• Last week, M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo seized the strategic mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu, contradicting their previous claims of avoiding further expansion and indicating a commitment to sustaining the conflict despite international pressure.
• Despite a declared ceasefire, M23’s capture of resource-rich territories has strengthened its financial and logistical position, while the withdrawal of Tanzanian and Malawian forces signals shifting regional dynamics in M23’s favor.
• M23 has initiated attempts to formalize governance in occupied areas, appointing administrators and establishing de facto authority in North Kivu, highlighting its broader political ambitions.
• Regional leaders convened at a high-level SADC-EAC summit on February 8 to address the crisis, urging an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire”; despite this, no end appears in sight as Rwanda’s role has been largely marginalized in discussions.

On February 6, M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seized the strategic mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu, roughly 100 kilometers from the regional capital Bukavu, despite previously stating it had “no intention of taking control of Bukavu or other localities.” The move is an escalation in M23’s continued military expansion, even after declaring a unilateral ceasefire on February 3—indicating that the pause was likely a tactical maneuver designed to help the insurgents rest, re-arm and recuperate, exploiting a brief pause in international scrutiny. Despite its assertions of seeking peace, M23’s advance toward Bukavu increases the likelihood of a wider regional conflict. Should the rebels overrun the city, they would control both economic centers of the north and south Kivu provinces, significantly undermining Kinshasa’s influence over eastern DRC and the likelihood of reclaiming territory from M23.

The humanitarian toll has been extensive, with estimates by the United Nations (UN) suggesting as many as 2,700 people have lost their lives since January of this year. Abuses have been reported from both Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and M23. On February 10, 84 soldiers from the FARDC faced prosecution for abuses against civilians in Bukavu, including murder, theft and rape– underscoring the issues within the Congolese military that have ultimately facilitated the conflict.

On February 8, regional leaders from east and southern Africa convened at a joint crisis summit between the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), co-chaired by Kenyan President William Ruto and Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa in Dar es Saalam, Tunisia to discuss a path forward. Key figures, including DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame attended, joining via video link, alongside leaders from South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia. Leaders urged an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire.” Despite this, no end appears in sight as Rwanda’s role has been largely marginalized in the discussions. No sanctions against Rwanda were demanded during the meeting, with the leveraging of diplomatic routes to end the conflict remaining the primary focus. This inertia to take decisive action against Kigali has propagated a lukewarm response from international actors, largely due to Rwanda’s importance to the West. Rwanda’s position as one of the most significant contributors to the UN’s peacekeeping missions, as well as the EU’s “Global Gateway Project” with Rwanda, which has involved providing $900 million for its infrastructure development, could make it less likely that Rwanda will face any accountability for its use of M23 as a “proxy force.” Confidence in regional organizations as neutral arbiters has eroded further and little progress was achieved during the summit, as skepticism has mounted over their ability to broker a credible diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

A M23 offensive on Bukavu would mark a major escalation, with the potential to draw in additional armed factions, including RED-Tabara, a Burundian militia accused of receiving Rwandan support. The fall of Bukavu would carry profound strategic implications—not only undermining the Congolese army (FARDC) but also creating a pathway for an offensive toward Kavumu, a critical military hub in South Kivu. Given Kavumu’s proximity to Lake Kivu and its function as a deployment center for Congolese forces, its capture would severely hamper FARDC’s ability to mount an effective counteroffensive. UN officials have voiced concerns over the potential loss of Kavumu airport, emphasizing its crucial role in humanitarian operations across the region. Kavumu’s strategic importance cannot be overstated—it houses a vital military airstrip used for troop movements and logistics. If M23 secures control over Kavumu, it would not only consolidate dominance over Lake Kivu but also deal a severe blow to FARDC’s operational capabilities.

M23’s capture of Nyabibwe on February 5 has strengthened its position along key trade routes in eastern DRC, facilitating resource exploitation and rent extraction from local populations—further entrenching its insurgency. A coalition of approximately 1,500 Congolese, Burundian, and Wazalendo (local self-defense militias) had been deployed last week to defend Nyabibwe, but their efforts ultimately failed. The joint forces of M23 and the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) have presented a formidable challenge—one that external actors have been unable to counter effectively. In the wake of this, both Tanzania and Malawi announced their withdrawal from DRC operations under the banner of SADC interventions, a significant setback as M23’s territorial gains continue. The retreat of these foreign forces suggests a growing perception that the conflict is tilting in M23’s favor, marking an important boost for Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Multiple local political actors across eastern DRC have made pleas for citizens and youth to enroll in the fight against M23, which not only highlights the desperation of FARDC but also risks more civilian deaths.

The retreat of powers from the SADC signals a broader trend of international ambivalence, which may further embolden Kigali. Meanwhile, Kinshasa’s reliance on proxy forces appears increasingly ineffective, as Kagame refuses to engage in dialogue over M23’s actions. With a series of strategic losses accumulating, DRC may need to reconsider its counterinsurgency strategy. Recent reports have confirmed that government forces are utilizing Kavumu military airbase in South Kivu for aerial bombardments, signaling a continued reliance on military escalation over diplomatic engagement.

To add to the complex security environment, reports of mass mobilization of Wazalendo self-defense militias in Bukavu are a worrying development. While these militias represent a counterweight to M23’s advance, their lack of formal training and command structure raises concerns over human rights violations, civilian exploitation, and the broader militarization of the conflict. Recent civil society reports highlight widespread harassment by alleged Wazalendo elements, particularly in Shabunda territory, prompting calls for their withdrawal. The unchecked expansion of these groups risks exacerbating the crisis rather than containing it, especially as direct confrontations between M23 and Wazalendo escalate—heightening the risk of civilian casualties and forced displacement.

In an assertive move, M23, in coordination with the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), has intensified efforts to establish de facto governance over occupied territories in North Kivu. Last week, M23 convened a large assembly in a Goma stadium, where they formally introduced newly appointed administrators and called upon residents to resume economic and educational activities. Moreover, the group has formalized a shadow administration, appointing key officials, including a governor, vice-governors, and mayors—further cementing its grip on the region. These moves suggest that M23’s ambitions extend beyond territorial control, underscoring its political aspirations.This has been made possible by the creation of the AFC in 2023, a politico-military coalition comprised of M23 and other armed and political groups. This coalition has ultimately transformed local conflicts into a cohesive and systematic attempt to uproot existing systems of governance in the DRC. By entrenching itself within the political landscape, M23 appears to be maneuvering for legitimacy, potentially forcing Kinshasa to engage in negotiations on its terms.

Diplomatic relations in the region are at an all-time low, with Rwanda intensifying its rhetoric against the DRC. On February 7, Kigali claimed to have evidence of an imminent large-scale attack orchestrated by Kinshasa while simultaneously rejecting allegations that Rwanda is fueling instability across the border. Meanwhile, amid growing reports of systematic sexual violence perpetrated by M23—including a mass prison break in which 150 female detainees were assaulted and murdered—the Congolese government has submitted a motion demanding the establishment of a UN fact-finding mission. If approved, the mission is expected to deliver a comprehensive report on human rights abuses in eastern DRC by September 2025.