On January 27, Rwandan-backed rebels known as M23 captured Goma, the largest city in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), despite the presence of U.N. peacekeeping force, defense forces from other African countries, local militias, and European mercenaries hired to block its advance. Nearly 3,000 people were killed in M23’s advance into Goma, including the provincial military governor. Roughly 500,000 people fled their homes, adding to the more than two million people displaced by the long-standing conflict.

According to U.N. experts, the Rwandan army has at least 4,000 troops and advanced military weaponry in eastern DRC and is deeply involved in M23 operations. Rwanda said on January 26 that its military presence is necessary because of a serious threat to its security and territorial integrity. On the same day, Congolese forces began shelling into Rwandan territory.

After declaring a humanitarian cease-fire for February 4, M23 advanced into South Kivu province the next day, and has vowed to continue their offensive to DRC’s capital, Kinshasa. The escalating DRC-Rwanda conflict could explode into a region- or even continent-wide war, harkening back to the two Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) that left millions of people dead. The trajectory of the conflict matters not only for the people of eastern DRC caught in the cross-fire, but also for global supply chains reliant on the critical minerals in eastern DRC as well as for international law precedent.

USIP’s Cecily Brewer and Tom Sheehy explain what this conflict is about, why past efforts to broker a truce have failed, what’s needed to secure a durable cease-fire and how this conflict impacts U.S. interests.

What is the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo about?

Brewer: The conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa goes back decades, and perhaps has its roots in colonial boundaries that split ethnic groups across state lines. While DRC and Rwanda are at the heart of the current conflagration, actions and alliances with other neighboring countries including Uganda and Burundi as well as southern and eastern African regional responses are important factors in the current situation. The combustible landscape that has flared in this recent outbreak dates back at least to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath in which escaping Hutu genocidaires took refuge in eastern DRC. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, led the charge against the Hutu genocidaires in 1994 and he and other high-level officials frequently reference the security threat from Hutu militia groups based in eastern DRC, who are accused of cooperating with Congolese armed forces.

The M23 are an ethnic Tutsi, Congo-based militia group created in 2012 who take their named from a failed March 23, 2009 peace agreement. M23 rebels reportedly receive significant support from Rwanda and often operate alongside Rwandan defense forces in eastern DRC.

M23 also took Goma in 2012 leading to a major humanitarian catastrophe and allegations of war crimes. The international community reacted with cuts to Rwanda’s foreign assistance and coordinated rebuke. Congolese forces backed by a multinational force forced M23 out of DRC and it disbanded, only to re-surface in 2021 saying that previous promises had not been met, including to integrate fighters into Congo’s army. The Nairobi and Luanda processes set up in 2022 are complementary African-led process to address the underlying factors perpetuating the conflict.

In addition to the underlying ethnic, historic, psychological and security factors driving the conflict, eastern DRC is rich in gold and critical minerals used in cell phones, military equipment, and electric car batteries. For example, experts estimate that M23 appears to be making at least $800,000 a month from coltan taxation in just the city of Rubaya. That money is almost certainly then used to fund the rebellion.

In addition, Rwanda is likely profiting, as minerals mined in M23-controlled areas pass through it on their way to the global supply chain. Figures from the U.S. Geological Survey show that Rwanda’s coltan exports rose by 50 percent between 2022 and 2023, which experts say could not have all come from Rwanda, which Rwanda refutes.

Why did the cease-fire brokered in July breakdown?

Brewer: The current phase of the long-standing conflict begins with M23’s reemergence in 2021. By late 2023, M23 rebels had moved deeper into eastern DRC. With DRC’s December presidential elections looming and associated heated rhetoric, tensions between DRC and Rwanda were at a breaking point. In November 2023, the U.S. director of National Intelligence undertook a diplomatic mission to de-escalate tensions, eventually resulting in Presidents Paul Kagame and Felix Tshisekedi agreeing to specific measures toward de-escalation, including Rwanda pulling back its forces and offensive military equipment by January 1, 2024 and DRC grounding its drones. The U.S. government committed to monitor progress toward these commitments, including sharing information with Congolese and Rwandan officials on ground movements.

In early 2024, Angola took a leading role in the mediation, in keeping with its role in the Luanda Process. At the end of July, Angola announced a long-term cease-fire between DRC and Rwanda. Four months later, foreign ministers approved a concept of operations for Rwandan troops to disengage from Congolese territory, with Angolan officials chairing a joint DRC-Rwanda committee to monitor implementation. But when Kagame pulled out of a December 2024 summit hosted by Angolan President João Lourenço, the mediation effort began to unravel. Kenya’s president, William Ruto, has announced that Kagame and Tshisekedi will attend a summit of southern and eastern Africa leaders in Tanzania February 7-8, but it remains to be seen if either DRC or Rwanda commit to discussing a cease-fire, or even show up. With DRC forces on their backfoot, Rwanda may be calculating that it can pursue additional gains to force negotiations on its own terms.

