Houthis Expand Ties Beyond Iran’s Axis

Houthis Expand Ties Beyond Iran’s Axis

The Houthi movement (Ansarallah) in Yemen is diversifying its relationships beyond Iran and other Axis of Resistance partners, increasing its operational autonomy.

Russia is expanding strategic ties to the Houthis as leverage against U.S.-led military support for Ukraine, while trying to avoid rupturing its established regional relationships.

The Houthis have built ties to the al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia in order to compound the threat the Yemeni group poses to global shipping chokepoints.

Houthi procurement networks have obtained key technology from China, even as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping represent a threat to China’s trade with Europe.

Since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the Houthi movement has emerged as among the most active and potent members of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and defying efforts by a U.S.-led coalition to destroy the movement’s arsenal. Yet, regional experts have always assessed the Houthis as eager to accept advice and weapons shipments from Iran while at the same time determining their own policies and resisting direction from Tehran. Unlike other members of the Axis, the Houthis swear fealty to their own leadership, and not to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and they have their own regional ambitions separate and distinct from Iran. Diversifying their regional and global partnerships helps reduce the Houthis’ dependence on Tehran.

The Houthis’ rising profile has made the group an attractive partner for regional and global actors seeking to overturn a political, security, and economic order they see as dominated by the United States and its allies. Russia, in particular, is expanding its relations with the Houthis, viewing the group as a useful instrument for developing leverage against the United States and its European allies. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea are a far greater threat to the European and U.S. economies than to that of Russia, most of whose trade is conducted overland.

In addition, Russia has become dependent, to some extent, on Iranian supplies of armed drones for use against Ukraine. U.S. officials this month confirmed Iran has shipped short-range ballistic missiles to the Russian military as well, for use against Ukrainian frontline positions. Russia’s relationship with and support for the Houthis, a key Iranian ally, is one means among many by which Moscow can ensure that Tehran remains responsive to the Kremlin’s request for additional weapons supplies.

However, the Houthis are also adversaries of key regional countries—particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—that the Kremlin views as partners on many issues, including global oil production policy. Moscow has also sought to avoid breaking ties with Israel, in part to deter the Israelis from providing advanced air and rocket defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, to Ukraine. Although they view the Houthis as increasingly helpful to their global objectives, Russian leaders have had to calibrate their relations with the group in order not to cause a rift with Russia’s other regional partners.

Russia’s need to avoid breaking with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia likely accounts for its reported decision to cancel, at the last minute, a delivery of missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in late July. Russia reportedly had agreed to the shipment to retaliate against Washington’s decision to ease restrictions on Ukraine’s use of American-supplied long-range artillery to strike targets inside the Russian Federation. Russia’s withdrawal from the sale came amid pressure from Saudi as well as U.S. officials who threatened the Kremlin with significant consequences if it went forward with the delivery, according to multiple CNN sources. The Saudis, who were attacked repeatedly by Houthi missile and armed drone attacks for years before the U.S. helped to negotiate a fragile truce in 2022, reportedly took the lead in warning Russia against arming the Houthis, upon learning of the plans, the sources said.

However, the aborted weapons shipment did not represent a decision by Russian leaders to shun the Houthis entirely, or to support Western efforts to compel the group to de-escalate in the Red Sea. According to a range of sources, Russia instead deployed military personnel to Yemen to help advise the Houthis over a three-day period in late July. U.S. intelligence reportedly observed large Russian ships make an unusual stop in the southern Red Sea, where it offloaded Russian personnel to a Houthi boat that ferried the Russians to Yemen. U.S. officials reportedly are concerned Russian President Vladimir Putin might yet decide to provide arms to the Houthis, potentially as a way to dissuade the U.S. from acceding to Ukraine’s request to be allowed to strike even deeper into Russian territory. Global experts argue that Russia’s expanding support for the Houthis is consistent with the recent pattern of Moscow’s policies in the region, including its decision in 2015 to intervene militarily in Syria to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime; its support for eastern Libya strongman General Khalifa Haftar; and its permission for the former “Wagner Group” Russian private military company to aid the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces fighting the Sudan Armed Forces since mid-2023.

Beyond what U.S. officials consider a troublesome expansion of relations with Moscow, the Houthis also appear to have developed ties to the al-Shabaab militant organization. The group, an al-Qaeda affiliate, still holds territory in Somalia and continues to both fight Somalia’s government and carry out terrorist attacks there and in other parts of East Africa. The scope of the Houthis’ assistance to al-Shabaab is not entirely clear: some reports indicate the group has re-exported some of the Iranian weapons it received to the group. One expert, Guled Ahmed, a Horn of Africa scholar at the Middle East Institute, said the Houthis sent three engineers to al-Shabaab fighters in southern Somalia to help them build sophisticated weapons and bombs. Some senior U.S. defense officials have told journalists the cooperation with the Houthis might enable al-Shabaab to further reverse the territorial gains the Somali National Army has made against the group over the last two years. The U.S. officials assess the Houthis view collaboration with the Somali terrorists as serving the Houthis’ goals to appear to pose an ever- greater threat to U.S. and British efforts to secure the Red Sea from attacks.

The Houthis also appear to be exploiting China’s cooperation with Russia and countries in the Global South to undermine U.S.-led dominance of the global rules-based order. China is not known to be advising or arming the Houthis, but it has apparently turned a blind eye to Houthi efforts to procure weapons-related technology in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nor has China helped U.S.-led maritime security operations to secure the Red Sea from Houthi attacks – which threaten the main route by which China’s exports reach Europe. China has fielded warships off the Yemen coast, but they have refused to answer distress calls from ships struck by Houthi missiles and drones, instead deferring entirely to the U.S.-led coalition to help stricken ships and their crews.

U.S. officials have sanctioned several individuals and entities for helping the Houthis procure key weapons-related technology in the PRC – appearing to confirm that the U.S. government has obtained precise intelligence on Houthi-related transactions there. In mid-June, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a PRC-based Houthi-affiliated individual and his China-based company, Guangzhou Tasneem Trading Company Limited, as terrorist entities for key roles in procuring in China materials that enable Houthi forces to manufacture advanced conventional weapons inside Yemen. Among other Houthi operations in China, the group has, according to the Treasury Department, coordinated with the PRC-based firm Ningbo Beilun Saige Machine Co., Ltd. to procure materials critical for manufacturing armed drones and other weapons. Similarly, according to Treasury, Houthi-affiliated individuals have worked through Dongguan Yuze Machining Tools Company Limited to source tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of equipment for their domestic weapons production efforts. China’s authoritarian government is widely assessed as able and willing to dismantle Houthi technology procurement activities in China if Beijing had assessed the Houthi activities as a threat to core Chinese interests.