Civilians are fleeing Ethiopia’s northernmost state of Tigray amid fears of renewed conflict, as both Eritrean and Ethiopian forces escalate their military presence along the border.
Ethiopia’s push to secure Red Sea access combined with a power struggle within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), bolstered by Eritrean interventions, is pushing the countries closer to full-scale conflict.
Failures in the implementation of key provisions of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement – which saw an end to the 2020 – 2022 Tigray War – has deepened divisions between the two countries.
Ethiopia’s domestic turmoil, Eritrea’s strategic calculations, and external geopolitical interests make the Horn of Africa a flashpoint for escalating conflict — one with potentially disastrous consequences for the region and beyond.
Civilians are fleeing the Tigray region in large numbers amid fears of renewed conflict, just two years after the end of the catastrophic 2020 – 2022 Tigray War. The mass panic comes as Eritrean and Ethiopian forces sharply escalate their military presence across their shared border, indicating a drastic decline in relations between the two countries in recent days.
The Horn of Africa is entering a renewed period of upheaval catalyzed by rising tensions between neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is threatening to descend into a full-scale conflict. Ethiopia’s internal instability, the protracted power struggle between political elites in the northernmost region of Tigray, and Eritrea’s imperative to preserve its sovereignty are converging to spark a war between the countries. The resurgence of conflict in Tigray risks escalating into a broader confrontation, potentially drawing Ethiopia and Eritrea into a broader regional conflict.
The recent tensions in Tigray are rooted in a widening rift between political elites, with rival factions of the governing Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) aligned with President Getachew Reda of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) and Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael of TPLF. Eritrea is accused of exacerbating this divide through its support of TIRA. Reda’s appointment as TIRA leader under the Pretoria Agreement – a peace treaty between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF – by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in May 2023, ultimately catalyzed the fracturing of the administration. TIRA has been criticized for being too closely aligned with the federal government, while the TPLF faction loyal to Debretsion has sought to regain control of Tigray. The TPLF – a left-wing ethno-nationalist paramilitary group and political party – was the dominant political force in Tigray for many years.
The situation has rapidly deteriorated in recent weeks, culminating in violent clashes on March 11 that forced Reda to flee to Addis Ababa after resisting arrest by the TPLF. Conflict between rival TPLF factions erupted across Tigray, with security forces loyal to Debretsion seizing control of major towns, including the administrative capital of Mekelle. After capturing the northern city of Adigrat, the security forces installed a loyal mayor and similarly took Adi Gudem after intense combat. They also seized control of Mekelle FM 104.4 radio station and the capital mayor’s office while simultaneously establishing parallel governance structures. Civilians are reportedly withdrawing funds and fleeing Tigray en masse, while military mobilization has been observed along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border by each state.
On March 17, negotiations in Addis Ababa between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Debretsion, Reda, and General Tadesse Werede, Commander-in Chief of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), resulted in Werede being appointed as the new TIRA leader. However, tensions remain high, with reports of TDF remobilization and calls for demobilized fighters to rejoin the TPLF despite their previous neutrality. Earlier this month, breakaway TDF factions reportedly seized control of eastern Tigray, ousting TIRA officials. The rapid and large-scale troop movements by the Ethiopian federal army, Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), and the TDF suggest that a major confrontation is imminent.
Since August, tensions have escalated as the TPLF has established parallel governance structures across Tigray and pressured key TIRA officials to resign after the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) declined the TPLF’s request to regain its legal status as a political party. The Pretoria Agreement – brokered by the African Union and implemented by Prime Minister Ahmed – has failed to stabilize the region. Ahmed was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the devasting 2020 – 2022 war in Tigray that claimed over 600,000 lives and is considered one of the deadliest conflicts in modern history. The agreement’s key provision — the disarmament of the TDF within 30 days — was never fully implemented. Ethiopia has yet to formally recognize the TPLF as a political party, while unresolved territorial disputes have further strained relations. Eritrea, excluded from the Pretoria negotiations, has actively sought to undermine the agreement by supporting factions opposed to Ethiopia’s federal government.
The renewed Tigray conflict is taking place amid worsening Ethiopia-Eritrea diplomatic relations. Both countries accuse each other of backing domestic opposition groups, and Ethiopia’s pursuit of Red Sea access has exacerbated the ongoing tensions between the two states. Prime Minister Ahmed has framed Red Sea access as Ethiopia’s historical right, a claim that is contested. In early 2024, Ethiopia signed a 50-year deal with Somaliland for sea access near Berbera, a move widely seen as an effort to counter Eritrea and regain influence over the ports of Assab and Massawa, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993 following a 30-year long war. Eritrea has responded by supporting the conflict in Tigray, viewing Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a direct threat to its sovereignty.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s military is stretched thin, with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) heavily deployed in Amhara to combat Fano ethno-nationalist militants. This could make Ethiopia reluctant to engage in a full-scale war with Eritrea. If a full-scale conflict were to erupt, it could fuel ethnic violence in the context of Ethiopia’s home to a multitude of ethnic armed factions, most notably the Fano which launched an armed rebellion against the state in 2023 despite being previously aligned with the central government during the Tigray War. As such, Eritrea may be betting on Ethiopia’s military constraints to advance its own strategic objectives.
Instability in Tigray and heightened Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions have significant regional spillover implications. Eritrea and Ethiopia have become entangled in Sudan’s civil war, supporting competing factions of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both Tigrayan fighters and Eritrea are allegedly providing significant aid to the SAF, contributing to further instability, particularly in Western Tigray – a disputed border area with Sudan – where the Ethiopian government has greater concern over the presence of Tigrayan forces.
Saudi Arabia is reportedly wary of Ethiopian military expansion along the Red Sea. However, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has accommodated Ethiopian interests in the Red Sea, not only bolstering its partnership but also raising questions about UAE policy in the region, particularly with Egypt. Further, Iran and Russia have exhibited vested interests in exploiting conflict in the region, with both seeking to weaken the hegemony of Western aligned governments in the region and exploit Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions to gain naval footholds.
Moreover, the plethora of jihadist groups operating in the Sahel region could potentially exploit the renewed conflict to expand their influence, further destabilizing the region. There is evidence that al-Shabaab is capitalizing on instability in Ethiopia to expand its networks across the Horn of Africa. In August 2024, Ethiopian and Kenyan intelligence services reported cooperation between the Oromo Liberation Army, which is fighting the Ethiopian government, and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Ethiopia’s domestic turmoil, Eritrea’s strategic calculations, and external geopolitical interests make the Horn of Africa a flashpoint for escalating conflict — one with potentially disastrous consequences for the region and beyond.