What is needed to secure another cease-fire and make it more durable?

Brewer: On one hand, that U.S. and Angola mediation produced a cease-fire in mid-2024 was remarkable. The U.S.-established intelligence fusion cell and Angolan-chaired joint DRC-Rwanda committee that monitored the parties’ implementation of their commitments to the agreement were innovative, robust monitoring efforts that drew on intelligence tools and established concrete forums to discuss implementation (and lack thereof) with the parties.

On the other hand, the cease-fire agreement appears to have lacked teeth, or credible and robust costs aimed to deter a party from violating its terms. Even the perfect monitoring mission cannot prevent violations of an agreement if parties are not willing to mitigate their actions for fear of being exposed and if there is not sufficient cost tied to violations.

This lesson echoes that of the OSCE-mandated Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (2014-2022), which served as the “eyes and ears of the international community on the ground in Ukraine,” but was not designed to deter Russian aggression with force. In the DRC case, in addition to and separate from the monitoring effort, Tshisekedi organized a multi-party armed deterrence force to dissuade M23 from taking Goma and other territory, but in the end it wasn’t enough.

In addition, the cease-fire was between the DRC and Rwanda and did not include M23 or other similar proxy groups supported by these governments, which is the writ of the stalled Nairobi Process. As studies on mediating ends to proxy wars indicate, even if a patron agrees to end support for its proxy, that proxy force may choose to continue fighting if its motivations for fighting are not addressed.

Durable resolution of these conflicts requires mediation that addresses the motivations of both patrons and proxies; and agreements backed by strong guarantees.

Durable resolution of these conflicts requires mediation that addresses the motivations of both patrons and proxies; and agreements backed by strong guarantees. While states often balk at the prospect of elevating proxy militia groups by including them in state-to-state talks, mediators and parties can find ways to engage proxy groups quietly or via parallel processes. The costs of exclusion have been borne out time and again.

To broker a durable peace, any future mediation effort and cease-fire agreement or political agreements should include not only DRC and Rwanda, but also a parallel process to address the motivations of the proxy groups they support. Given the history of cease-fire violations in the region, any future effort should also build in credible and robust deterrents to violating the agreement, potentially including sanctions, cuts in foreign investment or assistance, and/or international accountability measures.

How does this crisis impact U.S. interests?

Sheehy: The U.S. has a humanitarian interest in seeing the human suffering in the eastern DRC end. In the last 25 years, over five million Congolese lives have been lost due to violent conflict. Most of this suffering has been in eastern DRC. Violence often escalates, and this is a region that saw a genocide a few decades ago.

The DRC possesses abundant natural resources, including many critical minerals important to U.S. economic and national security whose demand will continue to spike. This includes coltan, copper, tin, and lithium needed for batteries, consumer electronics and defense production. The DRC is the world’s largest producer of cobalt, by far.

A USIP senior study group report details the high importance of African critical minerals to the United States. And the DRC is central to African critical minerals. That’s why Chinese mining companies have been investing in DRC for decades. According to the International Energy Agency, the DRC and China accounted for about 70 percent and 60 percent of global production of cobalt and rare earth minerals, respectively, in 2019. By one count, 15 of 19 active mines in the DRC are operated by China-related entities. Taking these two data points together indicates that China holds incredible market power, which both the DRC government and U.S. government have been working to diversify.

Tragically, the conflict in eastern DRC is being fueled by the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including critical minerals.

Tragically, the conflict in eastern DRC is being fueled by the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including critical minerals. This has been occurring for decades and embodies the “resource curse.” Instead of natural resources fueling development, they fuel conflict, as in this case, with the M23 and others living off extracted natural resources.

The U.S. has an interest in working with the DRC to break this cycle and successfully develop its critical minerals. This would benefit the DRC and the United States. With its immense potential, U.S. and allied mining companies are increasingly interested in the DRC. The U.S. has promoted the Lobito Corridor project largely to support these companies to access Congolese and Zambian critical minerals. And the Congolese government is actively seeking U.S. mining investment.

But this conflict is a deterrent. While the many of the most promising mining opportunities are distant from the conflict zone, any turmoil within country concerns U.S. investors deciding whether to put hundreds of millions of dollars or more in physical investment at risk.