Insecurity in South Sudan has escalated in recent weeks, with renewed fighting taking place in parts of Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states following more frequent skirmishes between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar.
The government has accused Machar and his allies of collaborating with the White Army, a militia group mainly composed of the Neur ethnic group, following an attack on a military base, leading to the arrests of several of Machar’s allies.
Heightening tensions threaten to upend a 2018 peace deal – a fragile power sharing arrangement between the two leaders – that ended a brutal five-year long civil war which resulted in over 400,000 casualties.
The downfall of the regime, and the 2018 agreement, could have devastating consequences for the nation including the resurgence of massacres and ethnic cleansing, transforming South Sudan into a battleground for militias and illegal activities, and creating a new front for proxy conflicts in the region.
Insecurity in South Sudan has escalated in recent weeks, with renewed fighting taking place in parts of Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. The conflict erupted following more frequent skirmishes between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by former rebel leader and Vice President Riek Machar. Several of Machar’s allies were arrested in early March, including high-ranking military leaders, such as the deputy army chief; Machar’s residence was reportedly encircled by the military. Heightening tensions threaten to upend a 2018 peace deal – a fragile power sharing arrangement between the two leaders – that ended a brutal five-year long civil war which resulted in over 400,000 casualties. Until recently, the power-sharing deal prevented the country from slipping into a full-scale civil war.
The government has accused Machar and his allies of collaborating with the White Army, a militia group mainly composed of the Neur ethnic group, to which Machar belongs and retains close ties to, following an attack on a military base on March 4. The attack took place in Nasir, a town along the border of South Sudan and Ethiopia. This event and the ensuing arrests have compounded the tensions between Machar and Kiir, with officials loyal to Machar alleging the violation of the peace agreement. With Neur forces surrounding the base, a UN crew with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) attempted to rescue Major General Majur Dak, a Dinka commander, three times by helicopter, but the rescue mission ultimately led to disaster when Dak and seven others were killed in a firefight on March 7, despite Machar pleading with the militia to let him live.
In February of this year, violent protests erupted in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, in the northwest of South Sudan, following a unilateral cabinet reshuffle by President Kiir amid escalating unrest in the Nasir region. His decision to unilaterally dismiss several key government officials without offering sufficient grounds, including Vice Presidents James Wani Igga and Hussein Abdelbagi, was viewed as an affront to the power-sharing mechanisms proscribed by the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Since assuming power in 2005, Kiir has been known to leverage an aggressive strategy of purging rivals, as such, the reshuffle was widely seen as a “soft coup” aimed at consolidating his power within the state apparatus ahead of the elections that were scheduled to take place this year. The region has historically been a hotspot for communal violence, with the reshuffle prioritizing appointments within Kiir’s Dinka ethnic group, leading to reignited tensions along ethnic lines.
On March 11, Uganda deployed special forces units from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to secure the capital city of Juba and provide support to Kiir’s administration. Ugandan troops have been intermittently deployed, first in 2013 and again in 2016 to quell unrest. Sharing a northern border with South Sudan, Uganda aims to prevent regional spillover and a large refugee influx across the border. However, its deployments have done little to ease the deep-rooted political tensions and fighting between ethnic groups. While the arrival of the UDPF in Juba may prevent a violent flare-up in the capital city, it is unlikely to reduce the likelihood of conflict in western South Sudan, as the threat of a large-scale internal conflict remains a distinct possibility. Additionally, this intervention may exacerbate tensions as it supports Kiir’s government against opposition forces, potentially undermining the scope for future dialogue and legitimate peace efforts.
The sharp escalation is partly related to economic pressures on the government, resulting from the ongoing conflict between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in neighbouring Sudan, as well as the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. These factors have significantly compromised South Sudan’s oil infrastructure and contributed to an influx of approximately 810,000 Sudanese refugees since 2023, according to the UN refugee agency, which has added significant strain to the country’s economy. South Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenues after part of a pipeline burst in Khartoum in 2024 due to the fighting. The conflict has limited the ability for repairs and halted the flow of oil. Additionally, RSF-SAF clashes earlier this year destroyed the al-Jili oil refinery located north of Khartoum, which had accounted for a substantial percentage of oil production. This has led to a fiscal crisis and widespread discontent, disrupting South Sudan’s food imports and causing the price of bread to increase by 30 percent. A situation exacerbated by the conflict in Sudan, which was once hoped to be a potential “breadbasket” of East Africa. Overall, this has threatened Kiir’s ability to continue to support his patronage network and sustain his regime.
The ongoing conflict in South Sudan stems, in part, from the instrumentalization of ethnic identities by political elites for economic and political gain. President Kiir’s centralization of oil revenues, which accounts for 90 percent of the country’s revenue according to a 2022 World Bank report, has been a critical factor in fueling ethnic tensions. Oil fields in Unity State and Upper Nile have become key flashpoints in the conflict, with local violence in these regions constituting a substantial proportion of communal militia activity since 2018. The Kiir administration has distributed oil contracts and revenues through ethnic patronage with the ethnically Dinka-dominated South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and allied militias controlling oil fields, and Nuer groups, like Machar’s SPLM-IO systematically excluded. This concentration of resources has exacerbated tensions, not only between Kiir’s Dinka-dominated troops and Machar’s Nuer forces, but also within broader South Sudanese society.
Post-independence conflict has largely been along Dinka-Nuer lines, with widespread ethnically targeted killings, sexual violence, and forced displacement. Power-sharing arrangements following the civil war have failed to address the underlying structural issues, such as centralized control over resources and ethnic patronage systems. While the agreement mandated oil revenue transparency, there has been little to no implementation. Instead, it has only redistributed power among elites, leaving local ethnic violence largely intact, suggesting that the conflict is unlikely to be resolved by military interventions.
Experts are anticipating the violence to escalate, with some concerned Nuer militias might try to take Malakal in the Upper Nile State – one of the biggest cities in South Sudan. According to International Crisis Group, “a battle for Malakal would dramatically up the ante … it is a multi-ethnic city, and fighting there could see communal massacres that might in turn trigger fighting in the rest of the state or throughout the country.” Additionally, Machar forces may try to retake Nasir, the city in which the White Army recently clashed with government forces. However, it is unclear how much support Machar will receive from militias, as local allegiances could frequently shift. Kiir, on the other hand, may use the death of Dak to rally the Dinka for support.
Many South Sudanese are disillusioned with the current government and the inadequate humanitarian services being provided. According to the International Rescue Committee, 69 percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance. The downfall of the current regime, and the 2018 agreement, could have devastating consequences for the nation, including the resurgence of massacres and ethnic cleansing, transforming South Sudan into a battleground for militias and illegal activities, and creating a new front for proxy conflicts in the region – a possibility parallel to its northern neighbor, Sudan. South Sudan has never held democratic elections, with scheduled elections postponed in late 2022 and 2024. As they were once again postponed to 2026, many are wondering if elections will ever occur.