it comes with several developments in the escalating tension between Washington and Tehran, including the imposition of sanctions on the Iranian oil industry and figures associated with it on February 6, 2025, and following the letter sent by US President Donald Trump to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Aya Allah Ali Khamenei on March 7, 2025, in which he warned Tehran of the need to reach a new nuclear agreement within two months, through direct talks with Washington.
In fact, the strikes launched by the US army against the Houthis come to separate the Houthis from Iran, and not only to separate the Houthis from the main arena of war in the Gaza Strip, especially since Trump closely links the actions of the Houthis and Iran, and holds the latter directly responsible for them and their attacks, and also relied on direct military threats against Iran, and stressed that any escalation by the Houthis is a direct result of Iranian interference. On March 15, 2025, Trump issued a direct warning to Iran, saying, “Your support for Houthi terrorists must stop immediately… If you do, beware, because the United States will hold you fully responsible, and this time we will not be tolerant,” he said on March 17, 2025: “From now on, every shot fired by the Houthis will be seen as coming out of Iran’s weapons and leadership, and it will hold Iran responsible and face serious consequences.”
Moreover, the motives of the US strikes are related to supporting Washington’s policies against Iran, on the one hand, Iran faced “maximum pressure” with what it called at the time “maximum resistance”, in which the Houthis participated directly and indirectly, through their attempts to target industrial facilities, airports and vital energy facilities in the Gulf countries, most notably targeting oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais Saudi Arabia in 2019. With the return of “maximum pressure” policies, Washington is certainly seeking to undermine any return to so-called “maximum resistance.”
However, in the region after October 7, 2023, Iran’s exercise of maximum resistance is minimal, and the chances increase that pressure on it and its proxies will lead it to accept fundamental concessions in its foreign and nuclear policy, especially since striking the Houthis comes after reducing the power of the Lebanese Hezbollah, reducing its role in the Lebanese political arena, and separating it from the Iranian “unity of squares” equation, and Iran may realize that targeting Houthi leaders and their infrastructure will not only be reflected in separating them from the “unity of squares.” But also in their strength in the Yemeni arena, especially since the continuation of the strikes and the deepening of their impact puts Yemen in a scenario similar to what happened in Syria, with the Yemeni army and the legitimate government preparing to move to restore its sovereignty over the Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.
The end of one war or the beginning of another?
Several indicators indicate that the United States may not be satisfied with sanctions against Iran, and that military action has become a good option, especially in light of the decline in fears that were previously facing talks of attack on Iran, foremost of which are the repercussions on the strategic straits in Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz, especially since the US strikes put among their goals depriving the Houthis of the ability to close the Bab al-Mandab or cause a widespread strike in it, and in light of the subsequent repercussions of the war in the Gaza Strip, it has become possible to avoid Those fears are serious if Washington decides to attack Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure.
Among these indicators, the US Department of Defense announced on March 22 that a second aircraft carrier would be sent to the region, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), to the Middle East with the extension of the presence of the aircraft carrier “USS Harry Truman” (CVN-75) along with the aircraft carrier leading the attacks against the Houthis, the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69), while the region during the various stages of the war in the Gaza Strip witnessed the presence of two aircraft carriers together in the region, when Gerald Ford (CVN-78) was present in the Mediterranean in conjunction with Truman’s presence in the Red Sea, and then Truman and Eisenhower were simultaneously in the Mediterranean, but what is different this time is that the previous presences were for deterrence and defense purposes, while sending a second aircraft carrier at a time when the first is carrying out offensive combat missions, indicates the United States’ concentration of combat military assets and an offensive strike force in preparation for perhaps a possible or imminent attack.
Finally, the US strikes against the Houthis in Yemen seem aimed at ending their participation in the war in the Gaza Strip, which has been ongoing since November 2023, but at the same time they fall within Washington’s goal to maximize the risks around Iran and reduce the risks associated with the US move to undermine it, whether through economic sanctions or military strikes. In general, this move indicates that military solutions have entered the table of options after it was only a threat and a threat, which means that US strikes against Iran are possible and perhaps imminent.